In this paper I don’t want to show what are bhāvas and rasas because my understanding is too unclear to claim for such an explanation. At the same time it doesn’t discourage me to write about them because apparently no understanding of them in our era is clear enough: disagreement among the scholars is too fundamental to be ignored.
Furthermore; there is a more fundamental confusion, not only about Nātyaśāstra but about all textual heritage received by us: in order to understand a text as the author has meant, how isolated should the text be considered and how should the tradition be trusted? In order to find any middle way between these two extremes there is no way than determining conditions, virtues and values of an authorized commentator. In the case of Bharata’s Nātyaśāstra, the confusion is usually embodied in this question: is Abhinavagupta an authorized commentator? We should not forget that although whoever denies the tradition seems a brave rebel, at the same time, if he is successful, he is busy in founding a new tradition which must seem not so pleasant to the further rebels. In spite of that, I deeply have doubt whether any meaningful understanding of a far historical text is possible in absolute absence of some tradition.
The other consideration which I think is very important to understand Bharata’s meaning is to know what the aim of his treatise is. This consideration can be treated in three levels: a) what his aim was while writing or delivering the text; b) what the aim of the sources from which he had taken his materials was; c) what the reporters of his work assumed his aim. As answer to each question I suggest three alternatives: 1) to give an analytic account of whatever business goes on the stage in a drama; 2) to make a terminological framework for art criticism; 3) to give a practical awareness to the artists (poets, directors and actors) to perform better. One may say that a single theoretical attempt can support all these aims. I accept but the manner of presenting that single theory is completely determined by the aim of the text as Aristotle in his Poetics, Tolstoy in What Is Art? and Stanislavski in his An Actor Prepares! differ in manner of presentation. It’s quite meaningful to speak of a theory of art which has manifested in An Actor Prepares! But if somebody reads that as a book on the philosophy of art, he will be in a deep trouble. Therefore, the aim of the text some how determines who to read the text. Even if not now, some time, I should make a decision about the aim of Nātyaśāstra or about the way in which I prefer it to be read. It doesn’t mean I want or I am able to trace its aim. It is satisfactory if I know assuming each alternatively suggested aim for the book, how it should be read. The meaning and classification of bhāvas, I think, directly depends on this consideration.
The first difficulty to understand the meaning of bhāvas is that Bharata has given two classifications of them without trying to make or explain a relationship between these two: one classification consists of sthāyī bhāvas, sañcāri bhāvas and sāttvika bhāvas and the second classification consists of vibhāvas, vyābhicāribhāvas and anubhāvas. Some questions immediately occur to the reader:
- Is the subject of these classifications the same? In other words, is the object which is classified in the first classification is the same as the object classified in the second one?
- What is the method and criterion of classification in each?
As for the first question, application of one word ‘bhāva’ to all classes as the object of both classifications cannot compel us to accept that one category has been classified in two ways. The word bhāva is too common to specify a class and its literal meaning is too loose to be applied to a distinctive characteristic. Nevertheless, Bharata has given an etymologic definition of bhāvas regarding their function bhāvayanti which raises the reasas.
In this paper I don’t want to study the second classification and its elements and criterions, though I now with respect to rasas and rasanispatti which are considered as the most important ideas of Bharata’s theory the second classification is more remarkable. Here I try to explain, with a great degree of uncertainty, how the first classification has been formed. The main thesis of mine is to declare that in this classification the general abilities of actor are classified and the classification is action-oriented. I need a separate opportunity to show that the second classification is around what the spectator receives from the stage while his eyes are fixed on the actor as the center of the drama. That is a character-oriented classification concerning the relationship between the character and his conditional environment i.e. a net of cause-effect factors of sthāyī bhāvas (vibhāvas), the relationship between the character and his own existence as a combination of soul, mind and body (vyābhicāri bhāvas ) and finally the relationship between the character and his body as an instrument for communication (anubhāvas).
Classification of Bhāva as an Item of Sangraha
Probably, Bharata means by Sangraha the subjects which should be spoken in the treatise among which he mentions bhāvas. In one classification he introduces three classes of them: sthāyī bhāvas (including 8 kinds: love, laughter, sorrow, anger, dynamic energy, fear, disgust and wonder ), sañcāri bhāvas (including 33 kinds like physical weakness, anxiety, envy, shame, remembrance and death etc.) and sāttvika bhāvas (including 8 kinds: numbness, sweating, horripilate, faltering voice, trembling, change of color, tears and fainting).
The word sthāyī suggests us to consider a sense of permanence or stability or basis in sthāyī bhāvas. They are said to become rasas which are the central ideas of staging; so they are illustrated as kings among the other bhāvas which serve sthāyī bhāvas as courtiers. They are also said to be of the nature of cittavrttis or modifications of mind. But it deserved to be questioned: modifications of whose mind? As an answer some alternatives can be thought of: the poet’s mind, the director’s mind, the actor’s mind, the spectator’s mind or the character’s mind. The first three are not obliged to express their own mentality on the stage though the stage should be a manifestation of their professional intentions; therefore I rule them out of concern. If I accept that the sthāyī bhāvas belong to the spectator’s mind, then it will be very difficult to distinguish them from rasas. Additionally, it means, for example, it’s possible to have a rasa of sadness while the mentality of the characters is modified by happiness; but it is the nature of comedy in which sadness is raised along with happiness. I believe that sthāyī bhāvas are the assumed most primary mental moods of the characters. I say ‘most primary’ because they cannot be reduced to any more primary feeling. One may say they cannot belong to the character since the character doesn’t exist in fact on the stage; therefore his mentality and consequently its moods don’t exist. Of course they don’t exist! If they existed on the stage as real, they would not be bhāvas. The other bhāvas also don’t exist as real on the stage: they are assumed and they are tried to be shown. They are void of their real existence and consequently of their natural effects ; otherwise the actors should love or hate each other on the scene. The nature of death as a sañcāri bhāva on the stage is not to cease life but only to produce a rasa. Bhāvas are void of their own reality. In the case of poet, director and actor, sthāyī bhāva is the mood which is intended to be assumed of the character by the spectator. In the case of spectator, they are the moods of characters which, regardless the intention of the agents of the stage, are inferred by spectator as artha and tasted by him as rasa.
Professor Barlingay expressed the sañcāri bhāvas as ‘the atomic behavioral patterns’ and sāttvika bhāvas as ‘the organic sensations’. The first interpretation I appreciate but about the second one I prefer to understand sāttvika bhāvas as ‘the physiological reflections to emotional states’. Probably they are sāttvika because unlike the first two they don’t need any medium to be conveyed to the spectator: they are directly perceived while the other bhāvas are inferred; they are self-illuminative.
Some considerations are possible in the case of this threefold classification:
First: the order of arrangement in this classification reflects the degree of temporality. Drama is a temporal art. The element of time cannot be ignored in action which is the medium of drama. In this classification, the duration of presence on the stage is remarked: usually the primary mental moods stay for a long time so that they determine the whole emotional atmosphere of the drama; behavioral patterns stay shorter than the emotional moods and longer than physiological reflections; and the latter should appear for a short time. If this temporal pattern is not followed, the risk of failure increases for the drama. A drama in which the moods change frequently is a case of chaos; lasting physiological reflections are boring and disturbing; when the behavioral patterns stay long, the drama will be monotone and if they appear for an instant, they will not be expressive.
Second: this order is arranged from subtle to concrete: sthāyī bhāvas are mental; they are translated to behaviors (which are media between mind and action) by the means of sañcāri bhāvas and are reacted by apparently involuntary bodily actions. In the same order, the degree of intellect which the spectator needs to cognize them reduces. Does it remind us of Sāmkhya theory of evolution? It did professor Barlingay though not exactly with the same details. Anyway, as in the Sāmkhya system evolution flows from subtlety to concreteness in order to manifest and present the objects for the purusa’s experience, here this order is to manifest sthāyī bhāvas to the spectator . But the most important point in this comparison is that all tattvas present at the same time on the stage: they are not replaced by each other.
Third: the personal skill of acting consists in these three classes of expression. A good actor should be able to convey these items. They are what an actor as his general ability should be able to perform. The director can say to the actor that “now I want you to be sad”, “now I want you to show that you are jealous” or “now I want you to faint”. This classification maintains a sufficient terminology for the technical conversation between the director and the actor by the means of which the director successfully and confidently can direct the actor to manifest his basic abilities which are compulsory to be already attained by the actor to be an actor. Therefore I can say that in this part of the text Bharata addresses the director and the actor. This classification is action-oriented.
Fourth: is this classification a specific feature of drama or it can be applied to the other per-formative arts? If I find another art to which the same classification is applicable then there will be a hope to generalize this classification. Let’s try the thesis in the case of rhapsody. First we should find a counterpart for the actor of drama. Is the rhapsodist the actor? Actor gets void of his own characteristics to take on the characteristics of the character. Is the rhapsodist void of his own characteristics? For example the actor should not be assumed as himself to be allowed to be assumed as Hamlet for a time. Who is the rhapsodist going to be assumed apart from himself? In fact the rhapsodist is the rhapsodist throughout the whole rhapsody: he is a reporter. The actor lends himself to the poet; what a rhapsodist lends to the poet? I think the correct answer is ‘his voice’. His voice is not an interpreter of his mind but of the work of the poet; therefore the actor in rhapsody is not the rhapsodist but his voice. The actor should lose his identity on the stage while the rhapsodist’s identity is safe. The qualities which the rhapsodist’s voice gives to the poem, consists of these items: per-formative themes, intonation patterns, and interjections. Here, I would like to suggest ‘per-formative themes’ to stand for sthāyī bhāvas, ‘intonation patterns’ for sañcāri bhāvas and ‘interjections’ for sāttvika bhāvas. I think I don’t need to justify the first correspondence. As the sañcāri bhāvas are the states according to which the actor should take a particular behavior, intonation is a vocal property of the sentence which is determined by its meaning and grammatical mood. In other words, intonation is the behavior of the voice regarding the various levels of semantic, syntactic and contextual aspects of the phrase. The correspondence between sāttvika bhāva and interjection is more interesting: both of them are supposed to appear involuntarily under the stress of a strong enough emotion. Interjections have no lexicographical definition as sāttvika bhāvas have no behavioral value. Both of them may appear in the case of any nervous state regardless the content or specific nature of that state. You may utter ‘O my God!’ whether you are frightened or surprised or disgusted as you may sweat whether you are frightened or you have fallen in love or in anger: they present the existence of a strong nervous state rather than its nature. Thus, there is a hope for generalizing this classification to all cases of per-formative arts.
The End
Friday, August 7, 2009
Freedom: Sphere and Cube
Always, day and night, I find a strong temptation in myself to claim that Islam, indeed in its cultural feature, is morphologically a Platonic stream. And always, day and night, conservatively I suppress this temptation and try to satisfy myself merely considering the symbologic aspects. For example it seems meaningful to trace the Platonic symbolism of freedom in Islamic architecture which found its universal typical, as is known world-widely in the present, centuries after its early blooming. It’s meaningful because the chained man in the Platonic Cave who had been expected to get redemption through Hellenistic Neo-Platonic liturgy, having sought for his salvation on Jesus’ adequately Platonically interpreted cross, finally became promised by the Muslim missioners to find freedom through the Mohammedan faith which is expected by them to “drop their burden and their yokes which were upon them.” (Koran, 7: 157)
In order to start such a symbologic study I prefer to consider the most primary sense of freedom which is understood as a state of absence of obstacles with regard to an object of which ability of motion is a natural property. Likewise, ‘setting something free’ normally means to remove the obstacles against its expected motion.
