Is Darśana a Pramāna?

Traditionally, pramāna is a sub class of jñāna while Darśana is a counter class of jñāna. Therefore traditionally, the answer to the titled question is negative. But I think it costs to try the stitches of pramāna on the body of Darśana not in order to show how the latter my put on the former, but in order to critique the figure of Darśana. A motive behind this suggestion is that the pramāna – however it is defined – is the major measure of every Indian epistemological school.

Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri has given a long list of the various interpretations on Darśana in his book, Jain Epistemology . The very wide variety by itself indicates a problematically debated issue. Usually, this case appears historically when a school has inherited a tradition which is difficult to reconcile with the further and more systematical developments of the school.

Vādi Devasūra in his logical treatise has a brief mention to Darśana only in order to distinguish that from avagraha : “apprehension of the thing in its aspect of mere existence”. The commentator expresses this stage of sensation with this impression: “something is”.

Jain thinkers don’t avoid identifying Darśana in principle with the Buddhist idea of nirvikalpa perception, a non-judgmental cognition of which according to the Buddhist the object is the pure individual or svalaksana, though the Jaina are not fond of what the Buddhist assign to nirvikalpa as object. According to them, though Darśana may be non-judgmental , its object is the most general aspect of the object which is existence. The difference refers to the metaphysical gap: for the Buddhist existence is ultimately individual while for the Jaina it is general as well as individual. For the Buddhist this nirvikalpa is the most essential pramāna because it causes the other so-called pramānas, while for the Jaina as the essence of pramāna is to be determinative, a non determinative sensation can have no role in production of a pramāna. Therefore, Darśana cannot be pramāna and pramāna -hood should start from avagraha in which there is a “lesser general aspect” . Dr. Shastri shows how this interpretation is not a generally accepted one, but let’s, for the sake of progression of the argument, limit ourselves to this interpretation. Here, aphorism assumes that existence is the most general characteristic of an object. An example can show how much this statement may raise challenges:
Suppose there is a hierarchy of universals which can be predicated to a subject. When a universal is above another universal, for example ‘animal’ which is above ‘man’, to be a man implies to be an animal. It is the basis of the first figure of syllogism. Now if existence is the supreme universal, then to be a man should implies to exist. In other words, if existence is the supreme universal (or the most general characteristic), the statement ‘man exists’ should be an analytic statement; while obviously it’s not. Aristotle clarifies this point that there is no category above his ten categories. Therefore, we cannot say that by Darśana we apprehend the most general aspect of the object which on account of generality needs to be determined. If the statement ‘X exists’ -as we showed- is a synthetic statement, it’s a determination by itself. Therefore it can be a pramāna .

A Jaina may respond that the statement ‘X exists’ cannot be a determination unless the subject X has been already determined. Therefore the concerned statement cannot be determinative if it is the first statement issued on X. It means if Darśana is supposed to be the result of the first touch with the object it cannot be determinative. It means the statement ‘X exists’ is not an appropriate expression for the Stage of Darśana; because if X absolutely is not determined, the statement seems nonsense. Apparently, if a Jaina wants to be precise in the case of Darśana, instead of the concerned statement, should state merely: “Existence!!!” so that the subject X is ruled out of the statement. But if that is the case, we should ask what links the new precise statement to the object. In other words, how we can claim that the Darśana is ‘the Darśana of the concerned object’? If the Jaina said that the Darśana is ‘the Darśana of the object’ because in its production the object has role, the epistemological status is Darśana is denied because this Jaina’s explanation is only an ontological explanation. It means that if the Jaina wants to insist on denying Darśana as a pramāna, Darśana should be understood as ‘frequent remembrance of existence through sensation’. This sense of Darśana, rather than being assigned to any object will be assigned to time. A funny consequent of this consideration is that if two objects are sensed in the same time, they cannot create two Darśana, otherwise we should accept that two simultaneous sensations are not possible. If that is the case and if a pramāna is insisted on to illuminate a new object, Darśana cannot be a pramāna.

