When we are thinking about the influence which the major religious beliefs impose on the normative approach which human has taken towards the nature, usually we consider the mythology of geneses in each religion and we try to trace the historical human attitude to them. But in fact, at least in the Abrahamic religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the eschatological views have the same importance as geneses. In some religions like Islam, the former is even more important than the latter; so that a person not believing in the set of the genesis mythology may be considered a Muslim more easily than a person not believing in the eschatological mythology.
Additionally it means, if we should moderate the religious interpretations in order to correct our attitude to the environmental crises, we should be aware of the role of the eschatological beliefs and try to moderate them or at least to treat the misunderstandings traditionally having been raised by them.
In this paper, after a brief introduction, I will discuss on eschatological parts of four major western religions: Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism (an Iranian belief which is followed by the Indian Parsis and has also some followers in Iran) and the relationship between them and the traditional attitude to the natural environment.
Initially I would like to mention that this analysis as well as the so-called relationship between mythology of geneses and the environmental ethics, is merely hypothetical. In fact the followers of the mentioned religions are influenced by direct religious commandments rather than philosophical understanding of mythology. It’s a very important difference between the religious approaches of Abrahamic traditions and Dharmic traditions.
Another difference between them which is important to be reminded is that although eschatology in the Dharmic religions has rather a philosophic role, in Abrahamic traditions, it maintains the same part in moral discipline as the notion of “Moksa” in Dharmic religions.
Additionally I should clarify one point: although the main scope of this paper is the Abrahamic religions, I shall pay equal attention to the Zoroastrianism which philologically has derived from a Dharmic family. I have two supporting reasons: first, morphologically Zoroastrianism display the same elements of Abrahamic traditions so that according to Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance, we should count that religion among the latter camp; second, geographically this religion, at the time of its flourishing, took location on the boundary between Abrahamic and Dharmic traditions. Therefore it’s natural to concern the mutual influences of them on each other. Even it’s widely believed by some secular scholars that the idea of eschatology is borrowed by Abrahamic nations from Zoroastrianism around the sixth century BC.
1. Introduction: How eschatological view is important with this respect
In the Encyclopedia of Wikipedia, the term eschatology is defined as follows: “Eschatology (from the Greek, Eschatos meaning "last" + -logy) is a part of theology and philosophy concerned with the final events in the history of the world, or the ultimate destiny of humanity, commonly referred to as the end of the world.”
Since it is a part of theology, as the other parts of theology, it reveals the divine attributes. In this case these attributes will be revealed through God’s plan and role in a universal event which is the End of the World.
In order to analyze the relationship between these attributes and the religious approaches to the nature, two points should be remarked on:
a) God as the source of wisdom: unlike Greek, Egyptian and Hindu-Puranic gods, God in the Abrahamic religions is perfect. As an aspect of this perfection, He is omniscient. Again Abrahamic God, like Greek, Egyptian and Hindu-Puranic gods and unlike Vedantic Brahman and Neo-Platonic “One”, is a self- consciously active God: He is willfully omnipotent. It is an old argument in the Abrahamic religions which nowadays is known rather through a Cartesian demonstration that a perfect willing omnipotent omniscient entity should be good-willing. In this point the divine wisdom comes to the scene. Wisdom on one hand is associated with the beginning and on the other hand with the end. At this point this religious concept shows similarity to the Aristotelian teleology. In fact wisdom is a road which leads the divine good-will from the beginnings to the ends.
Since the Abrahamic traditions have been further influenced widely by the Neo-Platonic tendencies of thought (the best examples are given in the case of Philo Alexandrian the founder of the Jewish philosophy and Saint Augustine who is known as the philosophical founder of the Catholic Church), the Abrahamic theologies appearing after the second century CE, gradually tried to reconcile the active Biblical God with the passive Neo-Platonic “One”. In this process, the divine good-will shifted from a wildly variously accidental voluntariness to a rationally constantly essential wisdom. In this system, the divine good-will consists of granting to the divine principles (which representing the Platonic Ideas and the divine attributes at the same time, form the origin of all entities and maintain the passive aspect of divinity) whatever they deserve temporally (this temporal deserved grant, maintaining the active aspect of divinity, represents the Aristotelian End which is in principle prior to all other beginnings.) As if, the end is nothing but the unfolded beginning. Naturally the end of the world is the moment on which the divine good-will will manifest the ultimate state which is deserved essentially by the nature. Here we can see how the eschatological views can either support or challenge the concept of intrinsic value of the nature which is a crucial point in Deep Ecology. In other words, in Abrahamic traditions, whatever god finally plans for the nature is nothing but the manifestation of the intrinsic value of the nature. This point is of course of an ontological nature rather than an ethical point of view as Ecosophism insists on its own metaphysical nature rather than ethical. Thus, the eschatological view of each religion reveals its attitude towards the intrinsic value of the nature even possibly having been denied.
b) God as the source of morality: Basically we can divide the theistic traditions into two camps: 1) ethics-oriented traditions; 2) nature-oriented traditions. Although it’s not possible to make a sharp distinction between these two class and always we can find some elements of both sects in every tradition, the main criteria is the answer to this question: are the divine characters, at least as whole, representing or supporting or stating a consistent set of ethical principles or not? As a pair of classic examples, the ancient Greek Pantheon’s answer to this question is negative therefore they belong to the second camp while the ancient Egyptian Enneads’ answer is positive and it belongs to the first camp. In the history of Hinduism, the Puranic and further Epical attempts to distinguish the Devas from the Asuras is the final triumph of the ethical orientation over the other one.
It may be said that the Abrahamic traditions belong to the first camp, although in the first stages of the Hebrew theology which are reflected in the first five books of the Old Testament, God seems like a wild furious egoist tribal deity which gradually is going to become civilized as ultimately is shown in Christianity. Even in the former stage, God represents the elements of an individualistic moral system including honesty, loyalty and piety though lacking mercifulness and the other civil norms.
At least in the further stages of Judo-Christian tradition as well as Islam, God’s perfection leads believers to consider God as the source of morality, although a fundamental doubt always has a great role in their view: are the ethical principles reasonable or not? We can find in all Abrahamic traditions some supporters for both possible answers to this question: in Christianity, the positive answer is supported by Tomes while the negative answer is supported by Anselm. In Islam the former is supported by the “Mo`tazeli” sect, while the latter by the “Ash`ari” sect. in the Judaism the book of Job is famous for reflecting this challenge.
According to the former opinion, the ethical principles are accessible through reason considering the intrinsic value of objects and actions, but still, due to imperfection of human reason, we need the perfect wisdom of God to reveal to us surely the objects of moral observation which very God observes in the level of divinity.
According to the latter opinion the normative aspect of religion cannot be derived from any rational process and the objects and the actions are ethically neutral. Consequently, we have to do whatever God orders only for the sake of the obligation which has root in His will. If in the former camp there is any possibility for arriving at normative principles through pure human attempt, in the latter camp, in order to be moral, we completely depends on God, although due to the defects of linguistically instrumental aspects of the divine revelation which is a human defect imposed on this business, again there appear some room for reasoning. This rational process takes place in the field of interpretation.
In both camps; the beginning, manner and goal of morality, whether essentially or accidentally, consist of one notion: Godlikeness; in the former camp, obviously, in the terms of wisdom and good-will, but in the latter one the case is a bit complicated. All Abrahamic religions have a common axiom: God has created man similar to Himself (although I should exclude Zoroastrianism because this religion is not so serious about this belief) According to this axiom the same moral principles which are applicable to God are applicable, at least in principle if not in fact, to man. Therefore, even for the second camp the main moral objective is Godlikeness although according to them the nature of God can be revealed only through His own words. I am not sure how much this concept may be comparable with the meaning of Brahmacarya in Indian philosophy.
However that means, ethically, our behavior to the nature, at least in principle, should follow the same attitude which God has towards the nature and his attitude will got completely manifested at the “end of the world.” Thus, the eschatological view has capacity for being religiously considered as a pattern for the man’s ethical attitude to the nature.
2. Common elements of eschatology in the Abrahamic religions
a) Last judgment: The essential core and purpose of the Abrahamic eschatology is the concept of “Last Judgment” in which every human being will be judged by God (or Jesus in Christianity) and will receive reward or punishment according to his good or bad behavior.
This last judgment usually deserves three events as precondition: “destruction of the natural world”, “final victory of God” and “resurrection of dead.” Among these three, the second one some times is considered the same in nature as the very last judgment although it reveals the hidden dualistic elements of those Abrahamic sects which emphasize on that.
The first event, destruction of the natural world, is the most relevant one among them to our current concern. Here, there is one important question which can determine the direction of our investigation: who or what is the responsible or agent of this predicted destruction?
According to orthodox Christianity, that’s planned by God: “In my vision, when he (an angel of God’s) broke the sixth seal, there was a violent earthquake and the sun went as black as coarse sackcloth; the moon turned red as blood all over, and the stars of the sky fell onto the earth like figs dropping from a fig tree when a high wind shakes it; the sky disappeared like a scroll rolling up and all the mountains and islands were shaken from their places.” (The New Jerusalem Bible; New Testament; Book of Revelation: 6: 12-14) “Then I heard a loud voice from the sanctuary calling to the seven angels, 'Go, and empty the seven bowls of God's anger over the earth.'” (Ibid; 16:1)
The same view is taken in Islamic sources: “When the sun is folded up; When the stars fall, losing their luster; When the mountains vanish; When the she-camels, ten months with young, are left untended; When the wild beasts are herded together When the oceans boil over with a swell; When the souls are sorted out.” (Koran; 81: 1-7)
In opposition, the final destruction of the world, in Zoroastrian view is operated by the Evil Principle of the universe, namely “Angraminu.” In this religion, the natural world is considered as the field, the instrument ant the scope of a fundamental battle between God and the Evil Principle. Originally God has created the nature perfectly and all defect and destructions in the nature has been later caused by the Evil principle. It’s remarkable that this evil influence includes the defects which deserve to be temporally recovered by the regulation of the ecosystem. In their view, as we will see later, there is no circulation of ecosystem in the ideal natural world. Therefore, God and man are supposed to try to save the nature alike and the final destruction of the nature is the last and greatest attempt of the Evil principle in the final battle which will be led to the final victory of God.
The Gnostic Christianity which used to dominate the Christian thought from the first century till the fifth century, although is said to be influenced basically by Zoroastrianism, believes that the creation of the natural world, as a resultant of a mistake, has been done by an ignorant member of the Pantheon and this mistake, fortunately, will be corrected at the end of the world through the complete destruction of the nature. Therefore, the divine will and likewise enlightened people are to destroy the world: God in a macrocosmic level at the end of the world and man in the daily religiously prescribed penance and self mortification which destroy the body as man’s medium with the material nature.
b) Renewal of the creation: In all Abrahamic religions, the process of the Last Judgment which is sometimes considered identical with the Final Victory of God is accompanied with the process of renewal of the creation; as if divine justice may not take place completely in the present nature and there is no choice other than a new creation.
Usually there occur two questions which can be related to our concern: i) Is the new creation material? ii) What is the nature of this new creation and in which way this new creation is more ideal than the present world? Apparently, the Abrahamic religions don’t agree on answering these questions:
i) According to the majority of Muslims, Orthodox Christianity and Zoroastrianism, the new creation is again material. For example it’s written in the New Testament: “Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth; the first heaven and the first earth had disappeared now, and there was no longer any sea.” (The New Jerusalem Bible; New Testament; Book of Revelation: 21: 1)
In opposition, according to Gnostic Christianity and a minority of the Shiite Muslims, namely “Shaikhiye”, this new world is absolutely spiritual and not material. Indeed, they cannot maintain any point in the field of our interest, because according to them, the nature has no intrinsic value; the nature is in its essence defective and unjust so that no justice and morality can take form in the nature. According to Gnostics, matter is the same as the Devil and no moral issue may have sense in the material world unless from a Theo-centric or an anthropocentric point of view which can reflect the divine spark in the “darkness of the nature.”
ii) Investigating the nature and the function of this new creation, I would like not to mention the Abrahamic religions which negatively deny the value of nature as are explained above. According to the other sects, the nature and function of this new creation is the most perfect impossible form of matter which grounds the divine justice and peace. Two items are common with this respect:
1) In this new creation there is no provision for any harm to any non-human living being. Human being is excluded from this statement otherwise the divine justice could not occur. Therefore in the ideal world, dynamic circulation of ecosystem will be replaced with some static idealist forms, because all kinds of ecosystem deserve some levels of violence; for example, in Zoroastrianism, the ideal society gradually will go towards vegetarianism and further the living beings will be fed only with music so that this feature described in the Zoroastrian scripture can be realized: “… so that they may restore the world, which will (thenceforth) never grow old and never die, never decaying and never rotting, ever living and ever increasing, and master of its wish, when the dead will rise, when life and immortality will come, and the world will be restored at its wish.” (Zamyadyasht: 11) As another example, even the bloody sacrifice which includes a kind of violence will be nonsense in the Christian new world: “I could not see any temple in the city since the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb were themselves the temple.” (The New Jerusalem Bible; New Testament; Book of Revelation: 21: 22)
2) In order to establish perfect divine justice, the nature should show the most perfect level of unity with human being. A common analysis of possibility of injustice in the present world usually arrives at a conclusion mentioning a kind of separation between man and the world as the responsible of injustice and sin, although this separation is only an appearance arisen by the veil of ignorance, otherwise, man should realize that he is from the same origin as the nature and one entity (God) is currently manifesting in both man and nature. This entity has two aspects: freedom and obligation. The former is manifested in human and the latter in the nature, but as they are to aspects of one entity and they are ultimately one, they mutually respond and reflect each other. This reflection is hidden in the present world while in the ideal world they respond to each other obviously. It means the ideal nature will function with the respect to every body according to his dispositional characteristics consisting of his virtues and vices. That will be the ultimate manifestation of unity of man and the nature and will provide an undefeatable kind of justice. So, the nature of the ideal world (which as I mentioned, currently is the hidden nature of the present world) is the same as the moral character of the man. I thing the best indication of this picture may be found in a phrase of the Koran: “When the earth is shaken to her (utmost) convulsion, and the earth throws up her burdens (from within), and man cries (distressed): 'What is the matter with her?' On that Day will she declare her tidings; for that thy Lord will have given her inspiration. On that Day will men proceed in companies sorted out, to be shown the deeds that they (had done). Then shall anyone who has done an atom's weight of good, see it! And anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see it.” (Koran: 99: 1-8)
I would like to express the function of this transcended world as “the manifestation of the moral nature of creation.” Now we are able to build the framework of “Environmental Ethics” on the basis of the “moral nature of the environment.”