If the mind is an entity which is essentially cognitive, its motion is nothing apart from cognition. Objectively, freedom of the mind to move towards an object is expressed by ‘intelligibility’ of the object. The preceding consideration takes a step from freedom as a property of the subject to freedom as a property of the object, just as in the common interpretation of freedom mentioned above, the objective concept of absence of obstacle, undertook the whole expression.
The Pythagorean School granted a potentially absolute freedom to mind while stating that “the elements of numbers are the elements of all entities.” (Metaphysics, A: 5 [986a]) Here, by numbers, they meant ‘Natural Numbers’ which seemed to them the most intelligible concept. Therefore as they meant that every thing is expressible by the means of Natural Numbers to an absolute mind, they granted the absolute freedom to mind. They were happy with their freedom only until they discovered the irrational quantities like the square root of 2 which can be expressed by no finite numerical formula. The explorer of these quantities has been said to have sunk in a shipwreck committed through a conspiracy by the Pythagoreans.
Plato took this fact as a justification to show how the material world which necessarily reflects the orthogonal dimensions of the space produces elements of unintelligibility: such a space consists of right triangles with legs of length 1 of which the hypotenuses are equal to the square root of 2. This hypotenuse is a length which visually can be sensed but rationally cannot be measured by the Natural numbers. It means the dimensional world consists of elements which are sensible but not intelligible. It’s an obstacle for the freedom of mind. (Republic [546c]; Timeaus [22]; also see Copleston’s A History of Philosophy, vol.1, part I, p. 220)
Therefore in the history of western symbology, it’s expectable to find the geometrical figures like square and cross which reflect the dimensionality of the space to symbolize bondage and its consequential suffering. Especially the latter, the cross, has an important place in the Christian iconography. There have been some Christian schools of mysticism taking the Christ on the cross as a metaphor standing for the man’s soul trapped by the material world for which the cross stands.
If square on the plane symbolizes mental bondage, in the space it will be expressed by cube. On the other hand, if there is a geometrical figure symbolizing freedom, it should express no-dimensionality. Such a figure cannot be any thing apart from circle and its spatial expression ‘Sphere’. This consideration led Plato’s Timeaus to suggest the sphere as the most complete figure, to be assumed as the shape of the whole unique universe and the cube as the most solid figure to be assumed as the shape of the innumerable particles of soil. Thus, indirectly he assigned oneness which is a formal property to sphere and plurality which is a material property to cube.
One may think these are nothing but the mere mathematical symbols; but for Plato no symbol is merely a symbol. A symbol is not able to connote an idea unless it makes the idea recollected and it cannot make the idea recollected unless it participates in the idea. For example, if there is any idea of freedom and if something symbolizes that idea, somehow it should be free by itself. The position in the case of mathematical symbols is even graver. Because they are located as media transferring the forms from the Ideal world to the material world, therefore the idea should been seen clearer and stronger in them. It means, if cube and sphere are the proper symbols for bondage and freedom, they should be respectively bonded and free by themselves. This fact was known by the first man who composed a cubic wagon with wheels and invented the first chariot. But the issue deserves more considerations: a footballer kicks the ball. Ball runs easily and it may stop in infinite positions while it maintains its formal balance. Somewhere else, a gambler casts a dice. It stops much earlier than the ball; but it has only six possible positions to sit for maintaining a balance. It means while in the case of sphere there is no formal differentiation, in the case of cube there is. A Platonic conclusion may be like this: the sphere is formally the most stable and materially the freest while the cube is formally variable and materially more solid. The statement which has been issued in the case of sphere shows that the sphere is formally more pure because it’s closer to the description which Plato gives of forms: an invariable idea free from material variation. Plato might allege that if cube formally were as pure as sphere, its definition should be as simple as sphere while its definition is much more synthetic than the definition of sphere. These evidences might seem enough to Plato to acknowledge the sphere and the cube as the proper symbols for freedom and bondage.
Now let’s shift our attention to the Islamic architecture which I think widely -much more widely than I mention in this paper- is influenced by Platonism. The typical structure in the Islamic architecture is a cubic hall placed under a semi-spherical dome.
The Islamic spiritual topography is a bi-dimensional system expecting godliness to come from the above to the below and directing its believers to the above as it is firmly accepted by the orthodox Muslims that their Prophet received his complete knowledge, purity, and prophecy during a journey to the skies.
This prophecy, as I mentioned previously, is believed to have gifted salvation to human being. Even in the daily rituals, a Muslim physically is directed to the above. These rituals usually are performed in the Mosque: a building which normally follows the typical structural pattern of the Islamic architecture.
It’s very important to know that in Islamic spiritual architecture, the interior is much more important than the façade or any other external features. Unlike Indo-Islamic buildings, in the main lands of the Islamic world, the Mosque is usually covered by a tick urban tissue so that a stranger visiting a bazaar suddenly may find himself in front of the entrance of the main Mosque of the city. Therefore, any structural symbolism should be viewed from the interior. Thus, a praying Muslim surrounded by a cubic-planed hall which usually has no view to outside, facing a spherical ceiling seeks for a kind of salvation which is expressed by the Arabic word ‘fath’ (ﻓﺘﺢ) which means ‘opening’ or ‘to remove the block’.
An elaborated explanation of this concept can be found at the beginning of the forty eighth chapter of Koran (48: 1-3). So I think it is meaningful to interpret this structure as a symbol of the path of salvation: a path from dimension to no-dimension; though I need another opportunity to explain philologically how this symbolism has been taken from the historical streams of Platonism.
In order to start such a symbologic study I prefer to consider the most primary sense of freedom which is understood as a state of absence of obstacles with regard to an object of which ability of motion is a natural property. Likewise, ‘setting something free’ normally means to remove the obstacles against its expected motion.
If the mind is an entity which is essentially cognitive, its motion is nothing apart from cognition. Objectively, freedom of the mind to move towards an object is expressed by ‘intelligibility’ of the object. The preceding consideration takes a step from freedom as a property of the subject to freedom as a property of the object, just as in the common interpretation of freedom mentioned above, the objective concept of absence of obstacle, undertook the whole expression.
The Pythagorean School granted a potentially absolute freedom to mind while stating that “the elements of numbers are the elements of all entities.” (Metaphysics, A: 5 [986a]) Here, by numbers, they meant ‘Natural Numbers’ which seemed to them the most intelligible concept. Therefore as they meant that every thing is expressible by the means of Natural Numbers to an absolute mind, they granted the absolute freedom to mind. They were happy with their freedom only until they discovered the irrational quantities like the square root of 2 which can be expressed by no finite numerical formula. The explorer of these quantities has been said to have sunk in a shipwreck committed through a conspiracy by the Pythagoreans.
Plato took this fact as a justification to show how the material world which necessarily reflects the orthogonal dimensions of the space produces elements of unintelligibility: such a space consists of right triangles with legs of length 1 of which the hypotenuses are equal to the square root of 2. This hypotenuse is a length which visually can be sensed but rationally cannot be measured by the Natural numbers. It means the dimensional world consists of elements which are sensible but not intelligible. It’s an obstacle for the freedom of mind. (Republic [546c]; Timeaus [22]; also see Copleston’s A History of Philosophy, vol.1, part I, p. 220)
Therefore in the history of western symbology, it’s expectable to find the geometrical figures like square and cross which reflect the dimensionality of the space to symbolize bondage and its consequential suffering. Especially the latter, the cross, has an important place in the Christian iconography. There have been some Christian schools of mysticism taking the Christ on the cross as a metaphor standing for the man’s soul trapped by the material world for which the cross stands.
If square on the plane symbolizes mental bondage, in the space it will be expressed by cube. On the other hand, if there is a geometrical figure symbolizing freedom, it should express no-dimensionality. Such a figure cannot be any thing apart from circle and its spatial expression ‘Sphere’. This consideration led Plato’s Timeaus to suggest the sphere as the most complete figure, to be assumed as the shape of the whole unique universe and the cube as the most solid figure to be assumed as the shape of the innumerable particles of soil. Thus, indirectly he assigned oneness which is a formal property to sphere and plurality which is a material property to cube.
One may think these are nothing but the mere mathematical symbols; but for Plato no symbol is merely a symbol. A symbol is not able to connote an idea unless it makes the idea recollected and it cannot make the idea recollected unless it participates in the idea. For example, if there is any idea of freedom and if something symbolizes that idea, somehow it should be free by itself. The position in the case of mathematical symbols is even graver. Because they are located as media transferring the forms from the Ideal world to the material world, therefore the idea should been seen clearer and stronger in them. It means, if cube and sphere are the proper symbols for bondage and freedom, they should be respectively bonded and free by themselves. This fact was known by the first man who composed a cubic wagon with wheels and invented the first chariot. But the issue deserves more considerations: a footballer kicks the ball. Ball runs easily and it may stop in infinite positions while it maintains its formal balance. Somewhere else, a gambler casts a dice. It stops much earlier than the ball; but it has only six possible positions to sit for maintaining a balance. It means while in the case of sphere there is no formal differentiation, in the case of cube there is. A Platonic conclusion may be like this: the sphere is formally the most stable and materially the freest while the cube is formally variable and materially more solid. The statement which has been issued in the case of sphere shows that the sphere is formally more pure because it’s closer to the description which Plato gives of forms: an invariable idea free from material variation. Plato might allege that if cube formally were as pure as sphere, its definition should be as simple as sphere while its definition is much more synthetic than the definition of sphere. These evidences might seem enough to Plato to acknowledge the sphere and the cube as the proper symbols for freedom and bondage.
Now let’s shift our attention to the Islamic architecture which I think widely -much more widely than I mention in this paper- is influenced by Platonism. The typical structure in the Islamic architecture is a cubic hall placed under a semi-spherical dome.
The Islamic spiritual topography is a bi-dimensional system expecting godliness to come from the above to the below and directing its believers to the above as it is firmly accepted by the orthodox Muslims that their Prophet received his complete knowledge, purity, and prophecy during a journey to the skies.
This prophecy, as I mentioned previously, is believed to have gifted salvation to human being. Even in the daily rituals, a Muslim physically is directed to the above. These rituals usually are performed in the Mosque: a building which normally follows the typical structural pattern of the Islamic architecture.
It’s very important to know that in Islamic spiritual architecture, the interior is much more important than the façade or any other external features. Unlike Indo-Islamic buildings, in the main lands of the Islamic world, the Mosque is usually covered by a tick urban tissue so that a stranger visiting a bazaar suddenly may find himself in front of the entrance of the main Mosque of the city. Therefore, any structural symbolism should be viewed from the interior. Thus, a praying Muslim surrounded by a cubic-planed hall which usually has no view to outside, facing a spherical ceiling seeks for a kind of salvation which is expressed by the Arabic word ‘fath’ (ﻓﺘﺢ) which means ‘opening’ or ‘to remove the block’.
An elaborated explanation of this concept can be found at the beginning of the forty eighth chapter of Koran (48: 1-3). So I think it is meaningful to interpret this structure as a symbol of the path of salvation: a path from dimension to no-dimension; though I need another opportunity to explain philologically how this symbolism has been taken from the historical streams of Platonism.
Art: Inspiration or Knowledge
The Ion is one of the early works by Plato which is considered by the scholars as a Socratic dialogue not presenting the originally Platonic view based zealously on the theory of Forms. This dialogue is the only work by Plato which can be said to be dedicated completely to ‘aesthetics of art’. The typical idea of this work is the ‘divine inspiration’ as the essence of aesthetic production and experience. As it’s an early dialogue, divinity here should not be understood in a purely Platonic sense as can be found for example in Timaeus, but rather in a Socratic sense which is not so different from the popular mythologies believed by the Greek of the time and received a testimony from Socrates in the Apology.
In this paper a summary of this dialogue will be presented. I try only to highlight the lines of demonstration avoiding the dialectical aspects.