Now, leaving aside the preceding argument, let’s concentrate on the expression which is suggested by the commentator of Vādi Devasūra’s treatise: “something is.” Let’s ask what is meant by ‘something’. Some possibilities are there:

1) ‘Something’ means ‘a being’
2) ‘Something’ means ‘a being apart from the other beings’.
3) ‘Something’ means ‘being in general’.
4) ‘Something’ means ‘a possessor of thing-ness’
5) ‘Something’ has no meaning but it has only reference.

The first and the second possibilities are very close to each other so that in both of them (especially in the second one) particularity of the object is considered while Darśana is not supposed to meet particularity of the object. A Jaina may respond that as particularity and generality according to Jain philosophy are not separable, it’s not possible to meet generality without particularity. If we accept this defense, it entails that a Darśana defined by the means of absolute generality is not possible but I thing it’s a conclusion which a Jaina avoids. Furthermore, although generality and particularity according to Jain philosophy are not separable, they are distinguishable. Their inseparability is an ontological issue while in epistemology we concern distinction.

The third possibility is equal to say: “existence exists”. Now, it is reasonable to ask whether this statement is analytic or synthetic. For almost all medieval philosophers the statement definitely was analytic: existing is the meaning of existence while the modern philosophy has started with Descartes taking the statement as a synthetic statement. If the statement is taken as an analytic one, there is no need to have experience in order to establish that and therefore Darśana is in vain and if the statement is synthetic there is no reference to the concerned object in the statement and the case will refer to the argument which we gave previously.

The fourth possibility can be taken separately providing the meaning of ‘thing-ness’ is not supposed to be the same as existence. It is possible; for example a ‘golden mountain’ can be expressed as a thing whether it exists or not. It means that ‘thing-ness’ is not always the same as existence. But I have doubt whether this sense of thing-ness can be applied to non-substantial categories. For example, is it correct to say the color ‘red’ is a thing? Even I have doubt whether the last doubt of mine is created by a merely linguistic habitual confusion or not. If thing-ness refers only to the substance and if Darśana is going to be interpreted in this way, the object of Darśana can be only the substance. Again I guest this conclusion is not pleasant to the Jaina. Let’s ignore these doubts and suppose that ‘thing-ness’ is applicable to all categories. Therefore, Darśana should be expressed by this phrase: “a possessor of ‘thing-ness’ exists.” Here, two generalities are assigned to the object: ‘thing-ness’ and ‘existence’. Here we don’t deal with a simple generality but with some extents of details. Furthermore, if ‘thing-ness’ is not essentially the same as existence, the statement will be synthetic. The problem is that: any synthetic statement presupposes the existence of its subject. For example a man is a rational animal whether any man exists or not, because it’s an analytic statement but a man has heart only if a man exists, because it’s a synthetic statement. It means, the fourth possibility cannot be a good possibility because it deserves the statement to state what must have been previously supposed stating the statement.

I would like to postpone going through the fifth possibility until I explain my own suggestion.

Any way, I think all these difficulties have appeared because Jain philosophy tries to introduce some thing with all functions of a pramāna not as a pramāna. I say ‘with all functions of a pramāna’ because Darśana is expected by the Jaina to reveal some true information about a certain newly perceived object in the form of ‘subject-predicate’ while they avoid granting the title of pramāna to Darśana.

My suggestion is that, though Darśana cannot be directly a pramāna with respect to the object but it is a pramāna with respect to ‘sensual stimulation’ or if the Jaina prefers more, ‘jīva’s operation’. The object of Darśana, in fact, can be only ‘stimulation’ and its content is as existential as the content of the other pramānas. Additionally, it means, there is no Darśana for a Darśana otherwise it deserves an infinite regress. On the other hand, Darśana is a pramāna which never can be confused with an apramāna. This fact that the object exists, is the matter of a further, though immediate, inference of which the ‘hetu’ is maintained by Darśana. Because here, hetu (stimulation of sensation) cannot be explained unless it is assumed to be ‘object oriented’. Therefore, Darśana doesn’t determine the so-called object (the stimulating object) and doesn’t give a meaning to that object. It only gives a reference to the object which will be determined through inference.