This fact that the nature in its essence is the same as the moral character of the man has got some proof in the religious historicity of the Abrahamic traditions while we see how the sins having be committed by the man, have resulted in the natural disasters like Noah’s flood, a story which is believed by all Abrahamic traditions.
A most indicative example is a story which is well-believed in Islamic historicity and I think this story has roots in Judo-Christian tradition. The Muslim historians of literature, searching for the origin of the poetry, claim the first poetic piece was issued by Adam, the first man, when his son, Cain, had killed the other son of Adam, Abel (that was the first sin done on the earth.) It’s told that he used to mourn reciting this verse:
“The lands have changed along with whatever is on them;
“And the face of the earth is dusty and ugly.”
Then they insist that this piece was a realistic report rather than a poetic expression, because before that murder the whole water of the world was sweet and all the trees were fruitful. They lost their qualities due to that crime as if the earth was shaken by the first crime on its surface.
c) Redeemer: Usually the renewal of the creation is imagined, either prior or posterior to prevalence of a redeeming figure (“Messiah/Christ” in the Judo-Christian tradition, “Mahdi” in Islam and “Sushiant” in Zoroastrianism.) With respect to this concept, I would like to remark two points: 1) necessity of the redeemer; 2) function of the redeemer:
1) Necessity of the redeemer:
There are several traditional arguments for necessity of prevalence of the redeemer in order to build the ideal world but one of them seems too relevant to our concern: since the nature of the environment is ultimately moral, and the nature and the man mutually influence and reflect each other, a moral uncorrected defect of man, can start a helpless regressive circle in which the nature grounds man’s corruption and man causes the nature’s decay. According to the Christian faith, this starting sin was committed in the Garden of Aden by Adam and Eve. It’s the same sin which Saint Augustine has named the “natural sin.” This first sin has caused the Garden of Aden (which some times is interpreted as a manifested stage of the original nature of the creation), not to be able to stand with the presence of them so that finally they were exiled to a less manifested level of the creation: our present environment. Even it’s interesting to know their sin (eating the forbidden fruit) some times is interpreted as attaining dualistic subject-object-ship cognition of the environment which is a precondition for any moral judgment in opposition to virtuous intuitive action: “Then the snake said to the woman, ‘No! You will not die! God knows in fact that the day you eat it your eyes will be opened and you will be like gods, knowing good from evil.’” (The New Jerusalem Bible; Old Testament; Genesis: 3: 4, 5) “… when they tasted of the tree, their shame became manifest to them…” (Koran: 7: 22) In this way, “shame” may be understood as moral alienation.
In order to help that mentioned regressive circle, two ways look possible: to damage the whole circle destroying at least one party of this pair; or to add a third element to break the regress. The first way is the same which according to the Bible, God once applied to man through the Great Flood but afterwards, he regretted and swore not to apply it later on: “God smelt the pleasing smell and said to himself, ‘Never again will I curse the earth because of human beings, because their heart contrives evil from their infancy. Never again will I strike down every living thing as I have done. As long as earth endures: seed-time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night will never cease.’” (The New Jerusalem Bible; Old Testament; Genesis: 8: 21, 22) “God spoke as follows to Noah and his sons: ‘I am now establishing my covenant with you and with your descendants to come, and with every living creature that was with you: birds, cattle and every wild animal with you; everything that came out of the ark, every living thing on earth. And I shall maintain my covenant with you: that never again shall all living things be destroyed by the waters of a flood, nor shall there ever again be a flood to devastate the earth. And this’, God said, ‘is the sign of the covenant which I now make between myself and you and every living creature with you for all ages to come: I now set my bow in the clouds and it will be the sign of the covenant between me and the earth. When I gather the clouds over the earth and the bow appears in the clouds, I shall recall the covenant between myself and you and every living creature, in a word all living things, and never again will the waters become a flood to destroy all living things. When the bow is in the clouds I shall see it and call to mind the eternal covenant between God and every living creature on earth, that is, all living things. That’, God told Noah, ‘is the sign of the covenant I have established between myself and all living things on earth.’” (Ibid; 9: 8-17)
The second way is to add a third element which is known as “redeemer”: “For this is how God loved the world: he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life.” (The New Jerusalem Bible; New Testament; John: 3: 16) That’s why in Rabbinic Judaism it’s said that the Messiah will come in an extremely good situation or an extremely bad situation: “Rabbi Johanan also said: The son of David will come only in a generation that is either altogether righteous or altogether wicked” (Talmud Sanhedrin 98a); although the first possibility traditionally is never hoped. In the Shiite Islamic view, the Mahdi will come to fill the world with justice since it has been filled with injustice and injury.
2) Function of the redeemer:
How will the redeemer break that regressive circle? In the early Judaism, the redeemer was supposed to come as a fully dominating ruler to reestablish David’s Kingdom, Solomon’s Temple and its sacrificial rituals. According to them the nature receives the divine bless trough the man, man through the Jews tribes, the Jews through their priests and the priests through the highest priest who is the only one being authorized to pass the main holy sacrifice in the most sacred part of Solomon’s Temple. In fact, this ritual and the rules which the Jews people are ordered to observe on behalf of the whole humanity and secondly of the whole creation, is to fulfill the conditions of a covenant between God and them according to which God has undertaken to give bless to the creation: “So now, if you are really prepared to obey me and keep my covenant, you, out of all peoples, shall be my personal possession, for the whole world is mine. For me you shall be a kingdom of priests, a holy nation.” (The New Jerusalem Bible; Old Testament; Exodus: 19: 5, 6) It means the Messiah’s function, some how though secondarily, is to save the nature. The same role in Shiite Islam is ascribed to the “Hojjat” which usually is identified with the coming redeemer, when they assert that the world cannot sustain even one moment without the spiritual function of the Hojjat.
Here I think it’s not irrelevant if we notice how it is easy to realize the charges like Lynn White’s are unfair. The human domination which is mentioned in the Bible and is the pretext to charge should be understood in two ways: first, a descriptive statement about the ultimate superiority of human abilities over the other species which as is descriptive, cannot have at least a direct indication to any moral norm; and second, a prescriptive statement due to the position of human in the hierarchy of distribution of divine bless. The latter is the moral duty which the Messiah of the early Judaism is to come to fulfill.
In the firs century, while the Jews were waiting for the Messiah to come as a king and defeat the Roman Empire, the Christian alleged that he had already come not to reestablish the kingdom of David in Jerusalem but to establish the Kingdom of God in the hearts of human being, not as a political kingdom but as the Kingdom of the Heaven, not to make the sacrificial smoke ascend but to transcend the man and the nature towards a unity in God, a process which had started by the first coming of the Christ and was supposed to be completed by his second coming at the end of the world.
After this proclaim, the Abrahamic traditions thought of this fact that the renewal of the nature might begin from the inner side of man rather than the outer world. It led them to the ideal unity between man and the nature which should manifest in the Messianic era through the Messianic function.
The common Christian interpretation of the Christ’s function refers to the same fact, while they say the Christ has come to establish “love” as a new covenant instead of the old covenant which was consisting of “Moses’ Low”: an intuitive desire for unity instead of an arguemental judgment based on separation.
d) Spiritual application of eschatology: I spoke of “God-likeness” as a meta-ethical principle of the Abrahamic traditions, and I promised that the plan which God has for the end of the world can reveal the essentially divine attitude to the nature. This consideration can shift that meta-ethical principle to an ethical realm so that a man, who wants to be moral and accordingly God-like, must take the same attitude to the nature as God has according to His own nature and the nature of the nature.
Before continuing this line I would like to mention a spiritual application of these premises which can help this shift to take place more easily in fact. This point would be felt to be important especially if one questions relevance of this argument with the present environment and its ethics: one may say you speak about the ideal world and its properties while we concern the present nature and its to-day crises.
Here, I would like to mention a very popular story which has been related by Rabbinic Judaism:
Rabbi Joshua bin Levi found the Messiah at the entrance of the city and asked him: “When wilt thou come Master?” The Messiah answered: “To-day.” Afterwards, Rabbi Joshua met Elijah (another spiritual figure) and as the Messiah hadn’t come that day the Rabbi complained to him: “He (the Messiah) spoke falsely to me stating that he would come today, but has not.” Elijah answered him: “This is what he said to thee: ‘To-day’, if you would hear his voice.” (See: Talmud Sanhedrin 98a)
This phrase and the like usually are interpreted through two possible contexts. One of them refers to the universal presence of the redeemer which will be manifested whenever his function can be understood by the man. This opinion is taken also by some Shiite Muslim sects and the Muslim Sufism especially when they speak of the “Qotb” (literary: pole.)
The second context refers to another concept which is expressed in Islam by a pair of terms: “universal eschatology” and “personal eschatology”. These two should be study under the light of the concepts of macro-cosmos and micro-cosmos. The former term indicates a chain of events which are supposed to happen at the end of the world as macro-cosmos but the latter means the same state happening in a man as a micro-cosmos. While one has to wait for a certain time to face the universal eschatological events, the personal eschaton may happen every time. It not only may happen but should be realized through spiritual development. In this state, man sees the present nature in union with him and in its manifested essence which corresponds to the moral nature of man. There are so many reports in Islamic spiritual culture about the saints who see the world as if they are in the eschatological era. Two thousand years ago they used to claim that the End is close; it was really close but only to them: the people who could realize the ultimately moral essence of the world through participating in God’s wisdom: “In due course John the Baptist appeared. He proclaimed this message in the desert of Judea: ‘Repent, for the kingdom of Heaven is close at hand.’ This was the man spoken of by the prophet Isaiah when he said: ‘a voice of one that cries in the desert: 'Prepare a way for the Lord, make his paths straight.'’” (The New Jerusalem Bible; New Testament; Mathew: 3: 1-3) Those people may be called the awaken men due to an Islamic opinion stating: “the present world is a dream of which the interpretation will be realized in the eschatological ideal world.” In this sense, the environmental dilemma will be simply expressed as follows: “how to avoid bad dreams?”
3. Conclusion
What should we do in order to avoid bad dreams? If you consulate a physician, he will suggest you to change your mental and physiological routines. A Jungian psychologist recommends you to face the dreams and try to realize your sub-consciousness through them and resolve your psychic complexes through this self-realization and then the bad dreams will be curbed automatically. An occultist but, advises you to correct your personality, mentality and action, not only to avoid the bad dreams but also to avoid the bad events which are going to happen to you as the interpretation of those dreams. Any way, your best friend or your spouse, will attempt to relieve you asking you not to mind of them and let them be forgotten. The religious approach to the environmental crises, of course is not like the first one and the last one.
Before continuing this discussion, I would like to have what ever we arrived at in this paper reviewed briefly once more:
1) God is the source of the wisdom through which He grants every thing whatever it deserves in its nature.
2) God is the source of morality, therefore God-likeness is the ultimate goal of morality and however God does or will deal to the nature should be a moral example for the man.
3) God will destroy and renew the nature, partially through a redeemer, at the end of the word in order to establish a complete justice and manifest the ultimate nature of his creation.
4) The following chart reveals the deferent views on some aspects of eschatology:
Cause of World Destruction
Value of World Destruction
The Nature of the Ideal World
Orthodox Sects
Divine Wisdom and Circular Regress
Partially Righteous
Material
Zoroastrianism
Evil Principle
Unrighteous
Material
Gnostic Christianity
Divine Wisdom
Absolutely Righteous
Immaterial
5) In the ideal world there is no harm for any non-human living being.