1. Rhapsody
Plato in this dialogue took rhapsody as his case-study though several passages assure us that he has taken rhapsody as a representative of all kinds of per-formative arts like dance and musical or dramatic plays; therefore whatever is assigned to the rhapsody in this dialogue, can be applied to all kinds of per-formative art . But I think it will be illuminative if we know what rhapsody meant in the ancient Greece. Rhapsody has derived from the Greek word ‘rhapsodia’ (ραψωδια) which is related to the verb ‘rhapsodein’ (ραψωδειν) which means ‘to stitch’. The Greek writer Pindar (522-443 BC) defines the word as “the singer of stitched verses”. The Ion by itself is the most informative source about the word. According to the dialogue and the other original sources a rhapsodist was a man who professionally recited a selection of an epic in public assemblies. Some times that recitation was accompanied by songs and some interpretations. The rhapsodist usually had a staff in his hand which was used to perform some dramatic acts. Hence, rhapsody can be considered as one of the most primary forms of dramatic performance. There were several poets loved by the rhapsodist to be taken as the source of the act among which Homer and Hesiod were the most famous. Probably, rhapsody was a more active and dramatic version of what now is known as ‘declamation’.
According to Plato it was widely believed that it’s not enough for a rhapsodist to “merely learn the [poet’s] words by rote… and no man can be rhapsodists who dose not understand the meaning of the poet.” Therefore the rhapsody is something in association with both poetic form and poetic content. The question whether content is something to be conveyed or merely an aid for performing the form is not discussed by Plato.
There is a claimed phenomenon insisted throughout the dialogue and taken at several points as the premise of demonstrations: ‘there are some rhapsodists who are able only to perform the epics of a particular poet.’ Ion, the only opponent of Socrates in this dialogue after whom the dialogue has been named, is one of these rhapsodists though he is one of the best performers in this art. The dialogue starts with an attempt to find an explanation for this phenomenon. It’s remarkable that validity of this claim is not challenged in the dialogue.
2. Art is not Based on Knowledge!
Ion would be able to perform the epics of all poets if his art was based on his knowledge and as he is not able, it’s proved that his art is not a manifestation of knowledge. Suppose his art is based on his knowledge. The immediate question is that what the object of that knowledge is. Here, Plato makes a light distinction between the aesthetic form and the content by suggesting two possibilities for the object of this knowledge. If it is the aesthetic form which is known by the rhapsodist, as form according to Plato is a general and universal aspect of the object, any knowledge of the aesthetic forms should be knowledge of the ‘general rules of art’ which can be applied to all epics of all poets equally. Even if some of these poems are not following these general rules (which makes them bad poems), at least the rhapsodist by the means of his professional knowledge should be able to take the part of a critic to state aesthetic judgments showing disadvantages of those poems; while Ion, though being the best rhapsodist is not able to do that. On the other hand, if the object of the rhapsodist’s knowledge is the content or -as Plato prefers- the subject and the theme of the poem, the following difficulties will be faced: a) the poets who have composed on a common theme and subject like love or war should be equally the subject of the rhapsodist’s skill; while in the case of Ion, obviously it is not true and he is skillful to perform only the Homeric verses though those verses some times are of the same subject as the Hesiod’s epics; b) the people who are the most knowledgeable regarding the themes of a poem should be the best rhapsodist for performing that poem; for example, a successful general should be able to perform the verses of Homer which describe the field of battle; while obviously it is not the case; c) likewise a rhapsodist who is able to perform the warlike verses, usually doesn’t know how to fight. Therefore, as neither the aesthetic form nor the subject or theme can be the object of the rhapsodist’s knowledge, his art cannot be based on his knowledge.
3. Inspiration and its Mechanism
If art is not based on knowledge, what is its basis? Plato’s suggestion is ‘inspiration’ or ‘being possessed’ . The rhapsodist is inspired by a particular or some particular poets so that the relationship between the rhapsodist and the poet is not a rational relationship and therefore there is no generality considered in this case. Inspiration, unlike knowledge, is a particular-based relationship. Ion cannot perform the poems by a poet other than Homer, simply because he is possessed by Homer through a kind of inspiration. Plato is so pleased by this suggestion that he likes to apply it to all artistic activities. He forms a chain of successive inspirations: a god (specifically a Muse ) inspires a poet; the poet inspires a rhapsodist and the rhapsodist inspires the auditors. It is a pattern which can be applied to all per-formative arts:
god composer performer appreciator
It is a divine chain which is formed by a god to convey his meaning to the appreciators and the media, the composer and the performer, are used only as the god’s instruments without admitting any dispositional virtue like that which is found in the case of knowledge. In order to explain this fact, Plato proposes an allegory around the magnet stone: “This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration.” A piece of iron is magnetic only as long as it is in a chain which ends to a magnet stone. Likewise, a composer or a performer is able to effect and inspire the others only as long as he is inspired in his own turn by a chain which has been already inspired by a god. In this allegory the magnet stone stands for the inspiring god.
Though there is no direct mention by Plato to the psychological mechanism of inspiration, the clues which he has given enable us to reconstruct the following pattern for its stages:
Absorption Imagination Emotion
This pattern equally may be applied to the composer, performer and appreciator; it means these three stages occur to all of them while they are engaged with the artistic performance or production . In fact, the end of inspiration which is to be handed over by the composer to the performer and by the performer to the appreciator is provocation of emotions. This miraculous process assures the appreciator that the massage which is conveyed through art has a divine source but Plato never mentions what the god’s intention of contacting human through art is .
Once in the dialogue, Plato compares the poet and the rhapsodist with a prophet who is possessed by a god to speak on behalf of the god and as a prophet at the time of prophecy should be void of his own mind resigning his soul completely to the god, the stages of inspiration also deserve the artist to be out of his ordinary rationality entering the realm of madness or being ‘mainomenos’ (μαινομενος). Of course, in the presence of a healthy and rational mind, no absorptive imagination is possible .
4. Conclusion: Plato’s Love-Hate Approach to Art
Plato’s approach to art seems controversial. This controversy never disappears in various dialogues in which Plato mentions the status of art and artist in his semi-ideological philosophy. Obviously, according to him, art is not a virtue, because all virtues finally refer to knowledge while art is not based on knowledge. But on other hand, art though not virtuous is divine and consequently holy. Here, controversially holiness and virtue are distinguished. I have doubt this distinction how much can be supported by the other dialogues. If this distinction is authentic and not merely accidental, the distance between holiness and virtuous can show a basic distance between religion on one side and ethics and philosophy on the other side and again it can suggest a distinction between divinity and reason; a distinction between art as a language applied by religion and dialectic as a language applied by reason. This development of Plato seems consistent with the Greek culture in which mythology is the language of religion as well as the material of poetry; while philosophy started existing just as the mind of philosopher wished to make distance from the mythological accounts of human and his world. Art seems to be invalid because it has come out of madness and at the same time too valid because that is delivering a divine message. In the Platonic ontological cosmology gods are standing some where between the inferior world and the Ideal world just as chest which is the place of emotions is placed between belly and head. It can imply the association of gods and emotions .
All these provide a love-hate approach which Plato started from the Ion. This approach most radically appears when he anoints the poet, crowns him and expels him from the Republic.
The End
In this paper a summary of this dialogue will be presented. I try only to highlight the lines of demonstration avoiding the dialectical aspects.
1. Rhapsody
Plato in this dialogue took rhapsody as his case-study though several passages assure us that he has taken rhapsody as a representative of all kinds of per-formative arts like dance and musical or dramatic plays; therefore whatever is assigned to the rhapsody in this dialogue, can be applied to all kinds of per-formative art . But I think it will be illuminative if we know what rhapsody meant in the ancient Greece. Rhapsody has derived from the Greek word ‘rhapsodia’ (ραψωδια) which is related to the verb ‘rhapsodein’ (ραψωδειν) which means ‘to stitch’. The Greek writer Pindar (522-443 BC) defines the word as “the singer of stitched verses”. The Ion by itself is the most informative source about the word. According to the dialogue and the other original sources a rhapsodist was a man who professionally recited a selection of an epic in public assemblies. Some times that recitation was accompanied by songs and some interpretations. The rhapsodist usually had a staff in his hand which was used to perform some dramatic acts. Hence, rhapsody can be considered as one of the most primary forms of dramatic performance. There were several poets loved by the rhapsodist to be taken as the source of the act among which Homer and Hesiod were the most famous. Probably, rhapsody was a more active and dramatic version of what now is known as ‘declamation’.
According to Plato it was widely believed that it’s not enough for a rhapsodist to “merely learn the [poet’s] words by rote… and no man can be rhapsodists who dose not understand the meaning of the poet.” Therefore the rhapsody is something in association with both poetic form and poetic content. The question whether content is something to be conveyed or merely an aid for performing the form is not discussed by Plato.
There is a claimed phenomenon insisted throughout the dialogue and taken at several points as the premise of demonstrations: ‘there are some rhapsodists who are able only to perform the epics of a particular poet.’ Ion, the only opponent of Socrates in this dialogue after whom the dialogue has been named, is one of these rhapsodists though he is one of the best performers in this art. The dialogue starts with an attempt to find an explanation for this phenomenon. It’s remarkable that validity of this claim is not challenged in the dialogue.
2. Art is not Based on Knowledge!
Ion would be able to perform the epics of all poets if his art was based on his knowledge and as he is not able, it’s proved that his art is not a manifestation of knowledge. Suppose his art is based on his knowledge. The immediate question is that what the object of that knowledge is. Here, Plato makes a light distinction between the aesthetic form and the content by suggesting two possibilities for the object of this knowledge. If it is the aesthetic form which is known by the rhapsodist, as form according to Plato is a general and universal aspect of the object, any knowledge of the aesthetic forms should be knowledge of the ‘general rules of art’ which can be applied to all epics of all poets equally. Even if some of these poems are not following these general rules (which makes them bad poems), at least the rhapsodist by the means of his professional knowledge should be able to take the part of a critic to state aesthetic judgments showing disadvantages of those poems; while Ion, though being the best rhapsodist is not able to do that. On the other hand, if the object of the rhapsodist’s knowledge is the content or -as Plato prefers- the subject and the theme of the poem, the following difficulties will be faced: a) the poets who have composed on a common theme and subject like love or war should be equally the subject of the rhapsodist’s skill; while in the case of Ion, obviously it is not true and he is skillful to perform only the Homeric verses though those verses some times are of the same subject as the Hesiod’s epics; b) the people who are the most knowledgeable regarding the themes of a poem should be the best rhapsodist for performing that poem; for example, a successful general should be able to perform the verses of Homer which describe the field of battle; while obviously it is not the case; c) likewise a rhapsodist who is able to perform the warlike verses, usually doesn’t know how to fight. Therefore, as neither the aesthetic form nor the subject or theme can be the object of the rhapsodist’s knowledge, his art cannot be based on his knowledge.
3. Inspiration and its Mechanism
If art is not based on knowledge, what is its basis? Plato’s suggestion is ‘inspiration’ or ‘being possessed’ . The rhapsodist is inspired by a particular or some particular poets so that the relationship between the rhapsodist and the poet is not a rational relationship and therefore there is no generality considered in this case. Inspiration, unlike knowledge, is a particular-based relationship. Ion cannot perform the poems by a poet other than Homer, simply because he is possessed by Homer through a kind of inspiration. Plato is so pleased by this suggestion that he likes to apply it to all artistic activities. He forms a chain of successive inspirations: a god (specifically a Muse ) inspires a poet; the poet inspires a rhapsodist and the rhapsodist inspires the auditors. It is a pattern which can be applied to all per-formative arts:
god composer performer appreciator
It is a divine chain which is formed by a god to convey his meaning to the appreciators and the media, the composer and the performer, are used only as the god’s instruments without admitting any dispositional virtue like that which is found in the case of knowledge. In order to explain this fact, Plato proposes an allegory around the magnet stone: “This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration.” A piece of iron is magnetic only as long as it is in a chain which ends to a magnet stone. Likewise, a composer or a performer is able to effect and inspire the others only as long as he is inspired in his own turn by a chain which has been already inspired by a god. In this allegory the magnet stone stands for the inspiring god.
