Notes on Referential Theory of Meaning

Since I cannot convince myself of leaving loyalty towards ‘the referential theory of meaning’, in this paper I will try to present and justify briefly my version of this theory which is some how deferent from Mill’s as well as Frege’s.

Postulations
Two statements I would like to assume as postulations for which I have no justification and I can summon only the intuitions as witness:

i) Whatever has causal efficiency is existent; tritely because we cannot assign an effect to some thing which absolutely doesn’t exist.
ii) Whatever exists can be denoted; because the sentence ‘there is some thing which cannot be denoted’ is paradoxical (because as soon as one utters this sentence, he denotes that ‘thing’ through the subject of the sentence.)


Argument for existence of the reference
Take the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which allegedly has no reference because there is no one ‘presently’ governing ‘France’ as a ‘King’. Frege says that though it doesn’t have a reference, it has a sense which is its ‘mode of expression’. This mode of expression, according to Frege, is understood through logical analysis of the phrase rather than pointing out a reference which it denotes. Some phrases have both reference and sense (like ‘present Prime Minister of India’ of which the reference is Man Mohan Sing) and some phrases have only reference without a sense (like Aristotle as a proper noun, though Russell claims that even the proper nouns are descriptive and therefore we can assign some thing like sense to them).

Now, after this Fregean distinction, suppose we have the following sentence:

(1) Present King of France is a king.

This sentence which Frege classifies as a non-informative sentence is acceptable[1], while the following sentence is not acceptable:

(2) Man Mohan Sing is a king.

Therefore, we can say that there is some thing related to the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which makes the sentence (1) acceptable and is lacked by the phrase ‘Man Mohan Sing’. It’s not reasonable to search that thing in the phonetic properties of the phrase. Frege would say it is its sense which makes the sentence (1) acceptable. It means it’s a causal efficiency of the sense to make the sentence (1) acceptable. Therefore, according to the postulation (i), the sense exists! And as the sense exists, according to the postulation (ii) it can be denoted. Let me show a phrase which denotes the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ as /Present King of France/. In fact I would like (as I have done) to claim that the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ is the reference of the phrase /Present King of France/, because if by denoting a reference through a phrase we mean to point out an existent object among the likes, /Present King of France/ points out the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of France’ which as we proved exists among the other senses which also in the same way exist.

Now take the following sentence which is also acceptable:

(3) Present King of France is not a king (because it doesn’t have the functions of a king.)

Here again the same demonstration can be applied: there is some thing related to the phrase ‘Present King of France’ to make the sentence (3) acceptable and this aspect should exist. As the Fregean reference of the phrase doesn’t exist, it should be again the sense which makes the sentence acceptable. But how one thing can cause two contradictory phrases? I leave this problem here only concluding that what makes the sentence (1) acceptable is some aspect of the sense which must differ from that aspect of the sense which makes the sentence (3) acceptable, though in both cases the sense exist as a reference for /Present King of France/.

Now let’s bring the following very acceptable sentence in our notice:

(4) The Present King of Nepal is fat.[2]

Here, obviously the sense of the phrase ‘Present King of Nepal’ doesn’t make this sentence acceptable but it is the Fregean reference which has this role. In other words, in order to accept or reject this sentence, we cannot merely analyze the sense of the phrase but we should go and see whether its reference is fat or not. The same case would be if France had still a monarch with negation of the sentence (3). It means we should go and see whether he had the functions of a king or not and as it would be true that he had the functions of a king we should accept the negation of sentence (3). Now one can ask how reference in this case would have ceased the causal efficiency of the sense.

Now we have faced three kind of denotation:

a) Denotation of reference as in the sentence (4)
b) Denotation of the sense as in the sentence (1)
c) Denotation of the sense as in the sentence (3)

We should show how they are related to each other. Frege simply has said that the sense determines the reference, though in the case of the phrases which have only sense without reference this function of sense in suspended. It explains a dichotomy between sense and reference but here we have a triad which I have distinguished in the cases a, b and c.


Platonic review
Let us have a Platonic glance to the case because I think this glance can illuminate the case partially[3]. We should note that ‘Present King of France’ for Plato might represent two things of two categories:

1) A lower rank universal which participates in three higher universals, namely ‘presence’[4], ‘monarchy’ and ‘French-hood’;
2) A particular man who governs France;

Thus, the three cases mentioned above will be understood by Plato as follows:

a) The sentence (4) means: The particular ‘Present King of Nepal’ participates in the universal ‘fatness’.
b) The sentence (1) means: the universal ‘Present King of France’ participates in the universal ‘monarch’.
c) The sentence (3) means: the universal ‘present King of France’ is not a particular participating in the universal ‘monarch’.

