Platonism is a disease which has no cure. This disease in its advanced stages compels the patient to interpret whatever statement, in the framework and context which have been designed by Neo-Platonism. An illuminative case-study for this disease is Al-Biruni’s translation of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali which can be considered the oldest surviving translation of that text in a non-Indian language .
Al-Biruni who was an Iranian Muslim scholar born in 973 CE, destined for a wide range of intellectual activities, spent a few years of his late fifties in north India learning Sanskrit, Indian religions, astrology, calendaring, mathematics and philosophy. Among the books which Al-Biruni wrote on what he had learnt in that journey, only two have remained: first, a long thesis named as “Investigation into What India Has” published in 1958 in Hyderabad; and second, his Arabic translation of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali of which -though having been written prior to and quoted in the former- no manuscript was known till 1930 in which the German orientalist, J. W. Hauer introduced its unique manuscript which is preserved in Koprolo Library in Istanbul . This translation also includes some parts of Vyasa’s commentary .
It’s very important to describe the method, the style and the other general features of this translation, but not philosophically. The main philosophical importance of this translation refers to the basic misunderstandings of the translator which the Arabic text reflects. The aim of the present paper is to show how those misunderstandings have been created by the Neo-Platonic background of Al-Biruni. Additionally and more importantly they give us a clue to imagine how Neo-Platonism could adapt a system of Yoga for itself. While historically such an adaptation in some extends appeared in some religious versions of Neo-Platonism like Augustine’s foundation for Christianity or Sufism, the next step will be to compare what these historical attempts give us with purely Neo-Platonic Yoga which hypothetically might be arrived at by the original Platonists.
However, Al-Biruni, not as an exception to the majority of the other Muslim thinkers, was a Neo-Platonist, or in better words, he was unconsciously Neo-Platonist because Plato and the Neo-Platonists were not so known by Muslim philosophers. Instead, it was Aristotle whose name used to echo in the atmosphere of the Islamic Philosophy. Among the Muslim thinkers the most popular Aristotelian text was not his Metaphysics, Physics or Ethics, but a pseudo-Aristotelian text titled as Aristotle’s Theology which in fact, was a translated selection of The Enneads of Plotinus (Πλωτινος), a Hellenistic philosopher of the third century who is known as the founder of Neo-Platonism. Plotinus found real Aristotle as a maintainer for a good terminological set which could serve to systematize Plato’s Timaeus. Thus, we can say that the Muslim philosophers were unconsciously dominated by Neo-Platonism in the name of Aristotle.
Neo-Platonic System
Now, if we want to understand how this Neo-Platonic domination led Al-Biruni to misunderstand Indian Yoga, it’s necessary to have a glance at the Neo-Platonic system.
According to Plotinus, the origin of the world -though not its cause in any Aristotelian sense- is an indivisible absolute existence which is called just as “The One” (το έν). This One, on one hand reflects the concept of Vedantic Brahman and on the other hand shows an inaccessible prototype of the Platonic “Supreme Form”. Since the existence is the same as consciousness which appears actually and ultimately through the phenomenon of contemplation, the One is a contemplative principle but due to its absoluteness, it doesn’t contemplate on any thing apart from itself: the ideal of Samādhi.
Contemplation in itself is productive. It’s not creative but emanative. In this sense, the contemplation of the One produces a Divine Mind, namely “the Intellect” (νους) which is a reduction of the absolute contemplation. As this product is not as perfect as the One, it has to undergo the dichotomy between object and subject which leads to assume the object to have several aspects. So, the Intellect has two objects to consider: itself as a reduction of the One and itself as itself apart from the One.
Since the real nature of the Intellect is a reduction of the One, the former consideration shows its real nature through a sight which the Intellect has on the One. This sight consists of the whole content of the Intellect because the Intellect is noting but a reflection of the One in the One; but as the intellect is not perfect, it cannot consider the One as whole. Instead, it’s consideration on the One, contains the assumed aspects of the One as a hierarchy of ideas which is the same as the famous Platonic hierarchy of Forms. In other words, the Platonic forms are nothing but the content of the “Divine Mind”.