Though there is no direct mention by Plato to the psychological mechanism of inspiration, the clues which he has given enable us to reconstruct the following pattern for its stages:
Absorption Imagination Emotion
This pattern equally may be applied to the composer, performer and appreciator; it means these three stages occur to all of them while they are engaged with the artistic performance or production . In fact, the end of inspiration which is to be handed over by the composer to the performer and by the performer to the appreciator is provocation of emotions. This miraculous process assures the appreciator that the massage which is conveyed through art has a divine source but Plato never mentions what the god’s intention of contacting human through art is .
Once in the dialogue, Plato compares the poet and the rhapsodist with a prophet who is possessed by a god to speak on behalf of the god and as a prophet at the time of prophecy should be void of his own mind resigning his soul completely to the god, the stages of inspiration also deserve the artist to be out of his ordinary rationality entering the realm of madness or being ‘mainomenos’ (μαινομενος). Of course, in the presence of a healthy and rational mind, no absorptive imagination is possible .
4. Conclusion: Plato’s Love-Hate Approach to Art
Plato’s approach to art seems controversial. This controversy never disappears in various dialogues in which Plato mentions the status of art and artist in his semi-ideological philosophy. Obviously, according to him, art is not a virtue, because all virtues finally refer to knowledge while art is not based on knowledge. But on other hand, art though not virtuous is divine and consequently holy. Here, controversially holiness and virtue are distinguished. I have doubt this distinction how much can be supported by the other dialogues. If this distinction is authentic and not merely accidental, the distance between holiness and virtuous can show a basic distance between religion on one side and ethics and philosophy on the other side and again it can suggest a distinction between divinity and reason; a distinction between art as a language applied by religion and dialectic as a language applied by reason. This development of Plato seems consistent with the Greek culture in which mythology is the language of religion as well as the material of poetry; while philosophy started existing just as the mind of philosopher wished to make distance from the mythological accounts of human and his world. Art seems to be invalid because it has come out of madness and at the same time too valid because that is delivering a divine message. In the Platonic ontological cosmology gods are standing some where between the inferior world and the Ideal world just as chest which is the place of emotions is placed between belly and head. It can imply the association of gods and emotions .
All these provide a love-hate approach which Plato started from the Ion. This approach most radically appears when he anoints the poet, crowns him and expels him from the Republic.
The End
Al-Biruni’s Neo-Platonic Understanding of Yoga
Platonism is a disease which has no cure. This disease in its advanced stages compels the patient to interpret whatever statement, in the framework and context which have been designed by Neo-Platonism. An illuminative case-study for this disease is Al-Biruni’s translation of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali which can be considered the oldest surviving translation of that text in a non-Indian language .
Al-Biruni who was an Iranian Muslim scholar born in 973 CE, destined for a wide range of intellectual activities, spent a few years of his late fifties in north India learning Sanskrit, Indian religions, astrology, calendaring, mathematics and philosophy. Among the books which Al-Biruni wrote on what he had learnt in that journey, only two have remained: first, a long thesis named as “Investigation into What India Has” published in 1958 in Hyderabad; and second, his Arabic translation of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali of which -though having been written prior to and quoted in the former- no manuscript was known till 1930 in which the German orientalist, J. W. Hauer introduced its unique manuscript which is preserved in Koprolo Library in Istanbul . This translation also includes some parts of Vyasa’s commentary .
It’s very important to describe the method, the style and the other general features of this translation, but not philosophically. The main philosophical importance of this translation refers to the basic misunderstandings of the translator which the Arabic text reflects. The aim of the present paper is to show how those misunderstandings have been created by the Neo-Platonic background of Al-Biruni. Additionally and more importantly they give us a clue to imagine how Neo-Platonism could adapt a system of Yoga for itself. While historically such an adaptation in some extends appeared in some religious versions of Neo-Platonism like Augustine’s foundation for Christianity or Sufism, the next step will be to compare what these historical attempts give us with purely Neo-Platonic Yoga which hypothetically might be arrived at by the original Platonists.
However, Al-Biruni, not as an exception to the majority of the other Muslim thinkers, was a Neo-Platonist, or in better words, he was unconsciously Neo-Platonist because Plato and the Neo-Platonists were not so known by Muslim philosophers. Instead, it was Aristotle whose name used to echo in the atmosphere of the Islamic Philosophy. Among the Muslim thinkers the most popular Aristotelian text was not his Metaphysics, Physics or Ethics, but a pseudo-Aristotelian text titled as Aristotle’s Theology which in fact, was a translated selection of The Enneads of Plotinus (Πλωτινος), a Hellenistic philosopher of the third century who is known as the founder of Neo-Platonism. Plotinus found real Aristotle as a maintainer for a good terminological set which could serve to systematize Plato’s Timaeus. Thus, we can say that the Muslim philosophers were unconsciously dominated by Neo-Platonism in the name of Aristotle.
Neo-Platonic System
Now, if we want to understand how this Neo-Platonic domination led Al-Biruni to misunderstand Indian Yoga, it’s necessary to have a glance at the Neo-Platonic system.
According to Plotinus, the origin of the world -though not its cause in any Aristotelian sense- is an indivisible absolute existence which is called just as “The One” (το έν). This One, on one hand reflects the concept of Vedantic Brahman and on the other hand shows an inaccessible prototype of the Platonic “Supreme Form”. Since the existence is the same as consciousness which appears actually and ultimately through the phenomenon of contemplation, the One is a contemplative principle but due to its absoluteness, it doesn’t contemplate on any thing apart from itself: the ideal of Samādhi.
Contemplation in itself is productive. It’s not creative but emanative. In this sense, the contemplation of the One produces a Divine Mind, namely “the Intellect” (νους) which is a reduction of the absolute contemplation. As this product is not as perfect as the One, it has to undergo the dichotomy between object and subject which leads to assume the object to have several aspects. So, the Intellect has two objects to consider: itself as a reduction of the One and itself as itself apart from the One.
Since the real nature of the Intellect is a reduction of the One, the former consideration shows its real nature through a sight which the Intellect has on the One. This sight consists of the whole content of the Intellect because the Intellect is noting but a reflection of the One in the One; but as the intellect is not perfect, it cannot consider the One as whole. Instead, it’s consideration on the One, contains the assumed aspects of the One as a hierarchy of ideas which is the same as the famous Platonic hierarchy of Forms. In other words, the Platonic forms are nothing but the content of the “Divine Mind”.
The latter consideration of the Intellect, in its turn, emanates a further principle which is a reduction of the Intellect, namely “the Soul” (ψυχη). This Soul is not even as contemplative as its generator. That’s why it should undo this defect through activity. Looking at the Divine Mind and its content, the Soul aims to restore the oneness of the One which has been lost through emanation. Therefore, the Soul engages with the formless primary Matter (ύλη) in order to imitate the hierarchy of ideas of the Divine Mind in the matter to make it apparently unique. Wherever that one-pointed hierarchy even partially is imitated in matter, there is life. Here, Plotinus satisfies the Aristotelian concept of life.
Thus, the Soul is identical with the platonic “Demiurge” and through its engagement with the absolutely passive matter, comes to plurality and therefore to emanate several individual souls. But even through this plurality the Soul cannot cover the whole Divine Mind in its imitation; therefore, the Soul is obliged to imitate the parts of the Divine Mind, one after another and consequently the element of time comes to the system. That’s why the material Nature (φυση) is continuously changing. Through this engagement, indeterminacy of the matter brings forgetfulness in the individual soul which should be removed by the Platonic recollection. Therefore, every soul has two aspects: a higher fully aware aspect which is in union with the cosmic Soul and a lower semi-aware aspect which has been spread over the matter creating and governing life. In this life, the individual soul tries to see a picture of its real nature intending self-realization. It’s purusārtha.
Now, let’s turn back to Al-Biruni and his misunderstanding. I prefer to explain the main points within five titles:
1. Yoga and Cittavrtti
In a phrase of the translation which stands for exposing the second sutra of the first pāda: “yogah cittavrtti nirodhah”, Al-Biruni says: “That’s to seize whatever spreads from you towards the external objects in case they are not engaged merely with you and to prevent the faculties of soul from attaching whatever apart from you.”
This understanding of cittavrtti is rather ontological than epistemological or psychological. This understanding is very harmonious with the Neo-Platonic concept of soul which spreads itself over the matter in order to create an imitation of the forms. The formal sub-arrangements of the soul according to Aristotle are the faculties of the soul. These faculties flowing towards the object and touching the object and assuming its form bring their potentiality to actuality. Therefore, the soul which is supposed to govern the object will be subordinated by the form of the object. It’s a feature of Neo-Platonic bondage which should be ceased in Yoga as well as any Neo-Platonic spiritual project.
2. Three Gunas
While according to the school of Sāmkhya-Yoga, the main feature of the material world is to be constituted by three gunas which represent the controversial manifestations of the matter, for a Platonist the main feature of the material world is to be ever changing. Al-Biruni’s understanding of the three gunas is more Platonic explaining the flux of the world. He says: “They are originative on one extreme of the Nature and terminative on the other extreme… and the mean between them takes from them whatever is apt for governing and controlling.” However, Al-Biruni’s interpretation of the three guņas reminds us rather of the three marks of reality in Jainism: “utpāda”, “vyaya” and “dhrauvya”.
3. Knowledge and Samādhi
In Al-Biruni’s translation, there is nothing as surprising as his interpretation of Samādhi. That’s on one hand too odd and on the other hand basically Platonic, so that nothing else might be so nicely passed as a sacrifice to Plato.
Vyasa explains two famous sutras of Patanjali as if the aphorist has classified Samadhi under two classes: “Samprajnāta” and “Asamprajnāta”. The former is accompanied by four features: “vitarka” which Vyasa interprets as direct perception of a gross object, “vicāra” which is interpreted as direct perception of a subtle object, “ānanda” which means joy but has been taken by Vyasa as awareness of the very process of cognition, and “asmita” which is ego-awareness. But Asamprajnāta Samādhi is a state void of those features in which only the Samskāras remain.
If Vyasa presented the objects of Samprajnāta Samādhi to Plato, as in Sāmkhya all of them are material, Plato would consider Samprajnāta Samādhi nothing than “opinion” or “doxa” (δοξα); because according to him, our cognition of the material objects is only an uncertain belief. But if Asamprajnāta Samādhi is supposed to be a higher knowledge, according to Plato, it must be identified with “episteme” (επιστημη) which is our knowledge of the rational and universal forms.
At this point, Al-Biruni, undertaking to advocate Plato, gives the following interpretation: “How many are the kinds of conception? … They are of two kinds: one of them is conception of the sensible and material objects and the second is conception of the rational and immaterial objects.”
First of all, Al-Biruni should be questioned how to translate Samādhi as conception. In order to answer to this question, it’s remarkable that as Patanjali has introduced the triad of “Kriyāyoga”, Plotinus suggests a triad as the means of spiritual development, namely “virtue”, “dialectic” and “contemplation”. This contemplation must be identified by Al-Biruni with Samādhi. The Greek word which Plotinus used for contemplation is “theoria” (θεωρια) deriving from the verb “theoro” (θεωρω) which means “I consider formally”; while, here the Arabic word used by Al-Biruni standing for Samādhi, is “taşavvur” (ﺘﺼﻮﱡﺮ) which means “to conceive of a form” deriving from word “şūrat” (ﺼﻮﺮﺓ) which means “form”. Now we can understand how Plotinus has granted permission to Al-Biruni for translating Samādhi as conception.
