On Plato’s Cratylus

I will try in this paper to give a simple summary of Cratylus, a dialogue by Plato which is known as the main source in which his linguistical opinions are reflected[1]. Then I shall try to show its relationship with the philosophy of language while initially I shall undertake to investigate whether there is such a relationship or not.

I dare to divide the whole body of the dialogue into six parts including an introduction and five arguments.


Introduction

The debate starts on correctness of names. The main rival opinions are standing for the alternative answers to the question whether correctness of a name is a matter of convention or not. Here, there is a piracy which has been committed by Plato: while the opponent of Plato’s Socrates has started the enquiry about lexicographical correctness of the words regarding the natural function of language, Socrates takes the enquiry as if it is on ethical correctness[2]. In other words, instead of questioning how a name means its object, Socrates questions how an object should be correctly named. Here there is confusion between correct name and good name. That’s why Socrates, throughout the dialogue, inclines to replace gradually the word correctness with the word fitness. Further, we will find Socrates admitting bad names to function linguistically. Here Socrates doesn’t concern application of a given language but creation of an ideal language.


First Argument:
The Teleological Argument

The first argument of the dialogue is teleological. If we are not ready to accept Protagoras who claims that ‘man is the measure of every thing’ and Euthydemus who says that ‘all things equally are of all natures’[3], we should admit that every thing has its objective nature. This statement can be extended over actions. The special nature of every action deserves the instruments of that action to be of a special nature. Speaking is an action and calling[4] is a part of speaking. The aim of calling is information and distinction according to the nature of the objects, therefore the names which are the instruments for this action should be formed so that, by the means of them, this expectation can be fulfilled.

Since the language looks like a band of rules, the action of naming must be of the same nature as legislation. Therefore it is reasonable to call the name giver as legislator. The legislator should form the names regarding the nature of objects and give them to the objects. Here, as instruments can be formed of alternative matters, the vocal aspect of a name (letters and syllables which have been taken by Socrates as matter for words) can differ but the form should be exactly the must perfect form which can fulfill the aim of calling. That’s why the objects may have several names.

As the art of instrument making and the art of applying the instrument are not the same, the function of the legislator and the function of the speaker are not exactly the same. The former makes the instrument and the latter use that. Usually the skillful user is the most authorized person to judge whether the instrument is appropriate or not. In the case of names of which the purpose is to inform and distinguish the nature of the objects, the skillful user is the speaker who is fully aware of the nature of the object. This kind of user is named by Socrates as ‘Dialectician’.[5]

Second Argument:
The Philological and Etiological Argument

Now, let’s investigate how a name can be fit with its object or in the other words how is a good name which is to be a perfect instrument for information and distinction. The most perfect names must be made by the must perfect legislators with the guidance of the must perfect dialecticians. They must have the best knowledge of the nature of the objects and therefore they must be the wisest speakers. Therefore a name which is given by a god is better than a name which is given by a man and a name which is given by a wise ancestor is better than a name which is given by a modern descendant and likewise a name given by a man is better than a name given by a woman.

Surveying the works by Homer[6] and Hesiod[7] we come to know that the proper nouns used by the ancient wise people, whether indicating gods or heroes or places, have been derived from some common or abstract nouns which give reference to the characteristics of their owners.[8] The common nouns (like the names of natural elements) also in their turn have been derived from the abstract nouns which describe their essence and some abstract nouns in the same manner are taken from some other abstract nouns so that Socrates can proclaim that the ancient legislators were after describing the essences through naming. Therefore, as they are the best examples, the criterion for fitness of a name is to describe the essence of the object which is named.

If it is necessary to avoid infinite regress, there should be some names which haven’t been derived from the other names: “the primary elements which need not be resolved to any further thing”. Then will be a matter of question that if not by the means of convention, by which means they can be good names. With respect to this question, initially three answers may occur to mind:

The primary words are given by the gods, therefore they are good names.
The primary words are taken from the foreign languages; therefore the question should be ceased because the criterion of fitness cannot be examined on them in our language.
The origin of the primary words is veiled by antiquity so that it’s not possible to question whether they are fit or not.

To Socrates all these answers seem as unreasonable excuses. The same criterion of fitness must be applicable to the primary words.