The latter consideration of the Intellect, in its turn, emanates a further principle which is a reduction of the Intellect, namely “the Soul” (ψυχη). This Soul is not even as contemplative as its generator. That’s why it should undo this defect through activity. Looking at the Divine Mind and its content, the Soul aims to restore the oneness of the One which has been lost through emanation. Therefore, the Soul engages with the formless primary Matter (ύλη) in order to imitate the hierarchy of ideas of the Divine Mind in the matter to make it apparently unique. Wherever that one-pointed hierarchy even partially is imitated in matter, there is life. Here, Plotinus satisfies the Aristotelian concept of life.
Thus, the Soul is identical with the platonic “Demiurge” and through its engagement with the absolutely passive matter, comes to plurality and therefore to emanate several individual souls. But even through this plurality the Soul cannot cover the whole Divine Mind in its imitation; therefore, the Soul is obliged to imitate the parts of the Divine Mind, one after another and consequently the element of time comes to the system. That’s why the material Nature (φυση) is continuously changing. Through this engagement, indeterminacy of the matter brings forgetfulness in the individual soul which should be removed by the Platonic recollection. Therefore, every soul has two aspects: a higher fully aware aspect which is in union with the cosmic Soul and a lower semi-aware aspect which has been spread over the matter creating and governing life. In this life, the individual soul tries to see a picture of its real nature intending self-realization. It’s purusārtha.
Now, let’s turn back to Al-Biruni and his misunderstanding. I prefer to explain the main points within five titles:
1. Yoga and Cittavrtti
In a phrase of the translation which stands for exposing the second sutra of the first pāda: “yogah cittavrtti nirodhah”, Al-Biruni says: “That’s to seize whatever spreads from you towards the external objects in case they are not engaged merely with you and to prevent the faculties of soul from attaching whatever apart from you.”
This understanding of cittavrtti is rather ontological than epistemological or psychological. This understanding is very harmonious with the Neo-Platonic concept of soul which spreads itself over the matter in order to create an imitation of the forms. The formal sub-arrangements of the soul according to Aristotle are the faculties of the soul. These faculties flowing towards the object and touching the object and assuming its form bring their potentiality to actuality. Therefore, the soul which is supposed to govern the object will be subordinated by the form of the object. It’s a feature of Neo-Platonic bondage which should be ceased in Yoga as well as any Neo-Platonic spiritual project.
2. Three Gunas
While according to the school of Sāmkhya-Yoga, the main feature of the material world is to be constituted by three gunas which represent the controversial manifestations of the matter, for a Platonist the main feature of the material world is to be ever changing. Al-Biruni’s understanding of the three gunas is more Platonic explaining the flux of the world. He says: “They are originative on one extreme of the Nature and terminative on the other extreme… and the mean between them takes from them whatever is apt for governing and controlling.” However, Al-Biruni’s interpretation of the three guņas reminds us rather of the three marks of reality in Jainism: “utpāda”, “vyaya” and “dhrauvya”.
3. Knowledge and Samādhi
In Al-Biruni’s translation, there is nothing as surprising as his interpretation of Samādhi. That’s on one hand too odd and on the other hand basically Platonic, so that nothing else might be so nicely passed as a sacrifice to Plato.
Vyasa explains two famous sutras of Patanjali as if the aphorist has classified Samadhi under two classes: “Samprajnāta” and “Asamprajnāta”. The former is accompanied by four features: “vitarka” which Vyasa interprets as direct perception of a gross object, “vicāra” which is interpreted as direct perception of a subtle object, “ānanda” which means joy but has been taken by Vyasa as awareness of the very process of cognition, and “asmita” which is ego-awareness. But Asamprajnāta Samādhi is a state void of those features in which only the Samskāras remain.
If Vyasa presented the objects of Samprajnāta Samādhi to Plato, as in Sāmkhya all of them are material, Plato would consider Samprajnāta Samādhi nothing than “opinion” or “doxa” (δοξα); because according to him, our cognition of the material objects is only an uncertain belief. But if Asamprajnāta Samādhi is supposed to be a higher knowledge, according to Plato, it must be identified with “episteme” (επιστημη) which is our knowledge of the rational and universal forms.