Furthermore, if Asamprajnāta Samādhi is supposed to be the same as the Platonic episteme and if Samskāras are the only mental content of this state, Samskāras must be understood by Al-Biruni as the recollected universal forms which should occur to a Platonically enlightened soul. But we cannot blame him for this misunderstanding because the excuse for such a thing has been offered by the ninth sutra of the fourth pāda in which Patanjali says: “… smrtti samskārayoh ekarūpatvāt” (recollection and Samskāras are of the same nature).
Now let’s see what’s the role of this epistemological dichotomy in the theory of bondage and liberation?
Patanjali in harmony with Sāmkhya declares that pain finally and helplessly is experienced in the world and the cause of this pain is a conjunction (samyoga) between the Self as the knower and the object of cognition. The latter modifies itself merely in order to be presented to the self because it wants to realize the natures of both parties through this conjunction. It’s an erroneous view because the self is already conscious even without any object. That’s why we can say that the cause of the conjunction is error.
A Neo-Platonist basically cannot agree with this view; at least, because according to Sāmkhya the matter takes modifications because it’s the principle of activity while for a Neo-Platonist, matter is absolutely passive. Additionally a Neo-Platonist like Al-Biruni is expected to interpret this theory only involving some Platonic concepts like uncertainty of sensual cognition of which the object is the unstable material particulars and certainty of rational knowledge of which the object is immaterial universals. That’s why Al-Biruni explains the point as it follows:
“When an aspect of the object of knowledge is unknown, the greed for cognition increases until that aspect becomes known and the greed gets extinguished; because in the state of bondage, the knower without an object of knowledge is a potential knower and will not be actualized unless by means of an object. For this purpose the object will be known and the engagement between the knower and the object is deserved; because the cognition is acquired through sensation. But sensation is not true due to the faults which occur in it. Whatever is not true is not known certainly and whatever lacks certainty, is misrepresented by a further ignorance. In this state the knowledge is like opinion, because the sensible object is not as stable as a rational object. When this point becomes confirmed without any doubt, that engagement will perish and the knower will get rid of the object, getting isolated and detached. It’s the meaning of liberation in which the knower is knower by its essence.”
The difference seems very narrow but we can see how he has avoided the point of disagreement and how he has inserts the Platonic notions.
4. Samāpatti
Coming to the concept of Samāpatti, Patanjali explains some initial stages of traveling from Samprajnāta Samādhi to Asamprajnāta Samādhi: the presentation of a gross object in a clear mind is a mixture of names, concepts and the very object. By purification of memory (smrti pariśuddha) the two former will be omitted and the object, as it is, will be presented. This process should be applied to the subtler objects so that finally it presents the “alinga” or “Prakrti”, the primary matter which is the source of the whole evolution.
Purification of memory, again, reminds Al-Biruni of a familiar Platonic theme: recollection. If there is a journey from Samprajnāta Samādhi to Asamprajnāta Samādhi, as we saw previously, it must be understood by Al-Biruni as a journey of soul from the material word to the realm of universals. But this interpretation basically seems problematic because Patanjali apparently describes a journey from form to matter.
Al-Biruni has rearranged his understanding in four stages which picture a Neo-Platonic spiritual progress. At the first stage the soul in its lower level, is committing its opinions of the material particular objects. This opinion is a mixture of names, conceptual attributes and the accidental differentiae. Of course this triad cannot be exactly the same as Patanjali’s because the very material object which is the third component of Patanjali’s never could be accepted by Plato to be presented in mind, otherwise it would be the very episteme. Instead of that, Al-Biruni borrows the concept of “accidental differentiae” from the greatest disciple of Plotinus, Porphyry (Πορφυριος), whose “introduction” used to be widely studied by Muslim Scholars as a part of Aristotle’s “Organon”. This stage must be identified with “savitarkā samāpatti” .
In the second stage, through recollection, the soul arrives at its higher level on which it looks at the universals by one side and the particulars only as the shadows of the universals by the other side. Al-Biruni explains that: “When it leaves those three towards the essence through which the particulars participate in the universals, the second level is attained.” Now the soul can assign each particular to its respective universals which form its essence. Due to this assignment, “the cognition is not empty of plurality” because under each universal, several particulars are recognized. Al-Biruni must have identified this stage with “nirvitarkā samāpatti” .
In the third stage, when the soul turns its back to the material world and looks at every form in its unity, as Al-Biruni claims, “it comprehends all objects as ‘One’ but manifested diversely due to time.” As we saw previously, the Soul, even on its highest level, has no capacity to cover the whole content of the Divine Mind at the same moment. Therefore, it approaches the subsets of the universals one after another. That’s just like Husserlian bracketing which forms essence. This stage must be identified with “nirvicārā samāpatti” .
In the fourth stage, only when the Soul gets union with the Intellect, it can have “the One” entirely and simultaneously in sight though as a hierarchy of the forms of which the peak is the platonic idea of the One, as Al-Biruni says: “When the existence seems timeless to him, such a person has arrived at the end of the noble fourth level and is capable of being called a ‘şeddiq’ (ﺻﺪﱢﻴﻖ).” This Arabic word deriving from the word “şedq” (ﺻﺪﻖ) which means honesty is standing for “rtambharā” . But this replacement should not be considered so simply because it’s a technical term in all Platonic traditions in the Middle East indicating a person who has arrived at the final spiritual stage and has a direct and infallible access to the ultimate reality. Here, the One which is the object of this state of knowledge must have been identified with “alinga” but this consideration is again problematic because “the One” is very close to Brahman and not by any means the same as “Prakrti” which is meant by “alinga”.
The other difficulty is that Patanjali in sutra 49 of the first pāda, assures us that the object of this stage is particular (viśesa) while the universals are the objects of the platonic episteme. Now, how has Al-Biruni justified his interpretation? Unfortunately this part of the manuscript is so badly damaged that we can get no idea ; though, it’s not so difficult to assume what the justification might be: first we should be aware that a form is a universal only as long as it is considered as some thing which is participated in by several individuals, otherwise a form is a particular idea among the other ideas. It’s the same charge which is cast by Aristotle upon the platonic theory of forms. Further, we should be aware that the Neo-Platonic One as the object of this state of knowledge in no way is a universal but a unique entity which in this term is the most particular existence. Thus, justification is over.
Regarding this stage, Al-Biruni says: “He will be like a crystal in which its entire environment is seen; as if the objects are in that but that is out of them. Likewise, he encompasses his environment so that the knowledge and the object of knowledge are united with him while he is the knower and the reasoning, the subject of reasoning and the object of reasoning will be one.” Surely, it’s a translation of sutra 41 of the same pāda. But Patanjali in this sutra doesn’t mention the union of subject, object and knowledge; instead, he only suggests these three alternatively as the objects of samāpatti. Again it’s a Neo-Platonic tendency leading Al-Biruni to such a misinterpretation: in the fourth stage the Soul as the knower is one with the Intellect which is at the same time the principle of intellection as well as the objects are the universals which are its content. The same theme is repeated by Al-Biruni translating the third sutra of the third pāda on definition of Samādhi: “that’s purification of those acts so that the consideration comes in union with the object of consideration.”
In order to show how Al-Biruni –at least in his three first stages- is influenced by Platonism, it is enough to quote a passage from Plato’s Seventh Letter: “For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, second the definition, the third, the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance, and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just uttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made up names and verbal forms. For that which has the name "round," "annular," or, "circle," might be defined as that which has the distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. Third, comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe and broken up-none of which things can happen to the circle itself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for it is something of a different order from them. Fourth, comes knowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in words nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear that it is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from the three things mentioned before. Of these things intelligence comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others are farther distant.” Here, Plato speaks of name, definition, image, knowledge (episteme) and “the thing itself imparted”; while Al-Biruni has mentioned name, conceptual attributes accidental differentiae (all in the first stage), knowledge of universals (in the second stage) and the reality of the object as one (in the third stage). I think the only note which I have to give in order to establish a full correspondence is about the third components of theirs. Platonic “image” stands for Al-Biruni’s “accidental differentiae” because as Plato has explained further, any image of the object reflects some accidental attributes so that it can differentiate itself from the other images of the same objects: “Every circle, of those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe, is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere it has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, has nothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite.”
5. Sattva, Purusa and Discriminative Knowledge
Discriminative knowledge (vivekakhyāti) is the key to liberation. By the means of this knowledge one should discriminate between Purusa and Buddhi which some times in the Yoga literature is mentioned as Sattva . In the sixth sutra of the second pāda, they are interpreted respectively as “Drk” or the power of consciousness and “Darśana” or the power of perception. Al-Biruni, translating the same sutra, interprets them as “the immaterial reason” and the “embodied reason” . These are again two standard terms in Neo-Platonism which indicate the Soul respectively in its cosmic level and individual level. Therefore he must have identified Purusa with the Soul or Psyche regarding its association with the Intellect and Buddhi with the same Soul regarding its association with matter. But in the other places, for example translating sutra 35 of the third pāda, he expresses them as Self and Heart ; although, in the traditional Indian spiritual anatomy, usually “manas” is located in the heart and not Buddhi. Probably, Al-Biruni has found his permission for such a rendering in the preceding sutra in which contemplation on heart is said to lead to awareness of consciousness (hrdaye cittasamvit) . The Arabic word which he has used here for the soul is “nafs” (ﻨﻔﺲ) which means “self” and is a standard term which is used by Arab Neo-Platonists for Psyche (the Soul) while word Psyche in Greek language, some times means “heart.” According to Muslim Philosophers, heart is the point at which the soul touches the body and gets embodied.
What’s the basic difference between heart and soul (Buddhi and Purusa)? Al-Biruni’s answer, though satisfying the Greeks, in no extend can be in harmony with Sāmkhya-Yoga: “One may think the heart is identical with the soul … but in fact, the soul is knower and the heart is living. This fact is not veiled for him if he has made the heart empty of the world. Then he will know his real essence.” The motive behind this interpretation can be understood only when we remember the relationship between soul and life in the Neo-Platonic view as we explained at the beginning of the present paper.
The same notice should be applied to Al-Biruni’s understanding of the last sutra of the third pāda in which Patanjali claims that when Buddhi and Purusa are equal in purity, there is liberation . Al-Biruni says: “as long as the heart is not purified as the soul is pure so that they are one in attributes, there is no liberation.” In a Neo-Platonic reading, it means liberation is on hand only if the individual soul is in union with the cosmic Soul. It reminds us of the last words of Plotinus: “Strive to give back the Divine in yourselves to the Divine in the All.” This purification of heart is the same thing which Al-Biruni understands of Samādhi.
***
Now, I dare to proclaim that whatever Al-Biruni has done is not a contribution to Yoga but a great contribution to Neo-Platonism. Whether this contribution was conscious or unconscious, whether he deliberately avoided violating Neo-Platonism or he could not simply be free from his philosophical tendencies, I cannot pass any comment. However, he gave me a framework to adapt a yoga system for Neo-Platonism. Regarding the historical role of Neo-Platonism in the Middle East, a place from which I have come, this contribution is too important for me although I am aware that a man in the modern world, just like Aristotle in the classic world, can state that Neo-Platonism is a cure for which there is no disease any longer.
Notes
Al-Biruni who was an Iranian Muslim scholar born in 973 CE, destined for a wide range of intellectual activities, spent a few years of his late fifties in north India learning Sanskrit, Indian religions, astrology, calendaring, mathematics and philosophy. Among the books which Al-Biruni wrote on what he had learnt in that journey, only two have remained: first, a long thesis named as “Investigation into What India Has” published in 1958 in Hyderabad; and second, his Arabic translation of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali of which -though having been written prior to and quoted in the former- no manuscript was known till 1930 in which the German orientalist, J. W. Hauer introduced its unique manuscript which is preserved in Koprolo Library in Istanbul . This translation also includes some parts of Vyasa’s commentary .