6) The ecosystem is an unjust but wise divine temporal treatment for some defects of the present world which will disappear in the ideal world.
7) The ultimate nature of the ideal world is moral. It indicates that the ultimate nature of the present world is also moral because the end is whatever is essentially deserved by the beginning. In fact the world is fed with the human morality.
8) Since the man and the nature mutually reflect each other, the moral decay of the man starts a helpless regressive circle in which the man and the nature mutually worsen each other. This circle finally will lead or will be responded by the Final Destruction of the World.
9) In order to break this circle, there needs a Redeemer who should come to the world to transcend the man and the nature. He will unite the man and the nature in God and will reveal their essential union. This process will start from the part of the man.
10) Every body, every time, should try to realize the eschatological era and its properties in himself, as if his relationship with the nature is the same ultimate moral unity. This realization is a result of participation in the divine wisdom and God-likeness.
As a conclusion, what we should do in order to save the nature is to save our own souls. The followers of the Abrahamic religions, according to the previous lines, transcend the problem of environmental ethics: they shift from the field of act-centered ethics to the realm of virtue-cenered ethics. That’s a secondary matter of concern that how many trees you cut or how many animals you slain and for which purpose you do these. It’s shallow to prescribe a list of acts as the moral treatments for the environment: just as shallow as the prescription of the physician for avoiding bad dreams. It’s a secondary concern how to deal directly to the nature while the main cause is our general moral virtues.
If we want to maintain a list of rules in the field of applied ethics concerning the environment, we should consider the natural role of human in the ecosystem otherwise if our rules our so exclusive that they prevent the man as an animal from his part in the ecosystem, it will be as immoral as preventing any other species from its own role. But in which measure the man can involve the ecosystem? Answering simply that “as much as he needs” seems seriously insufficient followed by a new question: “how much he needs?” that’s way the Abrahamic traditions originally think searching for this question in the field of applied ethics is non-sense. Instead we should concern the general virtue of man as a dispositional characteristic. This general virtue, as is expressed in God-likeness, seems to be a kind of intuitive morality rather than any other view which leads us to a moral argument establishing some rules for ethical application.
Additionally, Lynn white is wrong. He is confused between cause and effect and can be challenged by the method of Hume’s skepticism: if the egocentric interpretation of the Christian Genesis appeared at the same time as the egocentric attitude to the nature in the West, we cannot say they have a causal relationship. In fact the general encouraged renaissance egoism caused both the interpretation and the crisis.
Religious view believes that the nature is suffering secondary and accidentally from the violence against her but she is suffering directly, primarily and essentially from general human vicious character, as well as these characters indirectly cause the mentioned violence. We should improve our general moral character and then it will automatically locate us in the harmony with the nature and will control our violent behaviors to her; because the nature is of the same essence as our moral personality. In fact the Abrahamic suggestion for avoiding bad dreams is something between the Jungian’s and the occultist’s.
The original message of Zoroaster emphasizing “Good Mind” as the essential treatment consists of the same view (Gathas; Yasna 29: 1, 6 & 10):
Unto Thee, O Lord, the Soul of Creation cried: "For whom didst Thou create me, and who so fashioned me?Feuds and fury, violence and the insolence of might have oppressed me; None have I to protect me save Thee; Command for me then the blessings of a settled, peaceful life."
… Then, thus spake Ahura Mazda, the Lord of understanding and wisdom:"As there is no righteous spiritual lord or secular chief, So have I, as Creator, made thee (Zarathushtra) the protector and guide,For the welfare of the world and its diligent people:"
… O Ahura Mazda, and O Spirit of Truth and Right! Do Ye grant me and my followers such authority and power through Truth, That with the Good Mind, we may bring the world peace and happiness, Of which, Thou, O Lord, art indeed the first possessor.
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Notes on Referential Theory of Meaning
Since I cannot convince myself of leaving loyalty towards ‘the referential theory of meaning’, in this paper I will try to present and justify briefly my version of this theory which is some how deferent from Mill’s as well as Frege’s.
Postulations
Two statements I would like to assume as postulations for which I have no justification and I can summon only the intuitions as witness:
i) Whatever has causal efficiency is existent; tritely because we cannot assign an effect to some thing which absolutely doesn’t exist.
ii) Whatever exists can be denoted; because the sentence ‘there is some thing which cannot be denoted’ is paradoxical (because as soon as one utters this sentence, he denotes that ‘thing’ through the subject of the sentence.)
Argument for existence of the reference
Take the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which allegedly has no reference because there is no one ‘presently’ governing ‘France’ as a ‘King’. Frege says that though it doesn’t have a reference, it has a sense which is its ‘mode of expression’. This mode of expression, according to Frege, is understood through logical analysis of the phrase rather than pointing out a reference which it denotes. Some phrases have both reference and sense (like ‘present Prime Minister of India’ of which the reference is Man Mohan Sing) and some phrases have only reference without a sense (like Aristotle as a proper noun, though Russell claims that even the proper nouns are descriptive and therefore we can assign some thing like sense to them).
Now, after this Fregean distinction, suppose we have the following sentence:
(1) Present King of France is a king.
This sentence which Frege classifies as a non-informative sentence is acceptable[1], while the following sentence is not acceptable:
(2) Man Mohan Sing is a king.
Therefore, we can say that there is some thing related to the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which makes the sentence (1) acceptable and is lacked by the phrase ‘Man Mohan Sing’. It’s not reasonable to search that thing in the phonetic properties of the phrase. Frege would say it is its sense which makes the sentence (1) acceptable. It means it’s a causal efficiency of the sense to make the sentence (1) acceptable. Therefore, according to the postulation (i), the sense exists! And as the sense exists, according to the postulation (ii) it can be denoted. Let me show a phrase which denotes the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ as /Present King of France/. In fact I would like (as I have done) to claim that the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ is the reference of the phrase /Present King of France/, because if by denoting a reference through a phrase we mean to point out an existent object among the likes, /Present King of France/ points out the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which as we proved exists among the other senses which also in the same way exist.
Now take the following sentence which is also acceptable:
(3) Present King of France is not a king (because it doesn’t have the functions of a king.)
Here again the same demonstration can be applied: there is some thing related to the phrase ‘Present King of France’ to make the sentence (3) acceptable and this aspect should exist. As the Fregean reference of the phrase doesn’t exist, it should be again the sense which makes the sentence acceptable. But how one thing can cause two contradictory phrases? I leave this problem here only concluding that what makes the sentence (1) acceptable is some aspect of the sense which must differ from that aspect of the sense which makes the sentence (3) acceptable, though in both cases the sense exist as a reference for /Present King of France/.
Now let’s bring the following very acceptable sentence in our notice:
(4) The Present King of Nepal is fat.[2]
Here, obviously the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of Nepal’ doesn’t make this sentence acceptable but it is the Fregean reference which has this role. In other words, in order to accept or reject this sentence, we cannot merely analyze the sense of the phrase but we should go and see whether its reference is fat or not. The same case would be if France had still a monarch with negation of the sentence (3). It means we should go and see whether he had the functions of a king or not and as it would be true that he had the functions of a king we should accept the negation of sentence (3). Now one can ask how reference in this case would have ceased the causal efficiency of the sense.
Now we have faced three kind of denotation:
a) Denotation of reference as in the sentence (4)
b) Denotation of the sense as in the sentence (1)
c) Denotation of the sense as in the sentence (3)
We should show how they are related to each other. Frege simply has said that the sense determines the reference, though in the case of the phrases which have only sense without reference this function of sense in suspended. It explains a dichotomy between sense and reference but here we have a triad which I have distinguished in the cases a, b and c.
Platonic review
Let us have a Platonic glance to the case because I think this glance can illuminate the case partially[3]. We should note that ‘Present King of France’ for Plato might represent two things of two categories:
1) A lower rank universal which participates in three higher universals, namely ‘presence’[4], ‘monarchy’ and ‘French-hood’;
2) A particular man who governs France;
Thus, the three cases mentioned above will be understood by Plato as follows:
a) The sentence (4) means: The particular ‘Present King of Nepal’ participates in the universal ‘fatness’.
b) The sentence (1) means: the universal ‘Present King of France’ participates in the universal ‘monarch’.
c) The sentence (3) means: the universal ‘present King of France’ is not a particular participating in the universal ‘monarch’.
Here, two points should be remarked:
First: according to Plato a universal may be participated in by a lower universal as well as a particular.
Second: as Aristotle critically has mentioned, the Platonic universals in their turns are particulars because a Platonic universal is a unique entity among the universals.
Both preceding points show that how a Platonic universal may function as a particular though basically they belong to two distinctive categories. Additionally, a universal determines the nature of a particular as well as its own nature as a certain universal. It’s a function of a universal which is common among the other universals while this function doesn’t reveal universality of a universal which again is common among the universals. It means the mode of existence of a universal (its universality) is some thing different from its unique nature (table-ness, man-ness and so on) as well as the mode of existence of a particular is some thing different from its nature which is determined by the universal in which it participates. The main thesis of Plato’s is that the nature which a particular receives from a universal is the same as the nature of that universal otherwise they have nothing to do with each other unless there is another entity maintaining their link and it deserves infinite regress. Here we have a triad: the mode of existence of the universal (universality), the mode of existence of the particular (particularity) and the determinative nature which is common between particular and universal. Thus, in both universal and particular two aspects are distinguishable: the mode of existence and the determinative nature.
The same pattern confidently can be applied to sense and reference. Here we can distinguish three aspects: mode of existence of the sense (its sensuality), mode of existence of the reference (empirical existence) and the determinative nature (common between them so that sense can determine the reference). All functions refer to the mode of existence otherwise if it referred to the determinative nature, as the determinative nature is common between them, the functions must be the same while the sense of the ‘Present King of Nepal’ cannot govern over the people but only the reference of this phrase has the function of governing.
Now let’s see our exemplary sentences again:
a) The sentence (4) is acceptable as long as the mode of existence of the reference of the subject is considered.
b) The sentence (1) is acceptable as long as the determinative nature of the sense of the subject is considered.
c) The sentence (3) is acceptable as long as the mode of existence of the sense of the subject is considered.
Now, based on this distinction, we can rearrange our concept of synthetic (informative) and analytic (non-informative) sentence. It is not pointless because one can ask what makes a synthetic statement, informative and an analytic statement, non-informative. Apparently in both synthetic and analytic statements the subject denotes a ‘determinative nature’. In a synthetic statement the predicate is a mode of existence which is assigned to the subject and in an analytic statement, the predicate is again denoting a ‘determinative nature’.
For example when we say:
(5) A triangle is a shape with three sides.
We state only about the nature of triangle however it exists; but when we say:
(6) The sum of the internal angels of a triangle makes 180 degrees.
We state a statement which shows how the existence of a triangle is in harmony with the theorems of the Euclidean geometry. As evidence it is enough to be aware that in some non-Euclidean geometry, this amount is more than 180 degree while a triangle still has three sides. If that is the case, all existential statements, tritely must be synthetic because they assert a mode of existence. Now let examine a negative existential statement like:
(7) Atlantis is not existent.
We should be aware that in the ordinary language by existent usually we mean a class of existents which can be found apart from mind. Therefore, the mode of existence of a ‘sense’ which depends totally upon mind usually is not meant by the word ‘existent’. Hence, the sentence (7) means that this mode of existence is not applicable to a determinative nature which is indicated and inhered by the sense of ‘Atlantis’. Here, the reference of the word ‘Atlantis’ is the ‘determinative nature’ which exists in the ‘sense’ of Atlantis. But if we say:
(8) Atlantis was existent.
Though the subject has the same meaning, there is no contradiction because the mode of existence meant by ‘was exist’, is different from the mode of existence meant by ‘is existent’[5]. And again the following sentence also not contradictorily is acceptable:
(9) Atlantis is existent.
if by existent, the mode of existent of a sense is meant. In all these three sentences the meaning of the subject is the same: the ‘determinative nature’ which is indicated and inhered by the ‘sense’ but the difference, is in the mode of predication.
I think by the means of this kind of argument we can restore the referential theory of meaning.
Notes:
[1] Here I prefer using ‘acceptable’ instead of ‘true’ avoiding some logical traps around truth-values which threaten the above sentence while it is also acceptable that ‘present King of France is not a king’ because doesn’t have any function of a king.
[2] This paper has been written in May-2008 while the Maoists of Nepal had not ceased monarchy as yet.
[3] I don’t mind whether Plato is allowed in a twenty century philosophy of language. As the writer of this paper, I think I have enough rights to invite him.
[4] Though Plato never assumed a universal for tenses, we have supposed that his answer to Aristotle who asked in his metaphysics, whether the tenses have universal or not, is affirmative.
[5] I believe that ‘having been existent’ as it is reflected in its grammatical structure, is a mode of existence which presently exists because it makes the sentence (8) acceptable. Therefore according to the postulation (i), it must exist.