At this point, Al-Biruni, undertaking to advocate Plato, gives the following interpretation: “How many are the kinds of conception? … They are of two kinds: one of them is conception of the sensible and material objects and the second is conception of the rational and immaterial objects.”
First of all, Al-Biruni should be questioned how to translate Samādhi as conception. In order to answer to this question, it’s remarkable that as Patanjali has introduced the triad of “Kriyāyoga”, Plotinus suggests a triad as the means of spiritual development, namely “virtue”, “dialectic” and “contemplation”. This contemplation must be identified by Al-Biruni with Samādhi. The Greek word which Plotinus used for contemplation is “theoria” (θεωρια) deriving from the verb “theoro” (θεωρω) which means “I consider formally”; while, here the Arabic word used by Al-Biruni standing for Samādhi, is “taşavvur” (ﺘﺼﻮﱡﺮ) which means “to conceive of a form” deriving from word “şūrat” (ﺼﻮﺮﺓ) which means “form”. Now we can understand how Plotinus has granted permission to Al-Biruni for translating Samādhi as conception.
Furthermore, if Asamprajnāta Samādhi is supposed to be the same as the Platonic episteme and if Samskāras are the only mental content of this state, Samskāras must be understood by Al-Biruni as the recollected universal forms which should occur to a Platonically enlightened soul. But we cannot blame him for this misunderstanding because the excuse for such a thing has been offered by the ninth sutra of the fourth pāda in which Patanjali says: “… smrtti samskārayoh ekarūpatvāt” (recollection and Samskāras are of the same nature).
Now let’s see what’s the role of this epistemological dichotomy in the theory of bondage and liberation?
Patanjali in harmony with Sāmkhya declares that pain finally and helplessly is experienced in the world and the cause of this pain is a conjunction (samyoga) between the Self as the knower and the object of cognition. The latter modifies itself merely in order to be presented to the self because it wants to realize the natures of both parties through this conjunction. It’s an erroneous view because the self is already conscious even without any object. That’s why we can say that the cause of the conjunction is error.
A Neo-Platonist basically cannot agree with this view; at least, because according to Sāmkhya the matter takes modifications because it’s the principle of activity while for a Neo-Platonist, matter is absolutely passive. Additionally a Neo-Platonist like Al-Biruni is expected to interpret this theory only involving some Platonic concepts like uncertainty of sensual cognition of which the object is the unstable material particulars and certainty of rational knowledge of which the object is immaterial universals. That’s why Al-Biruni explains the point as it follows:
“When an aspect of the object of knowledge is unknown, the greed for cognition increases until that aspect becomes known and the greed gets extinguished; because in the state of bondage, the knower without an object of knowledge is a potential knower and will not be actualized unless by means of an object. For this purpose the object will be known and the engagement between the knower and the object is deserved; because the cognition is acquired through sensation. But sensation is not true due to the faults which occur in it. Whatever is not true is not known certainly and whatever lacks certainty, is misrepresented by a further ignorance. In this state the knowledge is like opinion, because the sensible object is not as stable as a rational object. When this point becomes confirmed without any doubt, that engagement will perish and the knower will get rid of the object, getting isolated and detached. It’s the meaning of liberation in which the knower is knower by its essence.”
The difference seems very narrow but we can see how he has avoided the point of disagreement and how he has inserts the Platonic notions.
4. Samāpatti
Coming to the concept of Samāpatti, Patanjali explains some initial stages of traveling from Samprajnāta Samādhi to Asamprajnāta Samādhi: the presentation of a gross object in a clear mind is a mixture of names, concepts and the very object. By purification of memory (smrti pariśuddha) the two former will be omitted and the object, as it is, will be presented. This process should be applied to the subtler objects so that finally it presents the “alinga” or “Prakrti”, the primary matter which is the source of the whole evolution.
Purification of memory, again, reminds Al-Biruni of a familiar Platonic theme: recollection. If there is a journey from Samprajnāta Samādhi to Asamprajnāta Samādhi, as we saw previously, it must be understood by Al-Biruni as a journey of soul from the material word to the realm of universals. But this interpretation basically seems problematic because Patanjali apparently describes a journey from form to matter.