It’s very important to describe the method, the style and the other general features of this translation, but not philosophically. The main philosophical importance of this translation refers to the basic misunderstandings of the translator which the Arabic text reflects. The aim of the present paper is to show how those misunderstandings have been created by the Neo-Platonic background of Al-Biruni. Additionally and more importantly they give us a clue to imagine how Neo-Platonism could adapt a system of Yoga for itself. While historically such an adaptation in some extends appeared in some religious versions of Neo-Platonism like Augustine’s foundation for Christianity or Sufism, the next step will be to compare what these historical attempts give us with purely Neo-Platonic Yoga which hypothetically might be arrived at by the original Platonists.
However, Al-Biruni, not as an exception to the majority of the other Muslim thinkers, was a Neo-Platonist, or in better words, he was unconsciously Neo-Platonist because Plato and the Neo-Platonists were not so known by Muslim philosophers. Instead, it was Aristotle whose name used to echo in the atmosphere of the Islamic Philosophy. Among the Muslim thinkers the most popular Aristotelian text was not his Metaphysics, Physics or Ethics, but a pseudo-Aristotelian text titled as Aristotle’s Theology which in fact, was a translated selection of The Enneads of Plotinus (Πλωτινος), a Hellenistic philosopher of the third century who is known as the founder of Neo-Platonism. Plotinus found real Aristotle as a maintainer for a good terminological set which could serve to systematize Plato’s Timaeus. Thus, we can say that the Muslim philosophers were unconsciously dominated by Neo-Platonism in the name of Aristotle.
Neo-Platonic System
Now, if we want to understand how this Neo-Platonic domination led Al-Biruni to misunderstand Indian Yoga, it’s necessary to have a glance at the Neo-Platonic system.
According to Plotinus, the origin of the world -though not its cause in any Aristotelian sense- is an indivisible absolute existence which is called just as “The One” (το έν). This One, on one hand reflects the concept of Vedantic Brahman and on the other hand shows an inaccessible prototype of the Platonic “Supreme Form”. Since the existence is the same as consciousness which appears actually and ultimately through the phenomenon of contemplation, the One is a contemplative principle but due to its absoluteness, it doesn’t contemplate on any thing apart from itself: the ideal of Samādhi.
Contemplation in itself is productive. It’s not creative but emanative. In this sense, the contemplation of the One produces a Divine Mind, namely “the Intellect” (νους) which is a reduction of the absolute contemplation. As this product is not as perfect as the One, it has to undergo the dichotomy between object and subject which leads to assume the object to have several aspects. So, the Intellect has two objects to consider: itself as a reduction of the One and itself as itself apart from the One.
Since the real nature of the Intellect is a reduction of the One, the former consideration shows its real nature through a sight which the Intellect has on the One. This sight consists of the whole content of the Intellect because the Intellect is noting but a reflection of the One in the One; but as the intellect is not perfect, it cannot consider the One as whole. Instead, it’s consideration on the One, contains the assumed aspects of the One as a hierarchy of ideas which is the same as the famous Platonic hierarchy of Forms. In other words, the Platonic forms are nothing but the content of the “Divine Mind”.
The latter consideration of the Intellect, in its turn, emanates a further principle which is a reduction of the Intellect, namely “the Soul” (ψυχη). This Soul is not even as contemplative as its generator. That’s why it should undo this defect through activity. Looking at the Divine Mind and its content, the Soul aims to restore the oneness of the One which has been lost through emanation. Therefore, the Soul engages with the formless primary Matter (ύλη) in order to imitate the hierarchy of ideas of the Divine Mind in the matter to make it apparently unique. Wherever that one-pointed hierarchy even partially is imitated in matter, there is life. Here, Plotinus satisfies the Aristotelian concept of life.
Thus, the Soul is identical with the platonic “Demiurge” and through its engagement with the absolutely passive matter, comes to plurality and therefore to emanate several individual souls. But even through this plurality the Soul cannot cover the whole Divine Mind in its imitation; therefore, the Soul is obliged to imitate the parts of the Divine Mind, one after another and consequently the element of time comes to the system. That’s why the material Nature (φυση) is continuously changing. Through this engagement, indeterminacy of the matter brings forgetfulness in the individual soul which should be removed by the Platonic recollection. Therefore, every soul has two aspects: a higher fully aware aspect which is in union with the cosmic Soul and a lower semi-aware aspect which has been spread over the matter creating and governing life. In this life, the individual soul tries to see a picture of its real nature intending self-realization. It’s purusārtha.
Now, let’s turn back to Al-Biruni and his misunderstanding. I prefer to explain the main points within five titles:
1. Yoga and Cittavrtti
In a phrase of the translation which stands for exposing the second sutra of the first pāda: “yogah cittavrtti nirodhah”, Al-Biruni says: “That’s to seize whatever spreads from you towards the external objects in case they are not engaged merely with you and to prevent the faculties of soul from attaching whatever apart from you.”
This understanding of cittavrtti is rather ontological than epistemological or psychological. This understanding is very harmonious with the Neo-Platonic concept of soul which spreads itself over the matter in order to create an imitation of the forms. The formal sub-arrangements of the soul according to Aristotle are the faculties of the soul. These faculties flowing towards the object and touching the object and assuming its form bring their potentiality to actuality. Therefore, the soul which is supposed to govern the object will be subordinated by the form of the object. It’s a feature of Neo-Platonic bondage which should be ceased in Yoga as well as any Neo-Platonic spiritual project.
2. Three Gunas
While according to the school of Sāmkhya-Yoga, the main feature of the material world is to be constituted by three gunas which represent the controversial manifestations of the matter, for a Platonist the main feature of the material world is to be ever changing. Al-Biruni’s understanding of the three gunas is more Platonic explaining the flux of the world. He says: “They are originative on one extreme of the Nature and terminative on the other extreme… and the mean between them takes from them whatever is apt for governing and controlling.” However, Al-Biruni’s interpretation of the three guņas reminds us rather of the three marks of reality in Jainism: “utpāda”, “vyaya” and “dhrauvya”.
3. Knowledge and Samādhi
In Al-Biruni’s translation, there is nothing as surprising as his interpretation of Samādhi. That’s on one hand too odd and on the other hand basically Platonic, so that nothing else might be so nicely passed as a sacrifice to Plato.
Vyasa explains two famous sutras of Patanjali as if the aphorist has classified Samadhi under two classes: “Samprajnāta” and “Asamprajnāta”. The former is accompanied by four features: “vitarka” which Vyasa interprets as direct perception of a gross object, “vicāra” which is interpreted as direct perception of a subtle object, “ānanda” which means joy but has been taken by Vyasa as awareness of the very process of cognition, and “asmita” which is ego-awareness. But Asamprajnāta Samādhi is a state void of those features in which only the Samskāras remain.
If Vyasa presented the objects of Samprajnāta Samādhi to Plato, as in Sāmkhya all of them are material, Plato would consider Samprajnāta Samādhi nothing than “opinion” or “doxa” (δοξα); because according to him, our cognition of the material objects is only an uncertain belief. But if Asamprajnāta Samādhi is supposed to be a higher knowledge, according to Plato, it must be identified with “episteme” (επιστημη) which is our knowledge of the rational and universal forms.
At this point, Al-Biruni, undertaking to advocate Plato, gives the following interpretation: “How many are the kinds of conception? … They are of two kinds: one of them is conception of the sensible and material objects and the second is conception of the rational and immaterial objects.”
First of all, Al-Biruni should be questioned how to translate Samādhi as conception. In order to answer to this question, it’s remarkable that as Patanjali has introduced the triad of “Kriyāyoga”, Plotinus suggests a triad as the means of spiritual development, namely “virtue”, “dialectic” and “contemplation”. This contemplation must be identified by Al-Biruni with Samādhi. The Greek word which Plotinus used for contemplation is “theoria” (θεωρια) deriving from the verb “theoro” (θεωρω) which means “I consider formally”; while, here the Arabic word used by Al-Biruni standing for Samādhi, is “taşavvur” (ﺘﺼﻮﱡﺮ) which means “to conceive of a form” deriving from word “şūrat” (ﺼﻮﺮﺓ) which means “form”. Now we can understand how Plotinus has granted permission to Al-Biruni for translating Samādhi as conception.
Furthermore, if Asamprajnāta Samādhi is supposed to be the same as the Platonic episteme and if Samskāras are the only mental content of this state, Samskāras must be understood by Al-Biruni as the recollected universal forms which should occur to a Platonically enlightened soul. But we cannot blame him for this misunderstanding because the excuse for such a thing has been offered by the ninth sutra of the fourth pāda in which Patanjali says: “… smrtti samskārayoh ekarūpatvāt” (recollection and Samskāras are of the same nature).
Now let’s see what’s the role of this epistemological dichotomy in the theory of bondage and liberation?
Patanjali in harmony with Sāmkhya declares that pain finally and helplessly is experienced in the world and the cause of this pain is a conjunction (samyoga) between the Self as the knower and the object of cognition. The latter modifies itself merely in order to be presented to the self because it wants to realize the natures of both parties through this conjunction. It’s an erroneous view because the self is already conscious even without any object. That’s why we can say that the cause of the conjunction is error.
A Neo-Platonist basically cannot agree with this view; at least, because according to Sāmkhya the matter takes modifications because it’s the principle of activity while for a Neo-Platonist, matter is absolutely passive. Additionally a Neo-Platonist like Al-Biruni is expected to interpret this theory only involving some Platonic concepts like uncertainty of sensual cognition of which the object is the unstable material particulars and certainty of rational knowledge of which the object is immaterial universals. That’s why Al-Biruni explains the point as it follows:
“When an aspect of the object of knowledge is unknown, the greed for cognition increases until that aspect becomes known and the greed gets extinguished; because in the state of bondage, the knower without an object of knowledge is a potential knower and will not be actualized unless by means of an object. For this purpose the object will be known and the engagement between the knower and the object is deserved; because the cognition is acquired through sensation. But sensation is not true due to the faults which occur in it. Whatever is not true is not known certainly and whatever lacks certainty, is misrepresented by a further ignorance. In this state the knowledge is like opinion, because the sensible object is not as stable as a rational object. When this point becomes confirmed without any doubt, that engagement will perish and the knower will get rid of the object, getting isolated and detached. It’s the meaning of liberation in which the knower is knower by its essence.”
The difference seems very narrow but we can see how he has avoided the point of disagreement and how he has inserts the Platonic notions.
4. Samāpatti
Coming to the concept of Samāpatti, Patanjali explains some initial stages of traveling from Samprajnāta Samādhi to Asamprajnāta Samādhi: the presentation of a gross object in a clear mind is a mixture of names, concepts and the very object. By purification of memory (smrti pariśuddha) the two former will be omitted and the object, as it is, will be presented. This process should be applied to the subtler objects so that finally it presents the “alinga” or “Prakrti”, the primary matter which is the source of the whole evolution.
Purification of memory, again, reminds Al-Biruni of a familiar Platonic theme: recollection. If there is a journey from Samprajnāta Samādhi to Asamprajnāta Samādhi, as we saw previously, it must be understood by Al-Biruni as a journey of soul from the material word to the realm of universals. But this interpretation basically seems problematic because Patanjali apparently describes a journey from form to matter.