Postulations
Two statements I would like to assume as postulations for which I have no justification and I can summon only the intuitions as witness:
i) Whatever has causal efficiency is existent; tritely because we cannot assign an effect to some thing which absolutely doesn’t exist.
ii) Whatever exists can be denoted; because the sentence ‘there is some thing which cannot be denoted’ is paradoxical (because as soon as one utters this sentence, he denotes that ‘thing’ through the subject of the sentence.)
Argument for existence of the reference
Take the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which allegedly has no reference because there is no one ‘presently’ governing ‘France’ as a ‘King’. Frege says that though it doesn’t have a reference, it has a sense which is its ‘mode of expression’. This mode of expression, according to Frege, is understood through logical analysis of the phrase rather than pointing out a reference which it denotes. Some phrases have both reference and sense (like ‘present Prime Minister of India’ of which the reference is Man Mohan Sing) and some phrases have only reference without a sense (like Aristotle as a proper noun, though Russell claims that even the proper nouns are descriptive and therefore we can assign some thing like sense to them).
Now, after this Fregean distinction, suppose we have the following sentence:
(1) Present King of France is a king.
This sentence which Frege classifies as a non-informative sentence is acceptable[1], while the following sentence is not acceptable:
(2) Man Mohan Sing is a king.
Therefore, we can say that there is some thing related to the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which makes the sentence (1) acceptable and is lacked by the phrase ‘Man Mohan Sing’. It’s not reasonable to search that thing in the phonetic properties of the phrase. Frege would say it is its sense which makes the sentence (1) acceptable. It means it’s a causal efficiency of the sense to make the sentence (1) acceptable. Therefore, according to the postulation (i), the sense exists! And as the sense exists, according to the postulation (ii) it can be denoted. Let me show a phrase which denotes the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ as /Present King of France/. In fact I would like (as I have done) to claim that the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ is the reference of the phrase /Present King of France/, because if by denoting a reference through a phrase we mean to point out an existent object among the likes, /Present King of France/ points out the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which as we proved exists among the other senses which also in the same way exist.
Now take the following sentence which is also acceptable:
(3) Present King of France is not a king (because it doesn’t have the functions of a king.)
Here again the same demonstration can be applied: there is some thing related to the phrase ‘Present King of France’ to make the sentence (3) acceptable and this aspect should exist. As the Fregean reference of the phrase doesn’t exist, it should be again the sense which makes the sentence acceptable. But how one thing can cause two contradictory phrases? I leave this problem here only concluding that what makes the sentence (1) acceptable is some aspect of the sense which must differ from that aspect of the sense which makes the sentence (3) acceptable, though in both cases the sense exist as a reference for /Present King of France/.
Now let’s bring the following very acceptable sentence in our notice:
(4) The Present King of Nepal is fat.[2]
Here, obviously the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of Nepal’ doesn’t make this sentence acceptable but it is the Fregean reference which has this role. In other words, in order to accept or reject this sentence, we cannot merely analyze the sense of the phrase but we should go and see whether its reference is fat or not. The same case would be if France had still a monarch with negation of the sentence (3). It means we should go and see whether he had the functions of a king or not and as it would be true that he had the functions of a king we should accept the negation of sentence (3). Now one can ask how reference in this case would have ceased the causal efficiency of the sense.
Now we have faced three kind of denotation:
a) Denotation of reference as in the sentence (4)
b) Denotation of the sense as in the sentence (1)
c) Denotation of the sense as in the sentence (3)
We should show how they are related to each other. Frege simply has said that the sense determines the reference, though in the case of the phrases which have only sense without reference this function of sense in suspended. It explains a dichotomy between sense and reference but here we have a triad which I have distinguished in the cases a, b and c.
Platonic review
Let us have a Platonic glance to the case because I think this glance can illuminate the case partially[3]. We should note that ‘Present King of France’ for Plato might represent two things of two categories:
1) A lower rank universal which participates in three higher universals, namely ‘presence’[4], ‘monarchy’ and ‘French-hood’;
2) A particular man who governs France;
Thus, the three cases mentioned above will be understood by Plato as follows:
a) The sentence (4) means: The particular ‘Present King of Nepal’ participates in the universal ‘fatness’.
b) The sentence (1) means: the universal ‘Present King of France’ participates in the universal ‘monarch’.
c) The sentence (3) means: the universal ‘present King of France’ is not a particular participating in the universal ‘monarch’.
Here, two points should be remarked:
First: according to Plato a universal may be participated in by a lower universal as well as a particular.
Second: as Aristotle critically has mentioned, the Platonic universals in their turns are particulars because a Platonic universal is a unique entity among the universals.
Both preceding points show that how a Platonic universal may function as a particular though basically they belong to two distinctive categories. Additionally, a universal determines the nature of a particular as well as its own nature as a certain universal. It’s a function of a universal which is common among the other universals while this function doesn’t reveal universality of a universal which again is common among the universals. It means the mode of existence of a universal (its universality) is some thing different from its unique nature (table-ness, man-ness and so on) as well as the mode of existence of a particular is some thing different from its nature which is determined by the universal in which it participates. The main thesis of Plato’s is that the nature which a particular receives from a universal is the same as the nature of that universal otherwise they have nothing to do with each other unless there is another entity maintaining their link and it deserves infinite regress. Here we have a triad: the mode of existence of the universal (universality), the mode of existence of the particular (particularity) and the determinative nature which is common between particular and universal. Thus, in both universal and particular two aspects are distinguishable: the mode of existence and the determinative nature.
The same pattern confidently can be applied to sense and reference. Here we can distinguish three aspects: mode of existence of the sense (its sensuality), mode of existence of the reference (empirical existence) and the determinative nature (common between them so that sense can determine the reference). All functions refer to the mode of existence otherwise if it referred to the determinative nature, as the determinative nature is common between them, the functions must be the same while the sense of the ‘Present King of Nepal’ cannot govern over the people but only the reference of this phrase has the function of governing.
Now let’s see our exemplary sentences again:
a) The sentence (4) is acceptable as long as the mode of existence of the reference of the subject is considered.
b) The sentence (1) is acceptable as long as the determinative nature of the sense of the subject is considered.
c) The sentence (3) is acceptable as long as the mode of existence of the sense of the subject is considered.
Now, based on this distinction, we can rearrange our concept of synthetic (informative) and analytic (non-informative) sentence. It is not pointless because one can ask what makes a synthetic statement, informative and an analytic statement, non-informative. Apparently in both synthetic and analytic statements the subject denotes a ‘determinative nature’. In a synthetic statement the predicate is a mode of existence which is assigned to the subject and in an analytic statement, the predicate is again denoting a ‘determinative nature’.
For example when we say:
(5) A triangle is a shape with three sides.
We state only about the nature of triangle however it exists; but when we say:
(6) The sum of the internal angels of a triangle makes 180 degrees.
We state a statement which shows how the existence of a triangle is in harmony with the theorems of the Euclidean geometry. As evidence it is enough to be aware that in some non-Euclidean geometry, this amount is more than 180 degree while a triangle still has three sides. If that is the case, all existential statements, tritely must be synthetic because they assert a mode of existence. Now let examine a negative existential statement like:
(7) Atlantis is not existent.
We should be aware that in the ordinary language by existent usually we mean a class of existents which can be found apart from mind. Therefore, the mode of existence of a ‘sense’ which depends totally upon mind usually is not meant by the word ‘existent’. Hence, the sentence (7) means that this mode of existence is not applicable to a determinative nature which is indicated and inhered by the sense of ‘Atlantis’. Here, the reference of the word ‘Atlantis’ is the ‘determinative nature’ which exists in the ‘sense’ of Atlantis. But if we say:
(8) Atlantis was existent.
Though the subject has the same meaning, there is no contradiction because the mode of existence meant by ‘was exist’, is different from the mode of existence meant by ‘is existent’[5]. And again the following sentence also not contradictorily is acceptable:
(9) Atlantis is existent.
if by existent, the mode of existent of a sense is meant. In all these three sentences the meaning of the subject is the same: the ‘determinative nature’ which is indicated and inhered by the ‘sense’ but the difference, is in the mode of predication.
I think by the means of this kind of argument we can restore the referential theory of meaning.
Notes:
[1] Here I prefer using ‘acceptable’ instead of ‘true’ avoiding some logical traps around truth-values which threaten the above sentence while it is also acceptable that ‘present King of France is not a king’ because doesn’t have any function of a king.
[2] This paper has been written in May-2008 while the Maoists of Nepal had not ceased monarchy as yet.
[3] I don’t mind whether Plato is allowed in a twenty century philosophy of language. As the writer of this paper, I think I have enough rights to invite him.
[4] Though Plato never assumed a universal for tenses, we have supposed that his answer to Aristotle who asked in his metaphysics, whether the tenses have universal or not, is affirmative.
[5] I believe that ‘having been existent’ as it is reflected in its grammatical structure, is a mode of existence which presently exists because it makes the sentence (8) acceptable. Therefore according to the postulation (i), it must exist.
On Plato’s Cratylus
I will try in this paper to give a simple summary of Cratylus, a dialogue by Plato which is known as the main source in which his linguistical opinions are reflected[1]. Then I shall try to show its relationship with the philosophy of language while initially I shall undertake to investigate whether there is such a relationship or not.
I dare to divide the whole body of the dialogue into six parts including an introduction and five arguments.
Introduction
The debate starts on correctness of names. The main rival opinions are standing for the alternative answers to the question whether correctness of a name is a matter of convention or not. Here, there is a piracy which has been committed by Plato: while the opponent of Plato’s Socrates has started the enquiry about lexicographical correctness of the words regarding the natural function of language, Socrates takes the enquiry as if it is on ethical correctness[2]. In other words, instead of questioning how a name means its object, Socrates questions how an object should be correctly named. Here there is confusion between correct name and good name. That’s why Socrates, throughout the dialogue, inclines to replace gradually the word correctness with the word fitness. Further, we will find Socrates admitting bad names to function linguistically. Here Socrates doesn’t concern application of a given language but creation of an ideal language.
First Argument:
The Teleological Argument
The first argument of the dialogue is teleological. If we are not ready to accept Protagoras who claims that ‘man is the measure of every thing’ and Euthydemus who says that ‘all things equally are of all natures’[3], we should admit that every thing has its objective nature. This statement can be extended over actions. The special nature of every action deserves the instruments of that action to be of a special nature. Speaking is an action and calling[4] is a part of speaking. The aim of calling is information and distinction according to the nature of the objects, therefore the names which are the instruments for this action should be formed so that, by the means of them, this expectation can be fulfilled.
Since the language looks like a band of rules, the action of naming must be of the same nature as legislation. Therefore it is reasonable to call the name giver as legislator. The legislator should form the names regarding the nature of objects and give them to the objects. Here, as instruments can be formed of alternative matters, the vocal aspect of a name (letters and syllables which have been taken by Socrates as matter for words) can differ but the form should be exactly the must perfect form which can fulfill the aim of calling. That’s why the objects may have several names.
As the art of instrument making and the art of applying the instrument are not the same, the function of the legislator and the function of the speaker are not exactly the same. The former makes the instrument and the latter use that. Usually the skillful user is the most authorized person to judge whether the instrument is appropriate or not. In the case of names of which the purpose is to inform and distinguish the nature of the objects, the skillful user is the speaker who is fully aware of the nature of the object. This kind of user is named by Socrates as ‘Dialectician’.[5]
Second Argument:
The Philological and Etiological Argument
Now, let’s investigate how a name can be fit with its object or in the other words how is a good name which is to be a perfect instrument for information and distinction. The most perfect names must be made by the must perfect legislators with the guidance of the must perfect dialecticians. They must have the best knowledge of the nature of the objects and therefore they must be the wisest speakers. Therefore a name which is given by a god is better than a name which is given by a man and a name which is given by a wise ancestor is better than a name which is given by a modern descendant and likewise a name given by a man is better than a name given by a woman.
Surveying the works by Homer[6] and Hesiod[7] we come to know that the proper nouns used by the ancient wise people, whether indicating gods or heroes or places, have been derived from some common or abstract nouns which give reference to the characteristics of their owners.[8] The common nouns (like the names of natural elements) also in their turn have been derived from the abstract nouns which describe their essence and some abstract nouns in the same manner are taken from some other abstract nouns so that Socrates can proclaim that the ancient legislators were after describing the essences through naming. Therefore, as they are the best examples, the criterion for fitness of a name is to describe the essence of the object which is named.
If it is necessary to avoid infinite regress, there should be some names which haven’t been derived from the other names: “the primary elements which need not be resolved to any further thing”. Then will be a matter of question that if not by the means of convention, by which means they can be good names. With respect to this question, initially three answers may occur to mind:
The primary words are given by the gods, therefore they are good names.
The primary words are taken from the foreign languages; therefore the question should be ceased because the criterion of fitness cannot be examined on them in our language.
The origin of the primary words is veiled by antiquity so that it’s not possible to question whether they are fit or not.
To Socrates all these answers seem as unreasonable excuses. The same criterion of fitness must be applicable to the primary words.