Al-Biruni has rearranged his understanding in four stages which picture a Neo-Platonic spiritual progress. At the first stage the soul in its lower level, is committing its opinions of the material particular objects. This opinion is a mixture of names, conceptual attributes and the accidental differentiae. Of course this triad cannot be exactly the same as Patanjali’s because the very material object which is the third component of Patanjali’s never could be accepted by Plato to be presented in mind, otherwise it would be the very episteme. Instead of that, Al-Biruni borrows the concept of “accidental differentiae” from the greatest disciple of Plotinus, Porphyry (Πορφυριος), whose “introduction” used to be widely studied by Muslim Scholars as a part of Aristotle’s “Organon”. This stage must be identified with “savitarkā samāpatti” .
In the second stage, through recollection, the soul arrives at its higher level on which it looks at the universals by one side and the particulars only as the shadows of the universals by the other side. Al-Biruni explains that: “When it leaves those three towards the essence through which the particulars participate in the universals, the second level is attained.” Now the soul can assign each particular to its respective universals which form its essence. Due to this assignment, “the cognition is not empty of plurality” because under each universal, several particulars are recognized. Al-Biruni must have identified this stage with “nirvitarkā samāpatti” .
In the third stage, when the soul turns its back to the material world and looks at every form in its unity, as Al-Biruni claims, “it comprehends all objects as ‘One’ but manifested diversely due to time.” As we saw previously, the Soul, even on its highest level, has no capacity to cover the whole content of the Divine Mind at the same moment. Therefore, it approaches the subsets of the universals one after another. That’s just like Husserlian bracketing which forms essence. This stage must be identified with “nirvicārā samāpatti” .
In the fourth stage, only when the Soul gets union with the Intellect, it can have “the One” entirely and simultaneously in sight though as a hierarchy of the forms of which the peak is the platonic idea of the One, as Al-Biruni says: “When the existence seems timeless to him, such a person has arrived at the end of the noble fourth level and is capable of being called a ‘şeddiq’ (ﺻﺪﱢﻴﻖ).” This Arabic word deriving from the word “şedq” (ﺻﺪﻖ) which means honesty is standing for “rtambharā” . But this replacement should not be considered so simply because it’s a technical term in all Platonic traditions in the Middle East indicating a person who has arrived at the final spiritual stage and has a direct and infallible access to the ultimate reality. Here, the One which is the object of this state of knowledge must have been identified with “alinga” but this consideration is again problematic because “the One” is very close to Brahman and not by any means the same as “Prakrti” which is meant by “alinga”.
The other difficulty is that Patanjali in sutra 49 of the first pāda, assures us that the object of this stage is particular (viśesa) while the universals are the objects of the platonic episteme. Now, how has Al-Biruni justified his interpretation? Unfortunately this part of the manuscript is so badly damaged that we can get no idea ; though, it’s not so difficult to assume what the justification might be: first we should be aware that a form is a universal only as long as it is considered as some thing which is participated in by several individuals, otherwise a form is a particular idea among the other ideas. It’s the same charge which is cast by Aristotle upon the platonic theory of forms. Further, we should be aware that the Neo-Platonic One as the object of this state of knowledge in no way is a universal but a unique entity which in this term is the most particular existence. Thus, justification is over.
Regarding this stage, Al-Biruni says: “He will be like a crystal in which its entire environment is seen; as if the objects are in that but that is out of them. Likewise, he encompasses his environment so that the knowledge and the object of knowledge are united with him while he is the knower and the reasoning, the subject of reasoning and the object of reasoning will be one.” Surely, it’s a translation of sutra 41 of the same pāda. But Patanjali in this sutra doesn’t mention the union of subject, object and knowledge; instead, he only suggests these three alternatively as the objects of samāpatti. Again it’s a Neo-Platonic tendency leading Al-Biruni to such a misinterpretation: in the fourth stage the Soul as the knower is one with the Intellect which is at the same time the principle of intellection as well as the objects are the universals which are its content. The same theme is repeated by Al-Biruni translating the third sutra of the third pāda on definition of Samādhi: “that’s purification of those acts so that the consideration comes in union with the object of consideration.”