Al-Biruni has rearranged his understanding in four stages which picture a Neo-Platonic spiritual progress. At the first stage the soul in its lower level, is committing its opinions of the material particular objects. This opinion is a mixture of names, conceptual attributes and the accidental differentiae. Of course this triad cannot be exactly the same as Patanjali’s because the very material object which is the third component of Patanjali’s never could be accepted by Plato to be presented in mind, otherwise it would be the very episteme. Instead of that, Al-Biruni borrows the concept of “accidental differentiae” from the greatest disciple of Plotinus, Porphyry (Πορφυριος), whose “introduction” used to be widely studied by Muslim Scholars as a part of Aristotle’s “Organon”. This stage must be identified with “savitarkā samāpatti” .
In the second stage, through recollection, the soul arrives at its higher level on which it looks at the universals by one side and the particulars only as the shadows of the universals by the other side. Al-Biruni explains that: “When it leaves those three towards the essence through which the particulars participate in the universals, the second level is attained.” Now the soul can assign each particular to its respective universals which form its essence. Due to this assignment, “the cognition is not empty of plurality” because under each universal, several particulars are recognized. Al-Biruni must have identified this stage with “nirvitarkā samāpatti” .
In the third stage, when the soul turns its back to the material world and looks at every form in its unity, as Al-Biruni claims, “it comprehends all objects as ‘One’ but manifested diversely due to time.” As we saw previously, the Soul, even on its highest level, has no capacity to cover the whole content of the Divine Mind at the same moment. Therefore, it approaches the subsets of the universals one after another. That’s just like Husserlian bracketing which forms essence. This stage must be identified with “nirvicārā samāpatti” .
In the fourth stage, only when the Soul gets union with the Intellect, it can have “the One” entirely and simultaneously in sight though as a hierarchy of the forms of which the peak is the platonic idea of the One, as Al-Biruni says: “When the existence seems timeless to him, such a person has arrived at the end of the noble fourth level and is capable of being called a ‘şeddiq’ (ﺻﺪﱢﻴﻖ).” This Arabic word deriving from the word “şedq” (ﺻﺪﻖ) which means honesty is standing for “rtambharā” . But this replacement should not be considered so simply because it’s a technical term in all Platonic traditions in the Middle East indicating a person who has arrived at the final spiritual stage and has a direct and infallible access to the ultimate reality. Here, the One which is the object of this state of knowledge must have been identified with “alinga” but this consideration is again problematic because “the One” is very close to Brahman and not by any means the same as “Prakrti” which is meant by “alinga”.
The other difficulty is that Patanjali in sutra 49 of the first pāda, assures us that the object of this stage is particular (viśesa) while the universals are the objects of the platonic episteme. Now, how has Al-Biruni justified his interpretation? Unfortunately this part of the manuscript is so badly damaged that we can get no idea ; though, it’s not so difficult to assume what the justification might be: first we should be aware that a form is a universal only as long as it is considered as some thing which is participated in by several individuals, otherwise a form is a particular idea among the other ideas. It’s the same charge which is cast by Aristotle upon the platonic theory of forms. Further, we should be aware that the Neo-Platonic One as the object of this state of knowledge in no way is a universal but a unique entity which in this term is the most particular existence. Thus, justification is over.
Regarding this stage, Al-Biruni says: “He will be like a crystal in which its entire environment is seen; as if the objects are in that but that is out of them. Likewise, he encompasses his environment so that the knowledge and the object of knowledge are united with him while he is the knower and the reasoning, the subject of reasoning and the object of reasoning will be one.” Surely, it’s a translation of sutra 41 of the same pāda. But Patanjali in this sutra doesn’t mention the union of subject, object and knowledge; instead, he only suggests these three alternatively as the objects of samāpatti. Again it’s a Neo-Platonic tendency leading Al-Biruni to such a misinterpretation: in the fourth stage the Soul as the knower is one with the Intellect which is at the same time the principle of intellection as well as the objects are the universals which are its content. The same theme is repeated by Al-Biruni translating the third sutra of the third pāda on definition of Samādhi: “that’s purification of those acts so that the consideration comes in union with the object of consideration.”
In order to show how Al-Biruni –at least in his three first stages- is influenced by Platonism, it is enough to quote a passage from Plato’s Seventh Letter: “For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, second the definition, the third, the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance, and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just uttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made up names and verbal forms. For that which has the name "round," "annular," or, "circle," might be defined as that which has the distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. Third, comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe and broken up-none of which things can happen to the circle itself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for it is something of a different order from them. Fourth, comes knowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in words nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear that it is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from the three things mentioned before. Of these things intelligence comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others are farther distant.” Here, Plato speaks of name, definition, image, knowledge (episteme) and “the thing itself imparted”; while Al-Biruni has mentioned name, conceptual attributes accidental differentiae (all in the first stage), knowledge of universals (in the second stage) and the reality of the object as one (in the third stage). I think the only note which I have to give in order to establish a full correspondence is about the third components of theirs. Platonic “image” stands for Al-Biruni’s “accidental differentiae” because as Plato has explained further, any image of the object reflects some accidental attributes so that it can differentiate itself from the other images of the same objects: “Every circle, of those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe, is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere it has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, has nothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite.”
5. Sattva, Purusa and Discriminative Knowledge
Discriminative knowledge (vivekakhyāti) is the key to liberation. By the means of this knowledge one should discriminate between Purusa and Buddhi which some times in the Yoga literature is mentioned as Sattva . In the sixth sutra of the second pāda, they are interpreted respectively as “Drk” or the power of consciousness and “Darśana” or the power of perception. Al-Biruni, translating the same sutra, interprets them as “the immaterial reason” and the “embodied reason” . These are again two standard terms in Neo-Platonism which indicate the Soul respectively in its cosmic level and individual level. Therefore he must have identified Purusa with the Soul or Psyche regarding its association with the Intellect and Buddhi with the same Soul regarding its association with matter. But in the other places, for example translating sutra 35 of the third pāda, he expresses them as Self and Heart ; although, in the traditional Indian spiritual anatomy, usually “manas” is located in the heart and not Buddhi. Probably, Al-Biruni has found his permission for such a rendering in the preceding sutra in which contemplation on heart is said to lead to awareness of consciousness (hrdaye cittasamvit) . The Arabic word which he has used here for the soul is “nafs” (ﻨﻔﺲ) which means “self” and is a standard term which is used by Arab Neo-Platonists for Psyche (the Soul) while word Psyche in Greek language, some times means “heart.” According to Muslim Philosophers, heart is the point at which the soul touches the body and gets embodied.
What’s the basic difference between heart and soul (Buddhi and Purusa)? Al-Biruni’s answer, though satisfying the Greeks, in no extend can be in harmony with Sāmkhya-Yoga: “One may think the heart is identical with the soul … but in fact, the soul is knower and the heart is living. This fact is not veiled for him if he has made the heart empty of the world. Then he will know his real essence.” The motive behind this interpretation can be understood only when we remember the relationship between soul and life in the Neo-Platonic view as we explained at the beginning of the present paper.
The same notice should be applied to Al-Biruni’s understanding of the last sutra of the third pāda in which Patanjali claims that when Buddhi and Purusa are equal in purity, there is liberation . Al-Biruni says: “as long as the heart is not purified as the soul is pure so that they are one in attributes, there is no liberation.” In a Neo-Platonic reading, it means liberation is on hand only if the individual soul is in union with the cosmic Soul. It reminds us of the last words of Plotinus: “Strive to give back the Divine in yourselves to the Divine in the All.” This purification of heart is the same thing which Al-Biruni understands of Samādhi.
***
Now, I dare to proclaim that whatever Al-Biruni has done is not a contribution to Yoga but a great contribution to Neo-Platonism. Whether this contribution was conscious or unconscious, whether he deliberately avoided violating Neo-Platonism or he could not simply be free from his philosophical tendencies, I cannot pass any comment. However, he gave me a framework to adapt a yoga system for Neo-Platonism. Regarding the historical role of Neo-Platonism in the Middle East, a place from which I have come, this contribution is too important for me although I am aware that a man in the modern world, just like Aristotle in the classic world, can state that Neo-Platonism is a cure for which there is no disease any longer.
Notes
Is Darśana a Pramāna?
Traditionally, pramāna is a sub class of jñāna while Darśana is a counter class of jñāna. Therefore traditionally, the answer to the titled question is negative. But I think it costs to try the stitches of pramāna on the body of Darśana not in order to show how the latter my put on the former, but in order to critique the figure of Darśana. A motive behind this suggestion is that the pramāna – however it is defined – is the major measure of every Indian epistemological school.
Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri has given a long list of the various interpretations on Darśana in his book, Jain Epistemology . The very wide variety by itself indicates a problematically debated issue. Usually, this case appears historically when a school has inherited a tradition which is difficult to reconcile with the further and more systematical developments of the school.
Vādi Devasūra in his logical treatise has a brief mention to Darśana only in order to distinguish that from avagraha : “apprehension of the thing in its aspect of mere existence”. The commentator expresses this stage of sensation with this impression: “something is”.
Jain thinkers don’t avoid identifying Darśana in principle with the Buddhist idea of nirvikalpa perception, a non-judgmental cognition of which according to the Buddhist the object is the pure individual or svalaksana, though the Jaina are not fond of what the Buddhist assign to nirvikalpa as object. According to them, though Darśana may be non-judgmental , its object is the most general aspect of the object which is existence. The difference refers to the metaphysical gap: for the Buddhist existence is ultimately individual while for the Jaina it is general as well as individual. For the Buddhist this nirvikalpa is the most essential pramāna because it causes the other so-called pramānas, while for the Jaina as the essence of pramāna is to be determinative, a non determinative sensation can have no role in production of a pramāna. Therefore, Darśana cannot be pramāna and pramāna -hood should start from avagraha in which there is a “lesser general aspect” . Dr. Shastri shows how this interpretation is not a generally accepted one, but let’s, for the sake of progression of the argument, limit ourselves to this interpretation. Here, aphorism assumes that existence is the most general characteristic of an object. An example can show how much this statement may raise challenges:
Suppose there is a hierarchy of universals which can be predicated to a subject. When a universal is above another universal, for example ‘animal’ which is above ‘man’, to be a man implies to be an animal. It is the basis of the first figure of syllogism. Now if existence is the supreme universal, then to be a man should implies to exist. In other words, if existence is the supreme universal (or the most general characteristic), the statement ‘man exists’ should be an analytic statement; while obviously it’s not. Aristotle clarifies this point that there is no category above his ten categories. Therefore, we cannot say that by Darśana we apprehend the most general aspect of the object which on account of generality needs to be determined. If the statement ‘X exists’ -as we showed- is a synthetic statement, it’s a determination by itself. Therefore it can be a pramāna .
A Jaina may respond that the statement ‘X exists’ cannot be a determination unless the subject X has been already determined. Therefore the concerned statement cannot be determinative if it is the first statement issued on X. It means if Darśana is supposed to be the result of the first touch with the object it cannot be determinative. It means the statement ‘X exists’ is not an appropriate expression for the Stage of Darśana; because if X absolutely is not determined, the statement seems nonsense. Apparently, if a Jaina wants to be precise in the case of Darśana, instead of the concerned statement, should state merely: “Existence!!!” so that the subject X is ruled out of the statement. But if that is the case, we should ask what links the new precise statement to the object. In other words, how we can claim that the Darśana is ‘the Darśana of the concerned object’? If the Jaina said that the Darśana is ‘the Darśana of the object’ because in its production the object has role, the epistemological status is Darśana is denied because this Jaina’s explanation is only an ontological explanation. It means that if the Jaina wants to insist on denying Darśana as a pramāna, Darśana should be understood as ‘frequent remembrance of existence through sensation’. This sense of Darśana, rather than being assigned to any object will be assigned to time. A funny consequent of this consideration is that if two objects are sensed in the same time, they cannot create two Darśana, otherwise we should accept that two simultaneous sensations are not possible. If that is the case and if a pramāna is insisted on to illuminate a new object, Darśana cannot be a pramāna.