Language is a unique faculty, whether it manifests in verbal language or in body language. As in body language, through bodily motions we imitate the objects, verbal language must have the same function. Now it is the part of the letters to imitate the nature of objects. For this sake, the physical position of the tongue and the other vocal instruments in the mouth should imitate the essence of the object. It means when we are speaking, a drama is on stage in our mouth.[9] Therefore, a good primary name is the name of which the letters have the same nature as the object: a vocal imitation of the object.


Third Argument:
Return of Convention

Naming is a kind of legislation. Since a bad rule is as legal as a good rule, a bad name is as indicative as a good name. Here, Socrates admits that the notion of correctness which he has concerned has noting to do with the linguistical function of a name. The ordinary language is full of bad names[10] but functioning yet.

On the other hand, the criterion of fitness ultimately refers to imitation and imitation is nothing but creating similarity. Therefore the best name is the most similar name to the object. The most perfect similarity is identity. It means the best name should be identical with the object while it is impossible because at least a name is a combination of syllables while the object my not be of this matter. This imperfection allows the best possible name to be made in several ways. That’s why even in two dialects of one language the names of the same object may differ from each other. Therefore even in the case of the best possible name, imitation cannot be the only criterion and another criterion should take part. This second criterion can be only convention.

Furthermore, it is not possible to imitate all objects by the means of syllables. For example, how we can imitate the essence of a certain number by the verbal peculiarities of the letters? Here again the principle of convention should be accepted.

Thus Socrates modifying his initial suggestion accepts that a good name should resemble its object as much as possible but when it is not possible, convention should be allowed.


Fourth Argument:
Use of Name

Here, the opponent says that if the principle of convention is accepted, how the name can reveal the real nature of the object while we have said that the use of a name is to inform the nature of the object so that the object can be revealed through the name.


As an answer, Socrates tries to distinguish between the informative function and the indicative function of the name. Then, he declares that for a name in its natural function, indication is the only necessary function which can be maintained merely by the principle of convention. It’s enough to be there a clear agreement between the speaker and the addressee on the meaning of a name.

Then, if that is the case, how we can distinguish between an informative name and an indicative name which are considered respectively as a good name and a bad name while the names are the only instrument for learning? Therefore if there is no insurance against deception by a name, learning is impossible; because before learning the fact about the real nature of an object, we cannot judge whether the given name for the object is revealing the nature of the object through imitation or it merely indicates the object without any information about its nature and learning the fact is possible only by the means of the informative names. Now, if an informative name is taken by mistake as an indicative name, the path of learning about the nature of the object is blocked and if an indicative name is taken by mistake as an informative name, we are led astray about the nature of the object because an indicative name which is a bad name doesn’t imitate the real essence of the object.

Socrates’ solution to this difficulty is to deny the name is as the only way of learning. Otherwise the first legislator could not give the first good name to the first named object, because as it would be the first name, the legislator must have not learnt the nature of the object previously due to absence of its name and he must have been ignorant and unable to give a good name to the object imitating and revealing its nature. Therefore, there must be another way to learn the real nature of the object not through the names by through the very object. Therefore, there is no problem with accepting the principle of convention analyzing the natural function of language.


Fifth Argument:
A Platonic Argument on Real Object of a Name

If we have right to ask what is a true or good name for an object, we must have right to ask what is the true object for a name. This argument is mentioned by Socrates very briefly (almost as a hint) nearly at the end of the dialogue and is left without enough stress and expected conclusion so that we should reconstruct the argument according to the platonic thought.

If we believe, like Heraclitus[11], that the objects are in flux[12], when we call an object by its good name which reveals its real nature, even before finishing our utterance, the name is not a good name for the object any longer because meanwhile, the nature of the object has changed. Therefore there is no good name applicable to ever-changing objects and all names which we apply for this sort of objects are just conventional names[13]. Therefore, though it is not concluded by Socrates, if there is a real object for a good name, it should be an eternal and motionless object which must be only a universal or a Platonic Idea. The only possible consequent is that the good names are appropriate only for universals and all application of names to the particulars is a matter of convention. Therefore, whenever we apply an informative name to a particular, roughly and indirectly we indicate the universal in which the object participates. But it’s remarkable that although whole this conclusion is not mentioned in this dialogue, this theme –as a typical platonic theme, is clearly found in the other dialogues by Plato.