Language is a unique faculty, whether it manifests in verbal language or in body language. As in body language, through bodily motions we imitate the objects, verbal language must have the same function. Now it is the part of the letters to imitate the nature of objects. For this sake, the physical position of the tongue and the other vocal instruments in the mouth should imitate the essence of the object. It means when we are speaking, a drama is on stage in our mouth.[9] Therefore, a good primary name is the name of which the letters have the same nature as the object: a vocal imitation of the object.
Third Argument:
Return of Convention
Naming is a kind of legislation. Since a bad rule is as legal as a good rule, a bad name is as indicative as a good name. Here, Socrates admits that the notion of correctness which he has concerned has noting to do with the linguistical function of a name. The ordinary language is full of bad names[10] but functioning yet.
On the other hand, the criterion of fitness ultimately refers to imitation and imitation is nothing but creating similarity. Therefore the best name is the most similar name to the object. The most perfect similarity is identity. It means the best name should be identical with the object while it is impossible because at least a name is a combination of syllables while the object my not be of this matter. This imperfection allows the best possible name to be made in several ways. That’s why even in two dialects of one language the names of the same object may differ from each other. Therefore even in the case of the best possible name, imitation cannot be the only criterion and another criterion should take part. This second criterion can be only convention.
Furthermore, it is not possible to imitate all objects by the means of syllables. For example, how we can imitate the essence of a certain number by the verbal peculiarities of the letters? Here again the principle of convention should be accepted.
Thus Socrates modifying his initial suggestion accepts that a good name should resemble its object as much as possible but when it is not possible, convention should be allowed.
Fourth Argument:
Use of Name
Here, the opponent says that if the principle of convention is accepted, how the name can reveal the real nature of the object while we have said that the use of a name is to inform the nature of the object so that the object can be revealed through the name.
As an answer, Socrates tries to distinguish between the informative function and the indicative function of the name. Then, he declares that for a name in its natural function, indication is the only necessary function which can be maintained merely by the principle of convention. It’s enough to be there a clear agreement between the speaker and the addressee on the meaning of a name.
Then, if that is the case, how we can distinguish between an informative name and an indicative name which are considered respectively as a good name and a bad name while the names are the only instrument for learning? Therefore if there is no insurance against deception by a name, learning is impossible; because before learning the fact about the real nature of an object, we cannot judge whether the given name for the object is revealing the nature of the object through imitation or it merely indicates the object without any information about its nature and learning the fact is possible only by the means of the informative names. Now, if an informative name is taken by mistake as an indicative name, the path of learning about the nature of the object is blocked and if an indicative name is taken by mistake as an informative name, we are led astray about the nature of the object because an indicative name which is a bad name doesn’t imitate the real essence of the object.
Socrates’ solution to this difficulty is to deny the name is as the only way of learning. Otherwise the first legislator could not give the first good name to the first named object, because as it would be the first name, the legislator must have not learnt the nature of the object previously due to absence of its name and he must have been ignorant and unable to give a good name to the object imitating and revealing its nature. Therefore, there must be another way to learn the real nature of the object not through the names by through the very object. Therefore, there is no problem with accepting the principle of convention analyzing the natural function of language.
Fifth Argument:
A Platonic Argument on Real Object of a Name
If we have right to ask what is a true or good name for an object, we must have right to ask what is the true object for a name. This argument is mentioned by Socrates very briefly (almost as a hint) nearly at the end of the dialogue and is left without enough stress and expected conclusion so that we should reconstruct the argument according to the platonic thought.
If we believe, like Heraclitus[11], that the objects are in flux[12], when we call an object by its good name which reveals its real nature, even before finishing our utterance, the name is not a good name for the object any longer because meanwhile, the nature of the object has changed. Therefore there is no good name applicable to ever-changing objects and all names which we apply for this sort of objects are just conventional names[13]. Therefore, though it is not concluded by Socrates, if there is a real object for a good name, it should be an eternal and motionless object which must be only a universal or a Platonic Idea. The only possible consequent is that the good names are appropriate only for universals and all application of names to the particulars is a matter of convention. Therefore, whenever we apply an informative name to a particular, roughly and indirectly we indicate the universal in which the object participates. But it’s remarkable that although whole this conclusion is not mentioned in this dialogue, this theme –as a typical platonic theme, is clearly found in the other dialogues by Plato.
Over viewing
In the dialogue which we have just reviewed, with respect to names, two kind of correctness, initially interchangeably and finally distinctly are considered: indicative correctness and informative correctness. Indicative correctness refers to the natural function of language. If it’s the question that when a person utters a name, how the others understand the object which is meant by him; the question is about indicative correctness. But there is another facility in naming which functions regarding dramatic or informative correctness. According to this concept of correctness a name is correctly applied if it reveals the nature of its object through imitating the essence of the object. This facility should not be missed by a wise though otherwise the natural function of the name is not necessarily damaged.
In order to maintain indicative correctness, it’s enough to observe the principle of convention while in order to maintain informative correctness there should be a wise name maker who is aware of the nature of objects as well as the nature of syllables. As wisdom for Plato finally is the same as goodness and morality, informative correctness is a moral principle rather than a principle which has any thing to do with the philosophy of language.
However, as no one can be precisely aware of the nature of an individual object, informative correctness cannot be applied as far as the individual as an individual is concerned. Informative correctness only can be applied to the universals which are participated in by the concerned individual. Otherwise in the case of individuals as individuals, the principle of convention should maintain an indicative correctness. It means it is not the case that the universals bind the individual object and the name as such, to each other but only good names (which are not necessarily the lexicographically correct names) are bound to the objects by the means of universals.
Historically, the dialogue attempts against two sophistical theories. The first is a theory which assumes the principle of convention as the only criterion for correctness. Although Plato has given a long argument against this theory, his Socrates finally accepts some extents of that as if it doesn’t threaten his philosophy so seriously, while the second theory, though having been charged briefly, is the serious opponent of platonic epistemology. This theory assumes the names to reveal the nature of the objects so that they are the only source of our knowledge. This theory violates the platonic theory of ‘recollection’ and its premises like the concepts of ‘doxa’ and ‘episteme’.
Notes:
[1] My only source in this paper is Cratylus, a dialogue by Plato, translated to English by Benjamin Jowett in 1871, available at: http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/plato/cratylus.htm. The very dialogue is full of analogies –as it is Socrates’ method. I omitted all of them trying to show the essential lines in the arguments.
[2] Here, I should use axiological correctness instead of ethical correctness; but as good and bad which can be understood here as appropriate and non-appropriate, finally for Plato have ethical stress, let me use mischievously what I have used in the above text.
[3] If we accept them, we will be called Sophist and it’s not good for our reputation; at least Plato and Aristotle will not be so happy with us.
[4] In the present paper, I mean by calling to apply a given name for pointing its respective object, while to give a name to an object is expressed as naming.
[5] Though Socrates is not allowed by his dialectical and political method to mention directly, but whoever is familiar with Platonic literature must understand that this dialectician who is fully aware of the nature of things is the same as the Philosopher who is designated by Plato to be the ruler. It means in the platonic dictatorship, even there is no freedom for naming. The case of freedom of speech can be assumed by the reader.
[6] The most famous ancient Greek poet (ca. 8th century BC) whose Iliad and Odyssey are referred in this dialogue.
[7] Another ancient Greek poet (about 700 BC), though standing on the second step of fame, whose Theogony and Works and Days are referred in this dialogue.
[8] The pseudo-etymological method of Socrates in this dialogue seems very funny to a modern etymologist.
[9] For example, Socrates suggests that the sound /r/, due to restlessness of the tongue in the mouth while /r/ is pronounced, connotes speed and motion. Therefore, a word in which there is /r/ should be expected to denote an object of the essence of speedy motion.
[10] Because in the case of naming, Socrates utters in the dialogue, “the present generation cares for euphony more than truth.”
[11] A pre-Socratic thinker (ca. 535-475 BC) with a great influence on Plato, advocating the same view as the Buddhist ‘anityavada’.
[12] Plato believes in this statement in the case of material particular objects.
[13] Another supporting argument which can be assumed regarding the whole body of platonic teaching is that: if there is a good name for a particular object, this name should reveal the real nature of the object to us and our knowledge of the object should be a certain and complete knowledge, while according to Plato our knowledge of the particulars never can be certain and complete.
I dare to divide the whole body of the dialogue into six parts including an introduction and five arguments.
Introduction
The debate starts on correctness of names. The main rival opinions are standing for the alternative answers to the question whether correctness of a name is a matter of convention or not. Here, there is a piracy which has been committed by Plato: while the opponent of Plato’s Socrates has started the enquiry about lexicographical correctness of the words regarding the natural function of language, Socrates takes the enquiry as if it is on ethical correctness[2]. In other words, instead of questioning how a name means its object, Socrates questions how an object should be correctly named. Here there is confusion between correct name and good name. That’s why Socrates, throughout the dialogue, inclines to replace gradually the word correctness with the word fitness. Further, we will find Socrates admitting bad names to function linguistically. Here Socrates doesn’t concern application of a given language but creation of an ideal language.
First Argument:
The Teleological Argument
The first argument of the dialogue is teleological. If we are not ready to accept Protagoras who claims that ‘man is the measure of every thing’ and Euthydemus who says that ‘all things equally are of all natures’[3], we should admit that every thing has its objective nature. This statement can be extended over actions. The special nature of every action deserves the instruments of that action to be of a special nature. Speaking is an action and calling[4] is a part of speaking. The aim of calling is information and distinction according to the nature of the objects, therefore the names which are the instruments for this action should be formed so that, by the means of them, this expectation can be fulfilled.
Since the language looks like a band of rules, the action of naming must be of the same nature as legislation. Therefore it is reasonable to call the name giver as legislator. The legislator should form the names regarding the nature of objects and give them to the objects. Here, as instruments can be formed of alternative matters, the vocal aspect of a name (letters and syllables which have been taken by Socrates as matter for words) can differ but the form should be exactly the must perfect form which can fulfill the aim of calling. That’s why the objects may have several names.
As the art of instrument making and the art of applying the instrument are not the same, the function of the legislator and the function of the speaker are not exactly the same. The former makes the instrument and the latter use that. Usually the skillful user is the most authorized person to judge whether the instrument is appropriate or not. In the case of names of which the purpose is to inform and distinguish the nature of the objects, the skillful user is the speaker who is fully aware of the nature of the object. This kind of user is named by Socrates as ‘Dialectician’.[5]
Second Argument:
The Philological and Etiological Argument
Now, let’s investigate how a name can be fit with its object or in the other words how is a good name which is to be a perfect instrument for information and distinction. The most perfect names must be made by the must perfect legislators with the guidance of the must perfect dialecticians. They must have the best knowledge of the nature of the objects and therefore they must be the wisest speakers. Therefore a name which is given by a god is better than a name which is given by a man and a name which is given by a wise ancestor is better than a name which is given by a modern descendant and likewise a name given by a man is better than a name given by a woman.
Surveying the works by Homer[6] and Hesiod[7] we come to know that the proper nouns used by the ancient wise people, whether indicating gods or heroes or places, have been derived from some common or abstract nouns which give reference to the characteristics of their owners.[8] The common nouns (like the names of natural elements) also in their turn have been derived from the abstract nouns which describe their essence and some abstract nouns in the same manner are taken from some other abstract nouns so that Socrates can proclaim that the ancient legislators were after describing the essences through naming. Therefore, as they are the best examples, the criterion for fitness of a name is to describe the essence of the object which is named.
If it is necessary to avoid infinite regress, there should be some names which haven’t been derived from the other names: “the primary elements which need not be resolved to any further thing”. Then will be a matter of question that if not by the means of convention, by which means they can be good names. With respect to this question, initially three answers may occur to mind:
The primary words are given by the gods, therefore they are good names.
The primary words are taken from the foreign languages; therefore the question should be ceased because the criterion of fitness cannot be examined on them in our language.
The origin of the primary words is veiled by antiquity so that it’s not possible to question whether they are fit or not.
To Socrates all these answers seem as unreasonable excuses. The same criterion of fitness must be applicable to the primary words.
Language is a unique faculty, whether it manifests in verbal language or in body language. As in body language, through bodily motions we imitate the objects, verbal language must have the same function. Now it is the part of the letters to imitate the nature of objects. For this sake, the physical position of the tongue and the other vocal instruments in the mouth should imitate the essence of the object. It means when we are speaking, a drama is on stage in our mouth.[9] Therefore, a good primary name is the name of which the letters have the same nature as the object: a vocal imitation of the object.
Third Argument:
Return of Convention
Naming is a kind of legislation. Since a bad rule is as legal as a good rule, a bad name is as indicative as a good name. Here, Socrates admits that the notion of correctness which he has concerned has noting to do with the linguistical function of a name. The ordinary language is full of bad names[10] but functioning yet.