Now, leaving aside the preceding argument, let’s concentrate on the expression which is suggested by the commentator of Vādi Devasūra’s treatise: “something is.” Let’s ask what is meant by ‘something’. Some possibilities are there:
1) ‘Something’ means ‘a being’
2) ‘Something’ means ‘a being apart from the other beings’.
3) ‘Something’ means ‘being in general’.
4) ‘Something’ means ‘a possessor of thing-ness’
5) ‘Something’ has no meaning but it has only reference.
The first and the second possibilities are very close to each other so that in both of them (especially in the second one) particularity of the object is considered while Darśana is not supposed to meet particularity of the object. A Jaina may respond that as particularity and generality according to Jain philosophy are not separable, it’s not possible to meet generality without particularity. If we accept this defense, it entails that a Darśana defined by the means of absolute generality is not possible but I thing it’s a conclusion which a Jaina avoids. Furthermore, although generality and particularity according to Jain philosophy are not separable, they are distinguishable. Their inseparability is an ontological issue while in epistemology we concern distinction.
The third possibility is equal to say: “existence exists”. Now, it is reasonable to ask whether this statement is analytic or synthetic. For almost all medieval philosophers the statement definitely was analytic: existing is the meaning of existence while the modern philosophy has started with Descartes taking the statement as a synthetic statement. If the statement is taken as an analytic one, there is no need to have experience in order to establish that and therefore Darśana is in vain and if the statement is synthetic there is no reference to the concerned object in the statement and the case will refer to the argument which we gave previously.
The fourth possibility can be taken separately providing the meaning of ‘thing-ness’ is not supposed to be the same as existence. It is possible; for example a ‘golden mountain’ can be expressed as a thing whether it exists or not. It means that ‘thing-ness’ is not always the same as existence. But I have doubt whether this sense of thing-ness can be applied to non-substantial categories. For example, is it correct to say the color ‘red’ is a thing? Even I have doubt whether the last doubt of mine is created by a merely linguistic habitual confusion or not. If thing-ness refers only to the substance and if Darśana is going to be interpreted in this way, the object of Darśana can be only the substance. Again I guest this conclusion is not pleasant to the Jaina. Let’s ignore these doubts and suppose that ‘thing-ness’ is applicable to all categories. Therefore, Darśana should be expressed by this phrase: “a possessor of ‘thing-ness’ exists.” Here, two generalities are assigned to the object: ‘thing-ness’ and ‘existence’. Here we don’t deal with a simple generality but with some extents of details. Furthermore, if ‘thing-ness’ is not essentially the same as existence, the statement will be synthetic. The problem is that: any synthetic statement presupposes the existence of its subject. For example a man is a rational animal whether any man exists or not, because it’s an analytic statement but a man has heart only if a man exists, because it’s a synthetic statement. It means, the fourth possibility cannot be a good possibility because it deserves the statement to state what must have been previously supposed stating the statement.
I would like to postpone going through the fifth possibility until I explain my own suggestion.
Any way, I think all these difficulties have appeared because Jain philosophy tries to introduce some thing with all functions of a pramāna not as a pramāna. I say ‘with all functions of a pramāna’ because Darśana is expected by the Jaina to reveal some true information about a certain newly perceived object in the form of ‘subject-predicate’ while they avoid granting the title of pramāna to Darśana.
My suggestion is that, though Darśana cannot be directly a pramāna with respect to the object but it is a pramāna with respect to ‘sensual stimulation’ or if the Jaina prefers more, ‘jīva’s operation’. The object of Darśana, in fact, can be only ‘stimulation’ and its content is as existential as the content of the other pramānas. Additionally, it means, there is no Darśana for a Darśana otherwise it deserves an infinite regress. On the other hand, Darśana is a pramāna which never can be confused with an apramāna. This fact that the object exists, is the matter of a further, though immediate, inference of which the ‘hetu’ is maintained by Darśana. Because here, hetu (stimulation of sensation) cannot be explained unless it is assumed to be ‘object oriented’. Therefore, Darśana doesn’t determine the so-called object (the stimulating object) and doesn’t give a meaning to that object. It only gives a reference to the object which will be determined through inference.
Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri has given a long list of the various interpretations on Darśana in his book, Jain Epistemology . The very wide variety by itself indicates a problematically debated issue. Usually, this case appears historically when a school has inherited a tradition which is difficult to reconcile with the further and more systematical developments of the school.
Vādi Devasūra in his logical treatise has a brief mention to Darśana only in order to distinguish that from avagraha : “apprehension of the thing in its aspect of mere existence”. The commentator expresses this stage of sensation with this impression: “something is”.
Jain thinkers don’t avoid identifying Darśana in principle with the Buddhist idea of nirvikalpa perception, a non-judgmental cognition of which according to the Buddhist the object is the pure individual or svalaksana, though the Jaina are not fond of what the Buddhist assign to nirvikalpa as object. According to them, though Darśana may be non-judgmental , its object is the most general aspect of the object which is existence. The difference refers to the metaphysical gap: for the Buddhist existence is ultimately individual while for the Jaina it is general as well as individual. For the Buddhist this nirvikalpa is the most essential pramāna because it causes the other so-called pramānas, while for the Jaina as the essence of pramāna is to be determinative, a non determinative sensation can have no role in production of a pramāna. Therefore, Darśana cannot be pramāna and pramāna -hood should start from avagraha in which there is a “lesser general aspect” . Dr. Shastri shows how this interpretation is not a generally accepted one, but let’s, for the sake of progression of the argument, limit ourselves to this interpretation. Here, aphorism assumes that existence is the most general characteristic of an object. An example can show how much this statement may raise challenges:
Suppose there is a hierarchy of universals which can be predicated to a subject. When a universal is above another universal, for example ‘animal’ which is above ‘man’, to be a man implies to be an animal. It is the basis of the first figure of syllogism. Now if existence is the supreme universal, then to be a man should implies to exist. In other words, if existence is the supreme universal (or the most general characteristic), the statement ‘man exists’ should be an analytic statement; while obviously it’s not. Aristotle clarifies this point that there is no category above his ten categories. Therefore, we cannot say that by Darśana we apprehend the most general aspect of the object which on account of generality needs to be determined. If the statement ‘X exists’ -as we showed- is a synthetic statement, it’s a determination by itself. Therefore it can be a pramāna .
A Jaina may respond that the statement ‘X exists’ cannot be a determination unless the subject X has been already determined. Therefore the concerned statement cannot be determinative if it is the first statement issued on X. It means if Darśana is supposed to be the result of the first touch with the object it cannot be determinative. It means the statement ‘X exists’ is not an appropriate expression for the Stage of Darśana; because if X absolutely is not determined, the statement seems nonsense. Apparently, if a Jaina wants to be precise in the case of Darśana, instead of the concerned statement, should state merely: “Existence!!!” so that the subject X is ruled out of the statement. But if that is the case, we should ask what links the new precise statement to the object. In other words, how we can claim that the Darśana is ‘the Darśana of the concerned object’? If the Jaina said that the Darśana is ‘the Darśana of the object’ because in its production the object has role, the epistemological status is Darśana is denied because this Jaina’s explanation is only an ontological explanation. It means that if the Jaina wants to insist on denying Darśana as a pramāna, Darśana should be understood as ‘frequent remembrance of existence through sensation’. This sense of Darśana, rather than being assigned to any object will be assigned to time. A funny consequent of this consideration is that if two objects are sensed in the same time, they cannot create two Darśana, otherwise we should accept that two simultaneous sensations are not possible. If that is the case and if a pramāna is insisted on to illuminate a new object, Darśana cannot be a pramāna.
Now, leaving aside the preceding argument, let’s concentrate on the expression which is suggested by the commentator of Vādi Devasūra’s treatise: “something is.” Let’s ask what is meant by ‘something’. Some possibilities are there:
1) ‘Something’ means ‘a being’
2) ‘Something’ means ‘a being apart from the other beings’.
3) ‘Something’ means ‘being in general’.
4) ‘Something’ means ‘a possessor of thing-ness’
5) ‘Something’ has no meaning but it has only reference.
The first and the second possibilities are very close to each other so that in both of them (especially in the second one) particularity of the object is considered while Darśana is not supposed to meet particularity of the object. A Jaina may respond that as particularity and generality according to Jain philosophy are not separable, it’s not possible to meet generality without particularity. If we accept this defense, it entails that a Darśana defined by the means of absolute generality is not possible but I thing it’s a conclusion which a Jaina avoids. Furthermore, although generality and particularity according to Jain philosophy are not separable, they are distinguishable. Their inseparability is an ontological issue while in epistemology we concern distinction.
The third possibility is equal to say: “existence exists”. Now, it is reasonable to ask whether this statement is analytic or synthetic. For almost all medieval philosophers the statement definitely was analytic: existing is the meaning of existence while the modern philosophy has started with Descartes taking the statement as a synthetic statement. If the statement is taken as an analytic one, there is no need to have experience in order to establish that and therefore Darśana is in vain and if the statement is synthetic there is no reference to the concerned object in the statement and the case will refer to the argument which we gave previously.
The fourth possibility can be taken separately providing the meaning of ‘thing-ness’ is not supposed to be the same as existence. It is possible; for example a ‘golden mountain’ can be expressed as a thing whether it exists or not. It means that ‘thing-ness’ is not always the same as existence. But I have doubt whether this sense of thing-ness can be applied to non-substantial categories. For example, is it correct to say the color ‘red’ is a thing? Even I have doubt whether the last doubt of mine is created by a merely linguistic habitual confusion or not. If thing-ness refers only to the substance and if Darśana is going to be interpreted in this way, the object of Darśana can be only the substance. Again I guest this conclusion is not pleasant to the Jaina. Let’s ignore these doubts and suppose that ‘thing-ness’ is applicable to all categories. Therefore, Darśana should be expressed by this phrase: “a possessor of ‘thing-ness’ exists.” Here, two generalities are assigned to the object: ‘thing-ness’ and ‘existence’. Here we don’t deal with a simple generality but with some extents of details. Furthermore, if ‘thing-ness’ is not essentially the same as existence, the statement will be synthetic. The problem is that: any synthetic statement presupposes the existence of its subject. For example a man is a rational animal whether any man exists or not, because it’s an analytic statement but a man has heart only if a man exists, because it’s a synthetic statement. It means, the fourth possibility cannot be a good possibility because it deserves the statement to state what must have been previously supposed stating the statement.
I would like to postpone going through the fifth possibility until I explain my own suggestion.
Any way, I think all these difficulties have appeared because Jain philosophy tries to introduce some thing with all functions of a pramāna not as a pramāna. I say ‘with all functions of a pramāna’ because Darśana is expected by the Jaina to reveal some true information about a certain newly perceived object in the form of ‘subject-predicate’ while they avoid granting the title of pramāna to Darśana.
My suggestion is that, though Darśana cannot be directly a pramāna with respect to the object but it is a pramāna with respect to ‘sensual stimulation’ or if the Jaina prefers more, ‘jīva’s operation’. The object of Darśana, in fact, can be only ‘stimulation’ and its content is as existential as the content of the other pramānas. Additionally, it means, there is no Darśana for a Darśana otherwise it deserves an infinite regress. On the other hand, Darśana is a pramāna which never can be confused with an apramāna. This fact that the object exists, is the matter of a further, though immediate, inference of which the ‘hetu’ is maintained by Darśana. Because here, hetu (stimulation of sensation) cannot be explained unless it is assumed to be ‘object oriented’. Therefore, Darśana doesn’t determine the so-called object (the stimulating object) and doesn’t give a meaning to that object. It only gives a reference to the object which will be determined through inference.
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