Here, two points should be remarked:

First: according to Plato a universal may be participated in by a lower universal as well as a particular.

Second: as Aristotle critically has mentioned, the Platonic universals in their turns are particulars because a Platonic universal is a unique entity among the universals.

Both preceding points show that how a Platonic universal may function as a particular though basically they belong to two distinctive categories. Additionally, a universal determines the nature of a particular as well as its own nature as a certain universal. It’s a function of a universal which is common among the other universals while this function doesn’t reveal universality of a universal which again is common among the universals. It means the mode of existence of a universal (its universality) is some thing different from its unique nature (table-ness, man-ness and so on) as well as the mode of existence of a particular is some thing different from its nature which is determined by the universal in which it participates. The main thesis of Plato’s is that the nature which a particular receives from a universal is the same as the nature of that universal otherwise they have nothing to do with each other unless there is another entity maintaining their link and it deserves infinite regress. Here we have a triad: the mode of existence of the universal (universality), the mode of existence of the particular (particularity) and the determinative nature which is common between particular and universal. Thus, in both universal and particular two aspects are distinguishable: the mode of existence and the determinative nature.

The same pattern confidently can be applied to sense and reference. Here we can distinguish three aspects: mode of existence of the sense (its sensuality), mode of existence of the reference (empirical existence) and the determinative nature (common between them so that sense can determine the reference). All functions refer to the mode of existence otherwise if it referred to the determinative nature, as the determinative nature is common between them, the functions must be the same while the sense of the ‘Present King of Nepal’ cannot govern over the people but only the reference of this phrase has the function of governing.

Now let’s see our exemplary sentences again:

a) The sentence (4) is acceptable as long as the mode of existence of the reference of the subject is considered.
b) The sentence (1) is acceptable as long as the determinative nature of the sense of the subject is considered.
c) The sentence (3) is acceptable as long as the mode of existence of the sense of the subject is considered.

Now, based on this distinction, we can rearrange our concept of synthetic (informative) and analytic (non-informative) sentence. It is not pointless because one can ask what makes a synthetic statement, informative and an analytic statement, non-informative. Apparently in both synthetic and analytic statements the subject denotes a ‘determinative nature’. In a synthetic statement the predicate is a mode of existence which is assigned to the subject and in an analytic statement, the predicate is again denoting a ‘determinative nature’.

For example when we say:

(5) A triangle is a shape with three sides.

We state only about the nature of triangle however it exists; but when we say:

(6) The sum of the internal angels of a triangle makes 180 degrees.

We state a statement which shows how the existence of a triangle is in harmony with the theorems of the Euclidean geometry. As evidence it is enough to be aware that in some non-Euclidean geometry, this amount is more than 180 degree while a triangle still has three sides. If that is the case, all existential statements, tritely must be synthetic because they assert a mode of existence. Now let examine a negative existential statement like:

(7) Atlantis is not existent.

We should be aware that in the ordinary language by existent usually we mean a class of existents which can be found apart from mind. Therefore, the mode of existence of a ‘sense’ which depends totally upon mind usually is not meant by the word ‘existent’. Hence, the sentence (7) means that this mode of existence is not applicable to a determinative nature which is indicated and inhered by the sense of ‘Atlantis’. Here, the reference of the word ‘Atlantis’ is the ‘determinative nature’ which exists in the ‘sense’ of Atlantis. But if we say:

(8) Atlantis was existent.

Though the subject has the same meaning, there is no contradiction because the mode of existence meant by ‘was exist’, is different from the mode of existence meant by ‘is existent’[5]. And again the following sentence also not contradictorily is acceptable:

(9) Atlantis is existent.

if by existent, the mode of existent of a sense is meant. In all these three sentences the meaning of the subject is the same: the ‘determinative nature’ which is indicated and inhered by the ‘sense’ but the difference, is in the mode of predication.

I think by the means of this kind of argument we can restore the referential theory of meaning.
Notes:
[1] Here I prefer using ‘acceptable’ instead of ‘true’ avoiding some logical traps around truth-values which threaten the above sentence while it is also acceptable that ‘present King of France is not a king’ because doesn’t have any function of a king.
[2] This paper has been written in May-2008 while the Maoists of Nepal had not ceased monarchy as yet.
[3] I don’t mind whether Plato is allowed in a twenty century philosophy of language. As the writer of this paper, I think I have enough rights to invite him.
[4] Though Plato never assumed a universal for tenses, we have supposed that his answer to Aristotle who asked in his metaphysics, whether the tenses have universal or not, is affirmative.
[5] I believe that ‘having been existent’ as it is reflected in its grammatical structure, is a mode of existence which presently exists because it makes the sentence (8) acceptable. Therefore according to the postulation (i), it must exist.