On the other hand, the criterion of fitness ultimately refers to imitation and imitation is nothing but creating similarity. Therefore the best name is the most similar name to the object. The most perfect similarity is identity. It means the best name should be identical with the object while it is impossible because at least a name is a combination of syllables while the object my not be of this matter. This imperfection allows the best possible name to be made in several ways. That’s why even in two dialects of one language the names of the same object may differ from each other. Therefore even in the case of the best possible name, imitation cannot be the only criterion and another criterion should take part. This second criterion can be only convention.
Furthermore, it is not possible to imitate all objects by the means of syllables. For example, how we can imitate the essence of a certain number by the verbal peculiarities of the letters? Here again the principle of convention should be accepted.
Thus Socrates modifying his initial suggestion accepts that a good name should resemble its object as much as possible but when it is not possible, convention should be allowed.
Fourth Argument:
Use of Name
Here, the opponent says that if the principle of convention is accepted, how the name can reveal the real nature of the object while we have said that the use of a name is to inform the nature of the object so that the object can be revealed through the name.
As an answer, Socrates tries to distinguish between the informative function and the indicative function of the name. Then, he declares that for a name in its natural function, indication is the only necessary function which can be maintained merely by the principle of convention. It’s enough to be there a clear agreement between the speaker and the addressee on the meaning of a name.
Then, if that is the case, how we can distinguish between an informative name and an indicative name which are considered respectively as a good name and a bad name while the names are the only instrument for learning? Therefore if there is no insurance against deception by a name, learning is impossible; because before learning the fact about the real nature of an object, we cannot judge whether the given name for the object is revealing the nature of the object through imitation or it merely indicates the object without any information about its nature and learning the fact is possible only by the means of the informative names. Now, if an informative name is taken by mistake as an indicative name, the path of learning about the nature of the object is blocked and if an indicative name is taken by mistake as an informative name, we are led astray about the nature of the object because an indicative name which is a bad name doesn’t imitate the real essence of the object.
Socrates’ solution to this difficulty is to deny the name is as the only way of learning. Otherwise the first legislator could not give the first good name to the first named object, because as it would be the first name, the legislator must have not learnt the nature of the object previously due to absence of its name and he must have been ignorant and unable to give a good name to the object imitating and revealing its nature. Therefore, there must be another way to learn the real nature of the object not through the names by through the very object. Therefore, there is no problem with accepting the principle of convention analyzing the natural function of language.
Fifth Argument:
A Platonic Argument on Real Object of a Name
If we have right to ask what is a true or good name for an object, we must have right to ask what is the true object for a name. This argument is mentioned by Socrates very briefly (almost as a hint) nearly at the end of the dialogue and is left without enough stress and expected conclusion so that we should reconstruct the argument according to the platonic thought.
If we believe, like Heraclitus[11], that the objects are in flux[12], when we call an object by its good name which reveals its real nature, even before finishing our utterance, the name is not a good name for the object any longer because meanwhile, the nature of the object has changed. Therefore there is no good name applicable to ever-changing objects and all names which we apply for this sort of objects are just conventional names[13]. Therefore, though it is not concluded by Socrates, if there is a real object for a good name, it should be an eternal and motionless object which must be only a universal or a Platonic Idea. The only possible consequent is that the good names are appropriate only for universals and all application of names to the particulars is a matter of convention. Therefore, whenever we apply an informative name to a particular, roughly and indirectly we indicate the universal in which the object participates. But it’s remarkable that although whole this conclusion is not mentioned in this dialogue, this theme –as a typical platonic theme, is clearly found in the other dialogues by Plato.
Over viewing
In the dialogue which we have just reviewed, with respect to names, two kind of correctness, initially interchangeably and finally distinctly are considered: indicative correctness and informative correctness. Indicative correctness refers to the natural function of language. If it’s the question that when a person utters a name, how the others understand the object which is meant by him; the question is about indicative correctness. But there is another facility in naming which functions regarding dramatic or informative correctness. According to this concept of correctness a name is correctly applied if it reveals the nature of its object through imitating the essence of the object. This facility should not be missed by a wise though otherwise the natural function of the name is not necessarily damaged.
In order to maintain indicative correctness, it’s enough to observe the principle of convention while in order to maintain informative correctness there should be a wise name maker who is aware of the nature of objects as well as the nature of syllables. As wisdom for Plato finally is the same as goodness and morality, informative correctness is a moral principle rather than a principle which has any thing to do with the philosophy of language.
However, as no one can be precisely aware of the nature of an individual object, informative correctness cannot be applied as far as the individual as an individual is concerned. Informative correctness only can be applied to the universals which are participated in by the concerned individual. Otherwise in the case of individuals as individuals, the principle of convention should maintain an indicative correctness. It means it is not the case that the universals bind the individual object and the name as such, to each other but only good names (which are not necessarily the lexicographically correct names) are bound to the objects by the means of universals.
Historically, the dialogue attempts against two sophistical theories. The first is a theory which assumes the principle of convention as the only criterion for correctness. Although Plato has given a long argument against this theory, his Socrates finally accepts some extents of that as if it doesn’t threaten his philosophy so seriously, while the second theory, though having been charged briefly, is the serious opponent of platonic epistemology. This theory assumes the names to reveal the nature of the objects so that they are the only source of our knowledge. This theory violates the platonic theory of ‘recollection’ and its premises like the concepts of ‘doxa’ and ‘episteme’.
Notes:
[1] My only source in this paper is Cratylus, a dialogue by Plato, translated to English by Benjamin Jowett in 1871, available at: http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/plato/cratylus.htm. The very dialogue is full of analogies –as it is Socrates’ method. I omitted all of them trying to show the essential lines in the arguments.
[2] Here, I should use axiological correctness instead of ethical correctness; but as good and bad which can be understood here as appropriate and non-appropriate, finally for Plato have ethical stress, let me use mischievously what I have used in the above text.
[3] If we accept them, we will be called Sophist and it’s not good for our reputation; at least Plato and Aristotle will not be so happy with us.
[4] In the present paper, I mean by calling to apply a given name for pointing its respective object, while to give a name to an object is expressed as naming.
[5] Though Socrates is not allowed by his dialectical and political method to mention directly, but whoever is familiar with Platonic literature must understand that this dialectician who is fully aware of the nature of things is the same as the Philosopher who is designated by Plato to be the ruler. It means in the platonic dictatorship, even there is no freedom for naming. The case of freedom of speech can be assumed by the reader.
[6] The most famous ancient Greek poet (ca. 8th century BC) whose Iliad and Odyssey are referred in this dialogue.
[7] Another ancient Greek poet (about 700 BC), though standing on the second step of fame, whose Theogony and Works and Days are referred in this dialogue.
[8] The pseudo-etymological method of Socrates in this dialogue seems very funny to a modern etymologist.
[9] For example, Socrates suggests that the sound /r/, due to restlessness of the tongue in the mouth while /r/ is pronounced, connotes speed and motion. Therefore, a word in which there is /r/ should be expected to denote an object of the essence of speedy motion.
[10] Because in the case of naming, Socrates utters in the dialogue, “the present generation cares for euphony more than truth.”
[11] A pre-Socratic thinker (ca. 535-475 BC) with a great influence on Plato, advocating the same view as the Buddhist ‘anityavada’.
[12] Plato believes in this statement in the case of material particular objects.
[13] Another supporting argument which can be assumed regarding the whole body of platonic teaching is that: if there is a good name for a particular object, this name should reveal the real nature of the object to us and our knowledge of the object should be a certain and complete knowledge, while according to Plato our knowledge of the particulars never can be certain and complete.
Classification of Knowledge in Tattvārtha Sūtra
Tattvārtha Sūtra is a standard text aiming to explain all essential points of Jain philosophy apparently without challenging the other schools. The importance of the text lies on the historical position of that which is a turning point between the Āgamic period and the philosophical period; therefore along with a philosophical sensibility the text reflects the original thought of the Jain system before being trapped by the philosophical challenges of other schools. The text, according to its title, was supposed to cover all philosophical points of the school and the epistemological concerns might not be exceptions.
The aim of this paper is to introduce Jain epistemology as it is presented in the mentioned text mainly from the ninth aphorism to the thirty third of its first chapter[1].
Classification of knowledge[2]
Like almost all primary systematical treaties of Indian philosophy (like Yoga Sūtras or Sāmkhya Kārikā or Nyāya Sūtras), the aphorist has started classifying knowledge without giving any definition of ‘knowledge’ so that a question like ‘what knowledge is?’ is not answered in this text.
Knowledge, most basically, is of five kinds:
matijñāna (sensual cognition)
śrutajñāna (verbal cognition)
avadhijñāna (clairvoyance)
manahparyayajñāna (mind reading)
kevalajñāna (omniscience)[3]
Matijñāna[4]
Matijñāna is a knowledge which is produced by the means of sense-organs and/or mind. It has four manifests: memory, recognition, reasoning and apprehension[5]. The process of matijñāna is explained through four succeeding stages: avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāranā[6].
Avgraha is the awareness which is primarily caused by the mere physical contact between an object and a sense-organ[7] without any articulation about the nature of the object[8].
Īhā is a stage at which the person inquires what the nature of the object is.
Avāya is a stage at which some characteristics are assigned to the object so that the mind can determine and identify the object.
Dhāranā is a stage at which the identity of the object gained at the last stage, is engraved in the mind[9].
Śrutajñāna[10]
It is the linguistic cognition through which we get the meaning of a verbal expression of the reality. Of course, matijñāna is a precondition for śrutajñāna; because in order to understand the meaning of a verbal expression first one should identify the vocal nature of the sounds and syllables trough sensual cognition whether through ear (hearing) or through eye (reading). Only after that it is possible to cognize the meaning which the syllables signify.
Although the object of śrutajñāna may be any kind of verbal expression, it is traditionally considered only in the case of the Jain scriptures. Therefore, this class of knowledge is concerned for giving religious information.
Avadhijñāna[11]
Clairvoyance[12] occurs in two cases:
heavenly and hellish beings
human beings who has eliminated their knowledge-covering karmas by the means of following the religious instructions
This power is classified under six classes:
a power depending on a particular space
a power depending on a particular time
a power with a gradually decreasing range
a power with a gradually increasing range
a power with an irregularly increasing and decreasing range
a power with fix and everlasting range
Manahparyayajñāna[13]
As it can be understood from the title of this class of cognition, it’s to cognize the modes of the mind. We should remember that according to Jain, mind is a material object, which like all other objects has two aspects: a substantial aspect which is represented by the constant attributes and an accidental aspect which is represented by the varying attributes. Mental contents and mental phases are the accidental attributes of mind and through mind-reading one can be aware of the mental modes of the others. Fallibility of this cognition depends on purity of the subject of cognition.
A question may occur at this point: what is the difference between clairvoyance and mind-reading? The text tries to make a distinction between them on account of the following explanations[14]:
a) Clairvoyance may be possessed by all various types of beings, even in spite of their impurity, while mind-reading occurs only in the case of pure beings.
b) The object of clairvoyance may be every thing and every where, while the object of mind-reading exists only in a region in which there is mind i.e. human region.
c) The region in which the subject of clairvoyance exists may be the hell, the heaven or the human region, while the region in which the subject of mind-reading exists is the same region in which the partially pure human souls exist.
d) The object of clairvoyance is matter and some general modes of that, while the object of mind-reading is a special kind of the modes which exist only in mind without cognizing necessarily the non-mental modes of the matter.
Kevalajñāna[15]
Omniscience is a kind of cognition produced by the essential absolute knowledge of a soul of which all knowledge-covering karmas are dropped. It is the only kind of knowledge which encompasses all substances with their all infinite modes. Although the previous kinds of knowledge can appear simultaneously together, none of them can appear while omniscience has been attained[16].
Further Divisions[17]
Among these five classes of knowledge, matijñāna and śrutajñāna are mediated by sense-organs, mind and words (in the case of the latter), while the others are produced only by elimination of the karmas which usually cover the essential knowledge of the soul; therefore in their cases, there is no need to any medium. The former division (mediate) is called paroksa and the latter division (immediate) is called pratyaksa[18]. Additionally, only mediate cognitions and clairvoyance may be false and false-hood never happens in the case of mind-reading and omniscience.
Notes:
[1] My reference in this paper is: Umāsvāti; Tattvārtha Sūtra; tr. Tatia Nathmal; Motilal Banarsidass Publishers; Delhi; 2007.
[2] Sutra I. 9.
[3] It’s questionable that what is the method or criterion for this classification: the method of cognition, the object, the mode or the means? Apparently, these five classes are arranged so that hey can narrate the stages of a spiritual progress of human being. Here, I thing the religious purpose has overcome any other philosophical concern.
[4] Sutras I. 13-19.
[5] Here, the main idea of the classification can be got clearly: matijñāna includes all cognitions of which an item of production is ordinary sensation even if sensation is not maintaining the whole process of the cognition (for example in the case of reasoning) apart from the knowledge of scriptures which is status due to religious purposes is different.
[6] It’s remarkable that in this text, there is no mention to darśana which would be placed in the further systematical texts before avagraha although not as a kind and a stage of knowledge.