Over viewing

In the dialogue which we have just reviewed, with respect to names, two kind of correctness, initially interchangeably and finally distinctly are considered: indicative correctness and informative correctness. Indicative correctness refers to the natural function of language. If it’s the question that when a person utters a name, how the others understand the object which is meant by him; the question is about indicative correctness. But there is another facility in naming which functions regarding dramatic or informative correctness. According to this concept of correctness a name is correctly applied if it reveals the nature of its object through imitating the essence of the object. This facility should not be missed by a wise though otherwise the natural function of the name is not necessarily damaged.

In order to maintain indicative correctness, it’s enough to observe the principle of convention while in order to maintain informative correctness there should be a wise name maker who is aware of the nature of objects as well as the nature of syllables. As wisdom for Plato finally is the same as goodness and morality, informative correctness is a moral principle rather than a principle which has any thing to do with the philosophy of language.

However, as no one can be precisely aware of the nature of an individual object, informative correctness cannot be applied as far as the individual as an individual is concerned. Informative correctness only can be applied to the universals which are participated in by the concerned individual. Otherwise in the case of individuals as individuals, the principle of convention should maintain an indicative correctness. It means it is not the case that the universals bind the individual object and the name as such, to each other but only good names (which are not necessarily the lexicographically correct names) are bound to the objects by the means of universals.

Historically, the dialogue attempts against two sophistical theories. The first is a theory which assumes the principle of convention as the only criterion for correctness. Although Plato has given a long argument against this theory, his Socrates finally accepts some extents of that as if it doesn’t threaten his philosophy so seriously, while the second theory, though having been charged briefly, is the serious opponent of platonic epistemology. This theory assumes the names to reveal the nature of the objects so that they are the only source of our knowledge. This theory violates the platonic theory of ‘recollection’ and its premises like the concepts of ‘doxa’ and ‘episteme’.

Notes:
[1] My only source in this paper is Cratylus, a dialogue by Plato, translated to English by Benjamin Jowett in 1871, available at: http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/plato/cratylus.htm. The very dialogue is full of analogies –as it is Socrates’ method. I omitted all of them trying to show the essential lines in the arguments.
[2] Here, I should use axiological correctness instead of ethical correctness; but as good and bad which can be understood here as appropriate and non-appropriate, finally for Plato have ethical stress, let me use mischievously what I have used in the above text.

[3] If we accept them, we will be called Sophist and it’s not good for our reputation; at least Plato and Aristotle will not be so happy with us.

[4] In the present paper, I mean by calling to apply a given name for pointing its respective object, while to give a name to an object is expressed as naming.

[5] Though Socrates is not allowed by his dialectical and political method to mention directly, but whoever is familiar with Platonic literature must understand that this dialectician who is fully aware of the nature of things is the same as the Philosopher who is designated by Plato to be the ruler. It means in the platonic dictatorship, even there is no freedom for naming. The case of freedom of speech can be assumed by the reader.

[6] The most famous ancient Greek poet (ca. 8th century BC) whose Iliad and Odyssey are referred in this dialogue.

[7] Another ancient Greek poet (about 700 BC), though standing on the second step of fame, whose Theogony and Works and Days are referred in this dialogue.

[8] The pseudo-etymological method of Socrates in this dialogue seems very funny to a modern etymologist.
[9] For example, Socrates suggests that the sound /r/, due to restlessness of the tongue in the mouth while /r/ is pronounced, connotes speed and motion. Therefore, a word in which there is /r/ should be expected to denote an object of the essence of speedy motion.

[10] Because in the case of naming, Socrates utters in the dialogue, “the present generation cares for euphony more than truth.”

[11] A pre-Socratic thinker (ca. 535-475 BC) with a great influence on Plato, advocating the same view as the Buddhist ‘anityavada’.

[12] Plato believes in this statement in the case of material particular objects.

[13] Another supporting argument which can be assumed regarding the whole body of platonic teaching is that: if there is a good name for a particular object, this name should reveal the real nature of the object to us and our knowledge of the object should be a certain and complete knowledge, while according to Plato our knowledge of the particulars never can be certain and complete.