In order to show how Al-Biruni –at least in his three first stages- is influenced by Platonism, it is enough to quote a passage from Plato’s Seventh Letter: “For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, second the definition, the third, the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance, and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just uttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made up names and verbal forms. For that which has the name "round," "annular," or, "circle," might be defined as that which has the distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. Third, comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe and broken up-none of which things can happen to the circle itself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for it is something of a different order from them. Fourth, comes knowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in words nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear that it is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from the three things mentioned before. Of these things intelligence comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others are farther distant.” Here, Plato speaks of name, definition, image, knowledge (episteme) and “the thing itself imparted”; while Al-Biruni has mentioned name, conceptual attributes accidental differentiae (all in the first stage), knowledge of universals (in the second stage) and the reality of the object as one (in the third stage). I think the only note which I have to give in order to establish a full correspondence is about the third components of theirs. Platonic “image” stands for Al-Biruni’s “accidental differentiae” because as Plato has explained further, any image of the object reflects some accidental attributes so that it can differentiate itself from the other images of the same objects: “Every circle, of those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe, is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere it has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, has nothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite.”
5. Sattva, Purusa and Discriminative Knowledge
Discriminative knowledge (vivekakhyāti) is the key to liberation. By the means of this knowledge one should discriminate between Purusa and Buddhi which some times in the Yoga literature is mentioned as Sattva . In the sixth sutra of the second pāda, they are interpreted respectively as “Drk” or the power of consciousness and “Darśana” or the power of perception. Al-Biruni, translating the same sutra, interprets them as “the immaterial reason” and the “embodied reason” . These are again two standard terms in Neo-Platonism which indicate the Soul respectively in its cosmic level and individual level. Therefore he must have identified Purusa with the Soul or Psyche regarding its association with the Intellect and Buddhi with the same Soul regarding its association with matter. But in the other places, for example translating sutra 35 of the third pāda, he expresses them as Self and Heart ; although, in the traditional Indian spiritual anatomy, usually “manas” is located in the heart and not Buddhi. Probably, Al-Biruni has found his permission for such a rendering in the preceding sutra in which contemplation on heart is said to lead to awareness of consciousness (hrdaye cittasamvit) . The Arabic word which he has used here for the soul is “nafs” (ﻨﻔﺲ) which means “self” and is a standard term which is used by Arab Neo-Platonists for Psyche (the Soul) while word Psyche in Greek language, some times means “heart.” According to Muslim Philosophers, heart is the point at which the soul touches the body and gets embodied.
What’s the basic difference between heart and soul (Buddhi and Purusa)? Al-Biruni’s answer, though satisfying the Greeks, in no extend can be in harmony with Sāmkhya-Yoga: “One may think the heart is identical with the soul … but in fact, the soul is knower and the heart is living. This fact is not veiled for him if he has made the heart empty of the world. Then he will know his real essence.” The motive behind this interpretation can be understood only when we remember the relationship between soul and life in the Neo-Platonic view as we explained at the beginning of the present paper.
The same notice should be applied to Al-Biruni’s understanding of the last sutra of the third pāda in which Patanjali claims that when Buddhi and Purusa are equal in purity, there is liberation . Al-Biruni says: “as long as the heart is not purified as the soul is pure so that they are one in attributes, there is no liberation.” In a Neo-Platonic reading, it means liberation is on hand only if the individual soul is in union with the cosmic Soul. It reminds us of the last words of Plotinus: “Strive to give back the Divine in yourselves to the Divine in the All.” This purification of heart is the same thing which Al-Biruni understands of Samādhi.
***
Now, I dare to proclaim that whatever Al-Biruni has done is not a contribution to Yoga but a great contribution to Neo-Platonism. Whether this contribution was conscious or unconscious, whether he deliberately avoided violating Neo-Platonism or he could not simply be free from his philosophical tendencies, I cannot pass any comment. However, he gave me a framework to adapt a yoga system for Neo-Platonism. Regarding the historical role of Neo-Platonism in the Middle East, a place from which I have come, this contribution is too important for me although I am aware that a man in the modern world, just like Aristotle in the classic world, can state that Neo-Platonism is a cure for which there is no disease any longer.
Notes
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