[7] This stage is denied by the text in the cases of the sense-organ of sight and mind because in these cases there is no physical contact between the object and the organ (sutra I. 19).
[8] This role in the further texts has been given to darśana of which the only object is ‘existence’ (see Pramāna-Naya-Tattvālokalamkara, II. 7).
[9] This stage provides the three first manifests of matijñāna, namely memory, recognition and reasoning. Furthermore, it’s remarkable that this four-fold pattern can be applied to these manifests also. For example in the case of recognition, first we contact the object, then we inquire the identity of the object, then we come to know that this is the same object which we have cognized previously and then we engrave this identity in the mind so that these four stages form a very complicated net of mental processes.
[10] Sutra I. 20.
[11] Sutras I. 21-23.
[12] Again the text escapes from giving a definition for this class of knowledge.
[13] Sutras I. 24-26.
[14] The responsible for this confusion is the previously mentioned epistemologically imprecise method of classification of knowledge.
[15] Sutras I. 26-31.
[16] The reason is that: absolute knowledge is an essential aspect of the soul which is normally covered by a certain kind of karma. If this karma is eliminated completely and omniscience is on hand, it’s nonsense to eliminate that again partially in order to produce the inferior kinds of knowledge.
[17] Sutras I. 10-12 and I. 32-33.
[18] Obviously this naming differs from all other schools (and even the later Jain systematical texts) because the sensual cognition according to them is pratyaksa while in this text it is paroksa.
The aim of this paper is to introduce Jain epistemology as it is presented in the mentioned text mainly from the ninth aphorism to the thirty third of its first chapter[1].
Classification of knowledge[2]
Like almost all primary systematical treaties of Indian philosophy (like Yoga Sūtras or Sāmkhya Kārikā or Nyāya Sūtras), the aphorist has started classifying knowledge without giving any definition of ‘knowledge’ so that a question like ‘what knowledge is?’ is not answered in this text.
Knowledge, most basically, is of five kinds:
matijñāna (sensual cognition)
śrutajñāna (verbal cognition)
avadhijñāna (clairvoyance)
manahparyayajñāna (mind reading)
kevalajñāna (omniscience)[3]
Matijñāna[4]
Matijñāna is a knowledge which is produced by the means of sense-organs and/or mind. It has four manifests: memory, recognition, reasoning and apprehension[5]. The process of matijñāna is explained through four succeeding stages: avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāranā[6].
Avgraha is the awareness which is primarily caused by the mere physical contact between an object and a sense-organ[7] without any articulation about the nature of the object[8].
Īhā is a stage at which the person inquires what the nature of the object is.
Avāya is a stage at which some characteristics are assigned to the object so that the mind can determine and identify the object.
Dhāranā is a stage at which the identity of the object gained at the last stage, is engraved in the mind[9].
Śrutajñāna[10]
It is the linguistic cognition through which we get the meaning of a verbal expression of the reality. Of course, matijñāna is a precondition for śrutajñāna; because in order to understand the meaning of a verbal expression first one should identify the vocal nature of the sounds and syllables trough sensual cognition whether through ear (hearing) or through eye (reading). Only after that it is possible to cognize the meaning which the syllables signify.
Although the object of śrutajñāna may be any kind of verbal expression, it is traditionally considered only in the case of the Jain scriptures. Therefore, this class of knowledge is concerned for giving religious information.
Avadhijñāna[11]
Clairvoyance[12] occurs in two cases:
heavenly and hellish beings
human beings who has eliminated their knowledge-covering karmas by the means of following the religious instructions
This power is classified under six classes:
a power depending on a particular space
a power depending on a particular time
a power with a gradually decreasing range
a power with a gradually increasing range
a power with an irregularly increasing and decreasing range
a power with fix and everlasting range
Manahparyayajñāna[13]
As it can be understood from the title of this class of cognition, it’s to cognize the modes of the mind. We should remember that according to Jain, mind is a material object, which like all other objects has two aspects: a substantial aspect which is represented by the constant attributes and an accidental aspect which is represented by the varying attributes. Mental contents and mental phases are the accidental attributes of mind and through mind-reading one can be aware of the mental modes of the others. Fallibility of this cognition depends on purity of the subject of cognition.
A question may occur at this point: what is the difference between clairvoyance and mind-reading? The text tries to make a distinction between them on account of the following explanations[14]:
a) Clairvoyance may be possessed by all various types of beings, even in spite of their impurity, while mind-reading occurs only in the case of pure beings.
b) The object of clairvoyance may be every thing and every where, while the object of mind-reading exists only in a region in which there is mind i.e. human region.
c) The region in which the subject of clairvoyance exists may be the hell, the heaven or the human region, while the region in which the subject of mind-reading exists is the same region in which the partially pure human souls exist.
d) The object of clairvoyance is matter and some general modes of that, while the object of mind-reading is a special kind of the modes which exist only in mind without cognizing necessarily the non-mental modes of the matter.
Kevalajñāna[15]
Omniscience is a kind of cognition produced by the essential absolute knowledge of a soul of which all knowledge-covering karmas are dropped. It is the only kind of knowledge which encompasses all substances with their all infinite modes. Although the previous kinds of knowledge can appear simultaneously together, none of them can appear while omniscience has been attained[16].
Further Divisions[17]
Among these five classes of knowledge, matijñāna and śrutajñāna are mediated by sense-organs, mind and words (in the case of the latter), while the others are produced only by elimination of the karmas which usually cover the essential knowledge of the soul; therefore in their cases, there is no need to any medium. The former division (mediate) is called paroksa and the latter division (immediate) is called pratyaksa[18]. Additionally, only mediate cognitions and clairvoyance may be false and false-hood never happens in the case of mind-reading and omniscience.
Notes:
[1] My reference in this paper is: Umāsvāti; Tattvārtha Sūtra; tr. Tatia Nathmal; Motilal Banarsidass Publishers; Delhi; 2007.
[2] Sutra I. 9.
[3] It’s questionable that what is the method or criterion for this classification: the method of cognition, the object, the mode or the means? Apparently, these five classes are arranged so that hey can narrate the stages of a spiritual progress of human being. Here, I thing the religious purpose has overcome any other philosophical concern.
[4] Sutras I. 13-19.
[5] Here, the main idea of the classification can be got clearly: matijñāna includes all cognitions of which an item of production is ordinary sensation even if sensation is not maintaining the whole process of the cognition (for example in the case of reasoning) apart from the knowledge of scriptures which is status due to religious purposes is different.
[6] It’s remarkable that in this text, there is no mention to darśana which would be placed in the further systematical texts before avagraha although not as a kind and a stage of knowledge.
[7] This stage is denied by the text in the cases of the sense-organ of sight and mind because in these cases there is no physical contact between the object and the organ (sutra I. 19).
[8] This role in the further texts has been given to darśana of which the only object is ‘existence’ (see Pramāna-Naya-Tattvālokalamkara, II. 7).
[9] This stage provides the three first manifests of matijñāna, namely memory, recognition and reasoning. Furthermore, it’s remarkable that this four-fold pattern can be applied to these manifests also. For example in the case of recognition, first we contact the object, then we inquire the identity of the object, then we come to know that this is the same object which we have cognized previously and then we engrave this identity in the mind so that these four stages form a very complicated net of mental processes.
[10] Sutra I. 20.
[11] Sutras I. 21-23.
[12] Again the text escapes from giving a definition for this class of knowledge.
[13] Sutras I. 24-26.
[14] The responsible for this confusion is the previously mentioned epistemologically imprecise method of classification of knowledge.
[15] Sutras I. 26-31.
[16] The reason is that: absolute knowledge is an essential aspect of the soul which is normally covered by a certain kind of karma. If this karma is eliminated completely and omniscience is on hand, it’s nonsense to eliminate that again partially in order to produce the inferior kinds of knowledge.
[17] Sutras I. 10-12 and I. 32-33.
[18] Obviously this naming differs from all other schools (and even the later Jain systematical texts) because the sensual cognition according to them is pratyaksa while in this text it is paroksa.
Coloration of Mentality
One of the most interesting points in Jainism, at least as it seems to me, is the concept of Leśyā which, like so many other points in Jainism, has no direct philosophical value but culturally is worthy of study. In brief words, Leśyās are the codes for coloration of the mental states.
If one asks me why I am interested in this coloration, I cannot say any thing but this fact that we can find the same attitude to visualization of soul, mind or so-called aura, through colors, in the other traditions and disciplines of spiritualism which apparently have no philological relationship with Jainism.
In spite of the main idea which assigns colors to souls, it may be useful if we consider technical similarities among their methods. It may urge us to search a common historical synapse among them or more bravely, a common scientific or psychological fact as their common root, though the latter idea may be charged for a pseudoscientific approach.
Considering the former idea, we should be aware that in the spiritual traditions which believe in immateriality of soul and spiritual entities, it’s difficult to justify how the spiritual states may be visualized through the colors, but in Jainism in which every thing, some how is material (in the terms of tempo-spatiality and atomism), that’s much easier to claim for visibility of the mental effects, especially while the variety of mental levels is determined by involution of material factors (karma pudgala) rather than pure spiritual factors (absolute jiva). Consequently, if historical stream of ideas flows from natural to unnatural and from easy-justification to complicated-justification, it will not be unreasonable if we provide a possibility for a hypothetical proclaim for the Jain theory of Leśyā as the philological root for the counterpart theory in the more abstract spiritual systems.
The aim of this paper is to show how the Jain theory of Leśyā and the other methods of coloration of mentality are similar or dissimilar. But first I would like to explain the nature and source of Leśyās.
Nature and Source of Leśyās
It’s debatable whether in Jainism by Leśyās, they mean only the color of the combination of the soul and karmas or that’s a six-fold classification of mental attitudes regarding Jain moral ideals. Even it’s debatable whether Leśyā is associated directly with emotion or activity or karma. If we suppose the idea of Leśyā, primarily and factually concerns the coloration of soul, as the only visible substance is pudgala[1], the Leśyās should be supposed to be directly a production of karma and therefore, the color of Leśyās, in fact, should be supposed to be the color of karmas. However, probably in order to extinguish this argument, the Jains distinguish between two kinds of Leśyās: first, the emotion or mental dispositional attitude which is called as Bhāva-Leśyā and second the very coler cause by this attitude which is called as Dravya-Leśyā.
Dravya-Leśyās and accordingly Bhāva-Leśyās are of six classes which I will display them and their correspondence in the following table[2]:
1
kŗşņa
black
Violence and disorder in personality
2
nīla
blue
Mental evil
3
kāpota
grey
Vocal and actual evil
4
tejas
yellow
Vocal and actual righteousness
5
padma
lotus-pink / golden red
Mental righteousness
6
śukla
white
Non-violence and tranquility in personality
There are two famous narrative similes in the Jain literature showing the type of mental attitude of the people under each Leśyā. The remarkable point is that both the similes are oriented towards violence as the criterion[3]:
“Six men arrived at a jambu-tree being interested in eating its fruit but that was difficult to climb the tree. The black man suggested cutting down the tree from the root. The blue man suggested cutting down the boughs. The grey man suggested cutting down only the branches. The yellow man proposed only to take bunches. The pink man suggested only plucking the ripe fruits but the white man was interested to take only the fruits which had fallen on the ground.”
The other story also has a similar structure:
“Six robbers were planning to rob a village. The black robber said that they had to kill all humans and animals. The blue one said that they had to kill only the humans. The grey one said that they had to kill only the men. The yellow one said that they had to kill only the armed men. The pink one said that they had to kill only the people who would attack them. But the white one sad that it was enough to take the goods which they desired and there was no need to kill any body.”
Both the stories show a gradual decline in generality of the set of objects of violence. Though the most normal and most wise suggestion belongs to the pink one, a Jain follower should be closer to the white one. One may say these stories intend to show that the end should not justify the means. But it’s very notable that none of the mental categories are going to the neglect the end due to insufficiency of justifiability of the means. It means there is no sense of renunciation in the stories. Shall I conclude that this classification of the mental attitudes don’t concern merely the monks but even the householders?
Now, it’s the time to investigate whether there is any coloration code in the other disciplines of spirituality or not.
Samkhya and Yoga
The typical of Samkhya system is to analyze everything through three Gunas, namely sattva, rajas and tamas, among which sattva is associated with the mental virtues and clarity while tamas is whit mental vices and ambiguity. Rajas play the role of a mediator between them.
Following a metaphorical Upanisadic clue[4], sattva is represented by the white color, tamas by the black color and rajas by the red color[5].
Additionally, the seventh verse of the fourth pada of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, asserts that: “the yogin’s karma is neither while nor black. That of others is of three kinds.[6]” This point is important because this phrase assigns color, even though in a metaphorical sense, to Karma. Vyasa, the interpreter, gives a four-fold classification for the karmas: black for the evil-minded people, white and black for the people who are engaged with the injury and the favor to the others, white for the people who are engaged in three principles of karya-yoga and have ceased hurting the others, and finally neither white nor black for the people who have detached from their all karmas.
Buddhism
In the early Buddhist tradition, in two places, colors are applied to spiritual development: first as the object of visual meditation (kasina); second, the radiation of the Buddha at the time of Enlightenment.
The first case is developed by Buddhaghosa. He prescribes to meditate on four colors: blue, yellow, red and white[7].
But the second case is more complicated: it’s said that when the Buddha became enlightened, six lights were shinning forth from him: blue which stood for peace and compassion, yellow standing for the Middle Path, red standing for bless, white standing for purity of Dharma and Nirvana, golden standing for wisdom and finally a light which was a combination of all those previous five lights.
If we can identify red or golden color in the Buddhist system with the padma-color of Jain system, it seems that he Buddhist system includes all virtuous Jain colors in addition to blue which is a vicious color. Even the traditional order of the colors is the same as the Jain order.
Mithraism
Mithraism was a world wide religion which can be traced to the Vedic tradition. In this tradition the stages of spiritual development are corresponding to the hierarchy of the plants in ancient astronomy. In this system, each plant is assigned to a color which determines the spiritual attitude of the follower. Those colors are:
dark grey - Moon
blue - Mercury
green -Venus
yellow - Sun
red - Mars
white – Jupiter
As we can see, in spite of the third color, green, the others are the same as the Jain system.
Sufism
Sufism is an Islamic discipline of spiritualism. The first important mention to coloration of soul in the Sufi literature appeared in the works of a grand master from the Middle Asia, Najm-ud-din Kubra (12-13 century CE) who according to his own experiences state that through meditation one can achieve a clairvoyance visualizing the color of the soul. That claim got more elaborated by the contributions of another Iranian grand master, Ala-ud-dawla Semnani (13-14 century CE). He asserted that there are seven subtle substances in a man which are responsible for his emotional and spiritual activities. The patern of color hierarchy which he suggested is like the following:
black
blue
red
white
yellow
luminous black
green
If we add grey between the second and the third color and replace the fourth and the fifth, the first five colors will be in the same order which Jain system suggests.
In the 17th century an Indian grand master, Ahmad Sirhindi, suggested another order:
blue
yellow
red
white
luminous black
green
Again if we add grey between the first and the second color, the first five colors will be the same as the last five colors of the Jain system.
The New Age interpretation of aura
The New Age school of mysticism supports this claim that around man’s body, there is a luminous halo (aura) which takes various colors according to the spiritual, emotional or psychic situation of the man. It may be interesting if we compare their interpretation and analysis of these colors with the Jain decoding of the colors. The New Age analysis is as follow[8]:
Black: hatred, lack of forgiveness, unresolved karma, dark intentions
Blue: relating to structure and organization, emphasis on business, sadness
Grey: grounding, down to earth, practical, invalidating, emphasizing body and denying spirit, feeling worth-less
Yellow: mental alertness, analytical thought, happiness, optimism
Golden: high spiritual vibration, integrity, respect, freedom, clear seeing
White: very high spiritual vibration, godly, divine, inspiration, seeing spiritual big picture, compassionate
As we can see their interpretation is almost the same as the Jain system.
Notes:
[1] If we believe whatever is visible has Rupa and color is a property! Because the only substance having Rupa and property is pudgala!
[2] According to Jain Psychology by Mohan Lal Mehta, p. 139, which in its own turn refers to Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XXXIV, 21-23 (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV, pp. 199, 200)! This account seems very confusing to me. It’s very difficult to extract a clear distinct idea from that. I tried t give whatever I could get as the main characteristics in the case of each Leśyā in the table.
[3] Both stories are related by Jain psychology, p. 140. That source also referred to Karma-grantha, IV, pp. 113, 114.
[4] Chandogya Upanisad, Ch. VI.
[5] This concept that red is a mediator between white and black, or a mixture of white and black, is mentioned by a Muslim Theosophist philosopher, Sohrevardi (12 century CE), in his Aql-I Sorkh (Red Reason).
[6] Karma’suklakrsnam yoginas trividhami taresam.
[7] The Buddha and his teachings, Narada Mahathera, Ch. 36.
[8] This analysis is taken from this New Age web page: http://www.the-auras-expert.com/aura-colors-meaning.html
If one asks me why I am interested in this coloration, I cannot say any thing but this fact that we can find the same attitude to visualization of soul, mind or so-called aura, through colors, in the other traditions and disciplines of spiritualism which apparently have no philological relationship with Jainism.
In spite of the main idea which assigns colors to souls, it may be useful if we consider technical similarities among their methods. It may urge us to search a common historical synapse among them or more bravely, a common scientific or psychological fact as their common root, though the latter idea may be charged for a pseudoscientific approach.
Considering the former idea, we should be aware that in the spiritual traditions which believe in immateriality of soul and spiritual entities, it’s difficult to justify how the spiritual states may be visualized through the colors, but in Jainism in which every thing, some how is material (in the terms of tempo-spatiality and atomism), that’s much easier to claim for visibility of the mental effects, especially while the variety of mental levels is determined by involution of material factors (karma pudgala) rather than pure spiritual factors (absolute jiva). Consequently, if historical stream of ideas flows from natural to unnatural and from easy-justification to complicated-justification, it will not be unreasonable if we provide a possibility for a hypothetical proclaim for the Jain theory of Leśyā as the philological root for the counterpart theory in the more abstract spiritual systems.
The aim of this paper is to show how the Jain theory of Leśyā and the other methods of coloration of mentality are similar or dissimilar. But first I would like to explain the nature and source of Leśyās.
Nature and Source of Leśyās
It’s debatable whether in Jainism by Leśyās, they mean only the color of the combination of the soul and karmas or that’s a six-fold classification of mental attitudes regarding Jain moral ideals. Even it’s debatable whether Leśyā is associated directly with emotion or activity or karma. If we suppose the idea of Leśyā, primarily and factually concerns the coloration of soul, as the only visible substance is pudgala[1], the Leśyās should be supposed to be directly a production of karma and therefore, the color of Leśyās, in fact, should be supposed to be the color of karmas. However, probably in order to extinguish this argument, the Jains distinguish between two kinds of Leśyās: first, the emotion or mental dispositional attitude which is called as Bhāva-Leśyā and second the very coler cause by this attitude which is called as Dravya-Leśyā.
Dravya-Leśyās and accordingly Bhāva-Leśyās are of six classes which I will display them and their correspondence in the following table[2]:
1
kŗşņa
black
Violence and disorder in personality
2
nīla
blue
Mental evil
3
kāpota
grey
Vocal and actual evil
4
tejas
yellow
Vocal and actual righteousness
5
padma
lotus-pink / golden red
Mental righteousness
6
śukla
white
Non-violence and tranquility in personality
There are two famous narrative similes in the Jain literature showing the type of mental attitude of the people under each Leśyā. The remarkable point is that both the similes are oriented towards violence as the criterion[3]:
“Six men arrived at a jambu-tree being interested in eating its fruit but that was difficult to climb the tree. The black man suggested cutting down the tree from the root. The blue man suggested cutting down the boughs. The grey man suggested cutting down only the branches. The yellow man proposed only to take bunches. The pink man suggested only plucking the ripe fruits but the white man was interested to take only the fruits which had fallen on the ground.”
The other story also has a similar structure:
“Six robbers were planning to rob a village. The black robber said that they had to kill all humans and animals. The blue one said that they had to kill only the humans. The grey one said that they had to kill only the men. The yellow one said that they had to kill only the armed men. The pink one said that they had to kill only the people who would attack them. But the white one sad that it was enough to take the goods which they desired and there was no need to kill any body.”
Both the stories show a gradual decline in generality of the set of objects of violence. Though the most normal and most wise suggestion belongs to the pink one, a Jain follower should be closer to the white one. One may say these stories intend to show that the end should not justify the means. But it’s very notable that none of the mental categories are going to the neglect the end due to insufficiency of justifiability of the means. It means there is no sense of renunciation in the stories. Shall I conclude that this classification of the mental attitudes don’t concern merely the monks but even the householders?
Now, it’s the time to investigate whether there is any coloration code in the other disciplines of spirituality or not.
Samkhya and Yoga
The typical of Samkhya system is to analyze everything through three Gunas, namely sattva, rajas and tamas, among which sattva is associated with the mental virtues and clarity while tamas is whit mental vices and ambiguity. Rajas play the role of a mediator between them.
Following a metaphorical Upanisadic clue[4], sattva is represented by the white color, tamas by the black color and rajas by the red color[5].
Additionally, the seventh verse of the fourth pada of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, asserts that: “the yogin’s karma is neither while nor black. That of others is of three kinds.[6]” This point is important because this phrase assigns color, even though in a metaphorical sense, to Karma. Vyasa, the interpreter, gives a four-fold classification for the karmas: black for the evil-minded people, white and black for the people who are engaged with the injury and the favor to the others, white for the people who are engaged in three principles of karya-yoga and have ceased hurting the others, and finally neither white nor black for the people who have detached from their all karmas.
Buddhism
In the early Buddhist tradition, in two places, colors are applied to spiritual development: first as the object of visual meditation (kasina); second, the radiation of the Buddha at the time of Enlightenment.
The first case is developed by Buddhaghosa. He prescribes to meditate on four colors: blue, yellow, red and white[7].
But the second case is more complicated: it’s said that when the Buddha became enlightened, six lights were shinning forth from him: blue which stood for peace and compassion, yellow standing for the Middle Path, red standing for bless, white standing for purity of Dharma and Nirvana, golden standing for wisdom and finally a light which was a combination of all those previous five lights.
If we can identify red or golden color in the Buddhist system with the padma-color of Jain system, it seems that he Buddhist system includes all virtuous Jain colors in addition to blue which is a vicious color. Even the traditional order of the colors is the same as the Jain order.
Mithraism
Mithraism was a world wide religion which can be traced to the Vedic tradition. In this tradition the stages of spiritual development are corresponding to the hierarchy of the plants in ancient astronomy. In this system, each plant is assigned to a color which determines the spiritual attitude of the follower. Those colors are:
dark grey - Moon
blue - Mercury
green -Venus
yellow - Sun
red - Mars
white – Jupiter
As we can see, in spite of the third color, green, the others are the same as the Jain system.
Sufism
Sufism is an Islamic discipline of spiritualism. The first important mention to coloration of soul in the Sufi literature appeared in the works of a grand master from the Middle Asia, Najm-ud-din Kubra (12-13 century CE) who according to his own experiences state that through meditation one can achieve a clairvoyance visualizing the color of the soul. That claim got more elaborated by the contributions of another Iranian grand master, Ala-ud-dawla Semnani (13-14 century CE). He asserted that there are seven subtle substances in a man which are responsible for his emotional and spiritual activities. The patern of color hierarchy which he suggested is like the following:
black
blue
red
white
yellow
luminous black
green
If we add grey between the second and the third color and replace the fourth and the fifth, the first five colors will be in the same order which Jain system suggests.
In the 17th century an Indian grand master, Ahmad Sirhindi, suggested another order:
blue
yellow
red
white
luminous black
green
Again if we add grey between the first and the second color, the first five colors will be the same as the last five colors of the Jain system.
The New Age interpretation of aura
The New Age school of mysticism supports this claim that around man’s body, there is a luminous halo (aura) which takes various colors according to the spiritual, emotional or psychic situation of the man. It may be interesting if we compare their interpretation and analysis of these colors with the Jain decoding of the colors. The New Age analysis is as follow[8]:
Black: hatred, lack of forgiveness, unresolved karma, dark intentions
Blue: relating to structure and organization, emphasis on business, sadness
Grey: grounding, down to earth, practical, invalidating, emphasizing body and denying spirit, feeling worth-less
Yellow: mental alertness, analytical thought, happiness, optimism
Golden: high spiritual vibration, integrity, respect, freedom, clear seeing
White: very high spiritual vibration, godly, divine, inspiration, seeing spiritual big picture, compassionate
As we can see their interpretation is almost the same as the Jain system.
Notes:
[1] If we believe whatever is visible has Rupa and color is a property! Because the only substance having Rupa and property is pudgala!
[2] According to Jain Psychology by Mohan Lal Mehta, p. 139, which in its own turn refers to Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra, XXXIV, 21-23 (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV, pp. 199, 200)! This account seems very confusing to me. It’s very difficult to extract a clear distinct idea from that. I tried t give whatever I could get as the main characteristics in the case of each Leśyā in the table.
[3] Both stories are related by Jain psychology, p. 140. That source also referred to Karma-grantha, IV, pp. 113, 114.
[4] Chandogya Upanisad, Ch. VI.
[5] This concept that red is a mediator between white and black, or a mixture of white and black, is mentioned by a Muslim Theosophist philosopher, Sohrevardi (12 century CE), in his Aql-I Sorkh (Red Reason).
[6] Karma’suklakrsnam yoginas trividhami taresam.
[7] The Buddha and his teachings, Narada Mahathera, Ch. 36.
[8] This analysis is taken from this New Age web page: http://www.the-auras-expert.com/aura-colors-meaning.html
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